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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1941, broadcast television1 has
exerted an unparalleled influence in the shaping of American
culture, identity and values. At its best, television is an
equalizer and educator. It serves as a point of common focus; a
bridge between people of different races, religions, cultures,
and socioeconomic classes. Television has brought us together
to experience momentous historical events as one nation. Some
of those televised experiences, like the 1969 Apollo moon
landing, were engrossing moments of national pride whose
black-and-white images are etched in the American psyche.
Other shared broadcast experiences, such as the events of
September 11, 2001, were powerful for very different reasons,
but television still helped us to survive them as a united people.
At its worst, television is what former Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Newton Minow
famously described as “a vast wasteland,”2 littered with
exploitative programming that does more to pollute than enrich
our democracy and culture. Television has, at times, broadened
the perspectives of some of the most isolated of viewers by
serving as a “window on the world” by presenting different
ideas, and showing new traditions.3 But television has at other
times transmitted a distorted reflection of our nation and its
communities and cultures, inhibiting the democratic system of
self-government it was intended to promote.4
Congress was aware of the potential power and influence of
broadcasting when it reserved for broadcast licensees a
uniquely privileged status among federally regulated
1. My focus in this article is on free, over-the-air commercial television,
as distinguished from cable, satellite and other fee-based subscription
television services and non-commercial, educational (“public”) broadcast
television, which are subjected to different federal regulations. For an
examination of the different television services, see generally HOWARD J.
BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BUSINESS OF TELEVISION (2d
ed. 1998).
2. Newton N. Minow, Address to the National Association of
Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), reprinted in NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L.
LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, app. 2 at 188 (1995).
3. See JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
TELEVISION 192-94, 263-70 (1978) (positing that by presenting selective and
biased perspectives, television “dims the mind” and provides viewers with an
artificial view of the world.).
4. See id.
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communications industries.
Broadcasters are considered
“public trustees.”5 In exchange for the exclusive right to
broadcast over a “channel” of publicly owned radio frequency
spectrum in a community of license (typically a major
metropolitan area), broadcasters enter into social contract of
sorts with the American people, which creates an attendant
obligation to broadcast in furtherance of the “public interest,
convenience and necessity.”6
Congress implemented this “public trustee doctrine,” which
is alternately referred to as the “public interest standard,” in
the recognition that broadcasting held the promise of fostering
a more deliberative democracy by cultivating, through locally
produced and directed programming, a politically informed and
engaged citizenry.7 In exchange for the quid of a television
license capable of generating great power and profit,
broadcasters as public trustees are expected to deliver the quo
of locally oriented “public interest” programming that informs
and enriches viewers.
Although the FCC has vacillated over time on the
definition of “public interest” programming, and whether it
encompasses a defined set of mandatory minimums for the
broadcasting of such programs, it has consistently deemed
locally oriented political campaign coverage, local public affairs
programs, educational and cultural programming, and
programs targeted at children and other special communities,
as public interest programming consistent with the
programmer’s role as public trustee.8 The Supreme Court
5. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (noting that “very early the licensee’s role developed in
terms of a ‘public trustee’ charged with the duty of fairly and impartially
informing the public audience”); see also STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 118 (3d ed. 2001); 3 HARVEY L.
ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 115-226 (3d ed. 1999).
6. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, §§
301, 302a, 303, 309, 318 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000))
(requiring that licensing and Commission enforcement decisions be made in
furtherance of “public interest, convenience and necessity”).
7. See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 21 (Dec. 18, 1998) (noting that broadcast
regulation “sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic
dialogue,
[and]
diversity
of
expression”),
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2004).
8. Congress has consistently characterized the local origination and
targeting of programming as “[a] primary objective and benefit of our Nation’s
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repeatedly has upheld the public trustee doctrine against First
Amendment challenges on the grounds that the broadcast
spectrum is a scarce, publicly owned resource. In 1969’s Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,9 the Court characterized this
“scarcity rationale” as founded in the notion that “there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate.”10 Because of spectrum
scarcity, “the Government is permitted to put restraints on
licensees” in order to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”11 Although
broadcasters, scholars and dissenting judges have subjected the
Red Lion scarcity rationale to withering criticism, Congress
and the courts continue to regard it as valid.
Despite its lofty aspirations, the public trustee doctrine has
been a failure since its inception.
Broadcasters have
successfully opposed nearly all efforts by Congress and the FCC
to define, quantify and enforce the public interest standard.
Over the last twenty-five years, the FCC has repealed almost
all of its substantive public interest regulations, relying instead
on marketplace forces in the individual television markets to
guide broadcasters’ decisions concerning the nature and
content of all of their programming. The few remaining vague
public interest rules, such as requiring that broadcasters air
“programming that responds to the issues of concern to the
community,”12 are virtually ignored by broadcasters and
unenforced by the FCC. In fact, the FCC has not penalized a
television licensee for failure to satisfy its public interest
system of regulation of television broadcasting.”
See Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992) (requiring cable systems to carry the signals of local
television stations on their basic tier of service).
9. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
10. Id. at 388.
11. Id. at 390. The Court reasoned that “it is the right of . . . listeners, not
the right of broadcasters, which is paramount.” Id.; see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981), quoting Office of Communication of United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“A licensed broadcaster
is ‘granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable
public obligations.”).
12. See Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies,
Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial
Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984) (Report and Order)
[hereinafter TV Deregulation Report and Order], recon. denied, 104 F.C.C.2d
358 (1986), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom., Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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obligations in over twenty-five years.
The typical commercial television broadcaster today airs
very little locally oriented public affairs programming, coverage
of local and regional political campaigns, children’s educational
and informational programs, or other public interest
programming. For example, a 2003 study of forty-five local
television stations in seven media markets found that less than
one-half of one percent of the average station’s programming
schedule is devoted to public affairs programming.13 Another
study found that in the seven weeks preceding the November
2002 midterm elections, more than half of the evening news
broadcasts aired in the top fifty media markets did not include
Viewers of those
any coverage of political campaigns.14
television stations were more apt to receive their political
information from slanted campaign advertising than from what
More recently,
is ostensibly “objective” news coverage.15
viewers without access to subscription cable, satellite television
networks, and broadband Internet service received little
coverage of the Democratic and Republican presidential
nominating conventions, with the three major commercial
television networks airing only three hours total of live
coverage for each of the conventions.16 In addition, although
the public trustee doctrine incorporates the duty to “serve[] the

13. ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, BUT YOU
WOULDN’T KNOW IT BY WATCHING LOCAL TV (2003) [hereinafter ALL POLITICS
IS
LOCAL],
available
at
http://www.ourairwaves.org/reports/
display.php?ReportID=12 (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). The study found that
the surveyed stations aired three times as many reruns of the situation
comedy “Seinfeld” than local public affairs programs. Id.
14. MARTIN KAPLAN, ET AL., LOCAL TV NEWS COVERAGE OF THE 2002
GENERAL ELECTION
1,
available
at
http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/
LCLNAReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
15. Id. (noting that despite the absence of political campaign coverage,
eighty percent of those local broadcasts aired at least one paid political
advertisement and more than half aired three or more ads). Another study by
the Alliance for Better Campaigns concluded that despite broadcasters’
unwillingness to cover political campaigns, they view political candidates as
lucrative advertising clients. It suggested that in the two months preceding
the November 2002 elections, broadcasters raised their advertising rates for
candidates by 53 percent.
See ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS,
PROFITEERING ON DEMOCRACY: HOW THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY GOUGED
CANDIDATES
IN
CAMPAIGN
’02
(2003),
available
at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=11 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004).
16. See Joanne Ostrow, Party Confabs Falling to Cable, DENVER POST,
July 22, 2004, at F-03.
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educational and informational needs of children,”17 some
television licensees have considered such animated comedy
programs as “The Jetsons” and “The Flintstones” and game
shows, such as “Wheel of Fortune,” as satisfying that duty.18
As public interest programming has become scarce on
broadcast television, advertising of all sorts has skyrocketed,
with prime time advertising on major network affiliates up
thirty-six percent between 1993 and 2003.19
Although television broadcasters typically attack the
constitutionality of the public trustee doctrine when the
government tries to enforce it, they are quick to don the mantel
of public trustees when it is politically expedient. For example,
when then-Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and Senator John
McCain (R-Ariz.) demanded in 1996 that television
broadcasters pay fair market value for new digital television
(DTV) channels by means of competitive bidding (i.e., auctions),
broadcasters launched a massive lobbying campaign claiming
that their status as public trustees exempted them from paying
for spectrum, unlike many other FCC digital licensees who
have paid in excess of $20 billion in spectrum fees since 1994.20
The broadcasters prevailed in what was called the “lobbying
coup of the decade,”21 winning additional digital channels
estimated to be worth $70 billion, at no cost to them. 22 Soon
17. Children’s Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2000).
18. See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming,
Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 11
F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,661-62 (1996) [hereinafter Children’s Television Order];
Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming Revision, 8
F.C.C.R. 1841, 1842 (1993) (Notice of Inquiry).
19. Steve McClellan, Ad Clutter Keeps Climbing, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 13 (noting that 17 minutes out of each hour of prime
time network broadcasting is now devoted to advertising), available at
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/BroadcastingCable/2003/12/22/340933 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2004).
20. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 103d
Cong., 304-15 (1994) (statement of Edward Fritts, President & CEO of the
National Association of Broadcasters); see also Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid
Pro Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 686, 692-95
(1997) (detailing the many benefits broadcasters have wrested from Congress
and the FCC based on their claims of public trustees); Henry Geller, Public
Interest Obligations of Broadcasters in the Digital Era: Law and Policy, in
DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 39 n.9 (1998), available
at http:// www.ciaonet.org/conf/asp06/asp06c.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
21. Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at
20.
22. Id.; see Paul Farhi, Broadcast Executives Say Dole Vented Anger at
Them, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at F1. The new digital channels have
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after their legislative victory, broadcasters reverted to
attacking the constitutional foundations of the same public
trustee doctrine they used to justify their demand for free
digital spectrum. In 1999, the FCC initiated a proceeding to
determine whether it should impose more substantial public
interest requirements upon television broadcasters that were
by then beginning to exploit the benefits of the new digital
spectrum, including the “multicasting” of various pay-per-view
and subscription subchannels as well as “datacasting”
services.23 Broadcasters quickly attacked the constitutionality
of any new public interest requirements. For example, CBS,
like almost all of its fellow broadcast licensees, argued that the
Red Lion scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation is no longer
valid “in light of the explosion in the number and type of media
outlets.”24 CBS went so far as to dispute the government’s
claim that broadcast airwaves are a publicly owned resource.25
The FCC’s proceeding on new public interest duties is still
open, with no new specific public interest requirements on the
horizon.26
In light of the apparent shortcomings in broadcast
regulation, it is necessary to examine how and why United
States television broadcast regulation has reached its current
state of dysfunction and incoherence. This article analyzes the
causes of the public trustee doctrine’s failure and identifies
what can be done to redeem it so that the American people are
no longer shortchanged and disserved by the television
licensees entrusted to serve their interests.
been characterized as “priceless” to broadcasters because of their profit
making potential. Louis Jacobson & Bara Vaida, Broadcast Blues, 35 NAT’L J.
2560, 2561 (2003).
23. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R.
21,633, 21,633 ¶ 3 (1999) (Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter FCC 1999 Digital
Public Interest Programming Proceeding].
24. Comments of CBS Corp., Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at v (filed Mar. 27, 2000).
25. Id. CBS contends that “electromagnetic spectrum is not a thing which
can be owned . . . [but] exists only by virtue of electromagnetic radiation,
which is produced by a radio transmitter sending energy through space, and
can only be utilized through broadcasters’ investment of capital and
initiative.” Id.
26. See Second Periodic Review of the Commission’s Rules and Policies
Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Report and Order, MB Docket
No. 03-15, FCC 04-192 (August 4, 2004) (Statement of Commissioner Michael
J. Copps) (urging resolution of the still-pending 1999 proceeding with the
promulgation of heightened public interest requirements for television
broadcasters).
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Section I of this article traces the origins and history of the
public trustee doctrine, starting with its conception following
the dawn of radio and its codification in the 1927 Radio Act and
the 1934 Communications Act, continuing through the FCC’s
many failed attempts at interpreting and enforcing public
interest requirements, and concluding with the contemporary
era of deregulation and the contentious transition to digital
television.
Section II examines why the public trustee doctrine has
failed.
It identifies and studies the three irreconcilable
contradictions upon which the public trustee doctrine was
precariously premised, and which doomed it from its inception:
the First Amendment tensions inherent in the public trustee
doctrine that have rendered it unworkable, the myth of
broadcasters as politically agnostic entities at journalistic arms’
length from government, and the economic and marketplace
demands that make broadcasting in the “public interest” a
commercial impossibility. This section concludes with an
analysis of how the increasing consolidation of media
ownership has further eroded the public trustee doctrine.
Section III examines a number of existing proposals for
reforming television regulation, and presents a new proposal to
require television broadcasters to subsidize access to broadband
Internet connections in low-income and underserved
communities.
The Internet has created the “uninhibited
marketplace of ideas” that television and the broadcast public
trustee doctrine failed to create. Yet, as more middle-class and
upper-class Americans rely on the Internet for political and
electoral information and activism, news, employment,
education, community organization, and basic communication,
lower income Americans and all Americans in underserved
parts of the country continue to encounter barriers blocking
their access to America’s “electronic town square.” This section
concludes with a discussion of how a television-to-Internet
cross-subsidy would be consistent with Congress’s and the
FCC’s existing programs dedicated to promoting universal
access to telecommunications and access to the Internet by the
poor and marginalized. I also explain how this proposal may
avoid a number of the political, economic and constitutional
obstacles that have blocked or stalled previous attempts at
reforming the public trustee doctrine.
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I. THE MYTHOLOGY OF TELEVISION BROADCASTERS
AS PUBLIC TRUSTEES
A. THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION
The first attempt by the United States to regulate radio
broadcasting was President Theodore Roosevelt’s formation on
July 12, 1904, of an interdepartmental board including
representatives from the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, Navy, and War, which was charged with
developing a radio regulation policy for the United States.27
The Interdepartmental Board recommended charging the Navy
with
regulating
ship-to-shore
radio
communications,
authorizing the Army to erect radio stations that would not
interfere with maritime communications, and asking Congress
to pass legislation preventing monopoly control of radio
communications.28 On January 23, 1908, the world witnessed
the lifesaving utility of broadcasting when the ocean liner
Republic summoned nearby vessels after having collided with
the Italian ship Florida.29 The new technology of radio was
credited with averting what surely would have been a
catastrophic loss of life.30
In 1912, Congress returned to radio regulation, enacting
the 1912 Radio Act as part of its obligations under the
international treaty the United States signed at the Third
Virtually
International Wireless Conference in London.31
27. MARVIN BENSMAN,
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4

THE BEGINNING OF BROADCAST REGULATION IN
(2000) (citing Radio Service Bulletin No. 117, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation, at 26 (December 31, 1926)).
28. See id. at 4-5 (citing LINWOOD S. HOWETH, HISTORY OF
COMMUNICATIONS — ELECTRONICS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY 76-77
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963)).
29. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 6.
30. Id. Shortly after the disaster, President Roosevelt urged Congress to
pass legislation requiring the outfitting of all oceangoing vessels with radios.
Id. Congress heeded his call and passed the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, placing
jurisdiction over radio regulation in the Departments of Commerce and Labor.
Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629-30 (1910) (forbidding any steamship carrying
or licensed to carry fifty or more individuals to leave any seaport in the United
States unless equipped with radio equipment and a crewmember trained to
use it).
31. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912). The 1912 Radio Act
empowered the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor to grant radio station
licenses upon request, allocated certain frequencies for government use,
adopted standardized distress signals, and imposed certain technical
requirements. Id. Congress articulated two principal purposes in enacting the
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anyone who requested a broadcast license received one as
broadcast spectrum was bountiful at the time the 1912 Act was
passed.32 Interference problems seldom surfaced because the
number of radio stations in existence was much smaller than
the number of available broadcast “channels” in the major
metropolitan areas, and radio was still viewed principally as a
navigation aid and novelty.
World War I catalyzed the development of the broadcasting
industry. The American and European militaries experimented
with the use of low-powered radio equipment for battlefield
communications and for communicating between ground
stations and war ships, submarines, and airplanes.33 By 1918,
the United States Navy had integrated radio communications
into its tactical arsenal.34 President Wilson’s Secretary of the
Navy,
Josephus
Daniels,
forcefully
advocated
the
nationalization of the radio industry as a national defense
system, and lobbied unsuccessfully for Navy Department
control of all broadcasting.35 Still, by 1920, there were only 272
land radio stations licensed in the United States.36
On November 2, 1920, Westinghouse’s pioneering radio
broadcast station KDKA in Pittsburgh demonstrated the
civilian utility of radio broadcasting by reporting the HardingCox presidential election results as soon as they were released
by the voting authorities.37 The success of this broadcast
resulted in a sharp increase in requests for broadcast licenses
from the Department of Commerce. On September 15, 1921,
the Department’s Bureau of Navigation Radio Service licensed
1912 Radio Act. The first was “to promote safety of life and property at sea
and to promote commerce by facilitating the dispatch of ships.” Hearings on
Legislative, Executive, Judicial Appropriation Bill for 1922 Before the
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 66th Cong. 1218 (1920).
The second stated purpose of the new statute was “to secure by the fullest use
of radio communication by federal regulation, made necessary by the fact that
in the present state of the art the unregulated use by interference would
impair or prevent almost all use.” Id.
32. See CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK 41 (2000) (stating that the
“number of licensed broadcasters grew to exceed spectrum’s capacity to
provide all with a clear signal.”).
33. See BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 11-12.
34. See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 224-25 (1994).
35. See id.
36. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 14.
37. Id. at 29; see also STARR, supra note 34, at 328.
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the first “limited commercial stations.”38
Between December 1, 1921, and December 1, 1922, the
total number of U.S. radio stations rose from 23 stations to 570
stations, with the total number of radio receivers in use in the
United States numbering between 500,000 and 1,000,000.39
Commentators predicted that broadcasting would “perfect
democracy” by creating an electronic town square accessible to
everyone, everywhere.40 As Americans’ standard of living and
average salaries rose, so did their demand for access to radio
programming.
As the demand for radio station licenses
increased, the sales of radio receivers also increased
dramatically.41
Concerned that the burgeoning broadcasting industry
needed more federal oversight, then Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover attempted to use the limited statutory
authority granted to the Department of Commerce in the 1912
Act to deny applications from stations for potential interference
and to revoke licenses from stations causing interference.42 In
1923, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Secretary lacked the authority to use
potential interference as a reason for denying or revoking a
broadcast license. Furthermore, a federal district court in
Illinois held three years later that the Secretary had no
authority under the 1912 Act to impose any restrictions on
frequency, transmitter power, or hours of operation.43 Unable
to regulate, Secretary Hoover embarked on a mission to foster
self-regulation in the broadcast industry.44
38. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 29 (citing Letter from William Downey to
Kenneth Gapen 40 (May 8, 1932) (on file with National Archives Record
Group)). The Bureau initially allocated only one frequency, 832.8 kHz, for use
by all commercial radio stations. Id. The increase in the number and
transmitter power of stations depleted that allocation almost immediately,
and the Bureau allocated a second frequency (618 kHz) to accommodate the
overwhelming demand. Id.
39. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 30.
40. See STARR, supra note 34, at 331.
41. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 31.
42. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1004 (1923).
43. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. at 1006-07; United States v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
44. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 10-12 (St.
Martin’s Press 3d ed. 1982). In 1922, Secretary Hoover convened the first of
four industry conferences devoted to discussing the federal response to the
need for increased radio regulation. Id. At the First Radio Conference,
attendees decided unanimously that self-regulation would not be enough to
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1. The Growing Cacophony
Almost 600 commercial radio stations were on the air by
the end of 1925, and because most of these stations were based
in major metropolitan areas, the lack of comprehensive federal
regulations governing frequency use, transmission power, and
hours of operation resulted in unacceptable levels of
interference.45 By that time, the federally allocated spectrum
was already depleted and stations, aware that the federal
government had no real enforcement authority, changed their
frequencies and boosted their transmission power in the hopes
of drowning out any newcomers. As the Supreme Court noted
in 1943, “With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.”46
The broadcast industry was in such chaos that President
Calvin Coolidge addressed the issue in his December 7, 1926,
message to Congress:
Due to the decisions of the courts, the authority of the Department [of
Commerce] under the law of 1912 has broken down; many more
stations have been operating than can be accommodated within the
limited number of wave lengths available; further stations are in
course of construction; many stations have departed from the scheme
of allocations set down by the department, and the whole service of
this most important public function has drifted into such chaos as
seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.47

Despite the President’s call for legislation, and the growing
demand from industry participants themselves for more federal
oversight, Congress was unable to agree on how best to
structure a federal regulatory regime.48 It was not until 1927
facilitate the efficient and effective growth of broadcasting. Id. At the Third
National Radio Conference in 1924, Secretary Hoover noted that the radio
broadcasting industry “is probably the only industry in the United States that
is unanimously in favor of having itself regulated.” Id. at 11 (citing quotation
in SYDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION
AND RADIO, 126 (1976)).
45. Id. at 11.
46. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
It added: “Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as
traffic control was to the development of the automobile.” Id. at 213.
47. H.R. DOC. NO. 69-483, at 10 (1927).
48. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 12. The majority-Republican House
of Representatives favored granting more expansive licensing and regulatory
authority to the Secretary of Commerce, whereas the Democratic Senate
wanted an independent and permanent commission dedicated to the
regulation of the industry. Id. Senator Clarence C. Dill (D-WA), chairman of
the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, argued that the power and
influence of radio broadcasting militated against the delegation of regulatory
authority to the Secretary of Commerce alone, asserting that “[t]he exercise of
this power is fraught with such possibilities that it should not be entrusted to
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that the House and Senate agreed to create the independent
Federal Radio Commission (FRC).49
B. CONGRESSIONAL CODIFICATION OF BROADCAST PUBLIC
TRUSTEESHIP
1. The 1927 Radio Act
The Radio Act of 1927 created the FRC to serve for an
initial trial period of one year and to adjudicate applications for
station licenses, renewals, and certain technical permits.50
Sections 9 and 11 of the 1927 Radio Act state that “the
licensing authority . . . [shall] determine that the public
interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the
granting [of a broadcast license].” Congress failed to define
what it meant by “public interest” in either the statutory text
or the legislative history. This led one commentator to posit
that the phrase meant “as little as any phrase that the drafters
of the Act could have used and still comply with the
constitutional requirement that there be some standard to
guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority.”51
The FRC not only was hampered by its temporary status;
its work was impeded by the failure of Congress to appropriate
any money for its operations.52 The effectiveness of the FRC
any one man nor to any administrative department of the Government. This
regulatory power should be as free from political influence or arbitrary control
as possible.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-772, at 2 (1926)).
49. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927); see also KRASNOW ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 12 (asserting that most of the language of the final enacted
version of the 1927 Radio Act originated in a bill introduced by Representative
Wallace H. White of Maine in 1923, authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to
serve as the “traffic cop of the air”).
50. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 12-13. The nascent FRC was
comprised of five members appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Id. at 13. The Department of Commerce retained the
power to assign station call letters and prescribe qualifications for licensees.
Id.
51. Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or
Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930),
quoted in Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 214-15 (1982).
52. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 13. The FRC was, however,
permitted to spend any unspent funds earmarked in the Department of
Commerce budget for communications regulation. Id. Congress allowed the
FRC to hire a staff of twenty employees, including support staff and engineers,
to assist the commissioners with building a regulatory structure to address a
burgeoning industry in 1927 in which there were 732 stations with 129 of
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was also limited by the vagueness of the 1927 Radio Act, which
although stronger and clearer in its treatment of broadcast
regulation than the 1912 Radio Act, still provided scant
guidance to the regulators about the scope of their authority.53
This state of affairs persisted through the change in
presidential administrations. In 1933, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt commissioned Daniel C. Roper, then Secretary of
Commerce, to prepare a report proposing a new legislative and
regulatory response to the broadcasting industry.54 The Roper
Commission’s January 1934 report recommended the creation
of a “new or single regulatory body, to which would be
committed any further control of two-way communications and
broadcasting.”55
One of the Roper Commission’s points of deliberation
involved the question of whether the United States should
follow the lead of the United Kingdom and regulate
broadcasting as a state-controlled, nonprofit enterprise funded
with public money, or whether it should remain a private,
commercial enterprise.56 Perhaps as its first lobbying coup, the
newly formed National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
entered into an agreement with the American Newspaper
Publishers Association in which the broadcasters agreed not to
compete directly with the newspapers in the provision of news
if the publishers would support the broadcasters in their efforts

those stations broadcasting on unauthorized frequencies that interfered with
other stations’ signals. Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO:
A REPORT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 200 (1947)); see also BENSMAN, supra
note 27, at 200.
53. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 13-14. The annual reauthorization
statutes necessary for prolonging the FRC’s uncertain existence became a
means of legislative retooling that threatened to further hamper the
Commission’s effectiveness. Id. at 14. An example of Congress’s tinkering
was the Davis Amendment to the1928 renewal act, which required the FRC to
allocate radio station licenses evenly across all of the nation’s regions and
states. Id. The Davis Amendment passed on account of the suspicions of
legislators from the South, West, Midwest who perceived the FRC as favoring
high-powered stations in the North and East. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 14-15 (quoting STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. 73D CONG. 144 (1934)). The Report urged the
consolidation of the communications regulatory functions of the FRC,
Interstate Commerce Commission, Department of Commerce and the
Postmaster General into the new comprehensive agency. Id. at 14.
56. See STARR, supra note 34, at 340-46.
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to keep broadcasting private and commercial.57 The deal held
and the Roper Commission decided against recommending the
emulation of the British broadcasting model.
2. The 1934 Communications Act
After listening to demands for more expansive regulation
from the Roper Commission, regulators, broadcasters and
citizens alike, Congress enacted the Communications Act of
1934 (1934 Communications Act), which established a
permanently funded and staffed Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) with broad authority over all forms of
The 1934 Communications Act
telecommunication.58
incorporated most of the contents of the 1927 Radio Act,
abolished the FRC, and directed that the new FCC make
licensing decisions – specifically, decisions concerning grants of
initial licenses as well as license renewals – in accordance with
“public interest, convenience, or necessity.”59 The Act provides
that all radio frequency spectrum in the United States is
publicly owned.60 In that respect, broadcast radio frequencies
can be likened to other valuable public resources, such as
national forests and wildlife, over which the federal
government and its delegates also serve as public trustees.61
57. Id. at 40-41.
58. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000)).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 303. The 1934 Communications Act specified a three-year
term for broadcast licensees. In 1981, the license term was extended to five
years for television stations and seven years for radio stations. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241(a), 95 Stat. 736
(1981). The broadcast license terms were extended once again, to eight years
for television stations, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Pub. L. No.
104-104, § 203, 110 Stat. 56, (1996).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (“provid[ing] for the use of such channels, but not the
ownership thereof”).
61. For an excellent history of the public trust doctrine in the
environmental area, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
The public trust doctrine has its roots in the legal digests of the Sixth Century
Roman Emperor Justinian, and specifically his concept of jus natural, or
“natural law.” See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life
into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 31-32 (2000);
see also Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust
Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728 (1989).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s leading and still binding case in this area,
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) provides that the
government must guard against the privatization of public trust resources and
specifically:
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Like its 1927 predecessor, the 1934 Communications Act did
not define the term “public interest” nor elaborate on the
obligation of broadcasters to be public trustees, instead
delegating implicit authority to the FCC to interpret these
obligations.62
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the
use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of
the peace.
Id. at 453.
62. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too
Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L. J. 427, 447 (2001).
According to Randolph J. May, senior fellow and Director of Communications
Policy Studies at The Progress and Freedom Foundation, this delegation may
violate the nondelegation doctrine, which requires Congress to make
important policy choices itself and not delegate those decisions to agencies
without providing those agencies with adequate guidance. Id. at 429, 434-35.
May writes that the public interest standard of broadcast regulation “has
proven so indeterminate that, in adopting it, Congress passed off to the new
agency the power to make law in a way that would surely shock [John] Locke
and the founders of our nation.” Id. at 428.
More than three hundred years ago, in the second of his famous Two
Treatises, John Locke wrote that the legislature ‘cannot transfer the
[p]ower of [m]aking [l]aws to any other hands. For it being but a
delegated [p]ower from the [p]eople, they, who have it, cannot pass it
over to others.’
Id. at 427-28 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 380
(Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1970) (1690)). May acknowledged that the
nondelegation doctrine has been dormant since its heyday in the 1930s, where
the Supreme Court applied it to strike down delegations of authority in the
National Industry Recovery Act, a New Deal law, in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Id. at 435-38. He posits, nevertheless, that the
public interest standard is so vague and devoid of statutory meaning that it
fails to satisfy the contemporary nondelegation doctrine requirement that
legislative delegations provide an “intelligible principle” to guide agency
action. Id. at 442-43. He concedes, however, that the current Supreme Court
has upheld delegations of authority with little guidance, citing to the public
interest standard as a constitutional delegation. Id. at 443. In Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’n, 51 U.S. 457, 474 (2001), Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, upheld delegations of legislative power in the Clean Air Act
to the EPA by citing to the public interest standard as one example of a broad
delegation of authority sustained by the Court. Id. at 443-44. And in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) Justice Scalia noted that the
Court would be hard pressed to strike down any delegation as “too vague to
survive judicial scrutiny” when the Court has upheld the public interest
standard. Id. at 443 (citing 488 U.S. 361, 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). May’s
argument is undermined by the fact that in the Schechter Poultry case, the
Supreme Court expressly distinguished the Interstate Commerce Code, which
itself contained vague delegation language – empowering the Interstate
Commerce Commission to regulate railroads as “the public convenience and
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C. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO INTERPRET THE PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD
In its short seven-year existence, the FRC never issued a
coherent definition of the public interest standard. Instead, it
made case-by-case determinations of individual station
practices that satisfied the standard. In May 1927, it allowed
stations to increase daytime transmitting power when
broadcasting “service programs,” which it defined as “those of
educational and religious institutions, civic organizations, and
distributors of market and other news.”63 The following year
the FRC denied sixty-two stations permission to continue
broadcasting because the stations had aired programming that
was contrary to the public interest by containing false
statements, personal attacks, and the excessive reliance on
phonograph recordings to the detriment of local service.64 In
announcing these decisions, the FRC declared that the primary
interests at stake were not those of the broadcasters, but rather
that “emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the
convenience, and the necessity of the listening public.”65 The
FRC interpreted the public trustee doctrine as requiring that
broadcast stations “be operated as if owned by the public.”66
Specifically, the FRC asserted that “[i]t is as if people of a
community should own a station and turn it over to the best
man in sight with this injunction: Manage this station in our
interest. . . . The standing of every station is determined by
that conception.”67
In Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.,68 the FRC adjudicated a
necessity may require” – which served as a source of the vague “public
interest, convenience and necessity” language in the 1934 Communications
Act. See MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 2, at 4.; see also Louis G. Caldwell, The
Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act
of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (“‘Public interest, convenience or
necessity’ means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the [Radio]
Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that
there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing
authority.”).
63. 1 F.R.C. 14 (1927).
64. 2 F.R.C. 16, 151-62 (1928).
65. Id. at 170.
66. The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility
of Broadcast Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. BAR J. 5, 14 (1950) (internal quotation
omitted).
67. Id.
68. 3 F.R.C. 32 (1929), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
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conflict among three Chicago area radio stations for a “clear
channel” frequency.69 It determined that its selection of the
prevailing station would be determined by the station with the
best public interest broadcasting performance, defined as
meeting the:
tastes, needs and desires of all substantial groups among the
listening public . . . in some fair proportion, by a well-rounded
program, in which entertainment, consisting of music of both classical
and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, important
public events, discussions of public questions, weather, market
reports, and news, and matters of interests to all members of the
family find a place.70

In its decision, the FRC emphasized the importance of
broadcasters’ duty to create a “marketplace of ideas” for the
public, declaring that “the public interest requires ample play
for the free and fair competition of opposing views” and “that
[this] principle applies . . . to all discussions of issues of
importance to the public.”71
The FRC also asked about programming and public
interest content in initial station applications and license
renewals, including the requirement that applicants list the
amount of weekly programming aired in six categories
classified as “entertainment,” “religious,” “commercial,”
“educational,” “agricultural,” and “fraternal.”72

69. A “clear channel” is a frequency that is reserved nationally for only
one station or a very small number of stations located far apart. Clear
channels prevent any risk of distant channel interference caused by
atmospheric conditions. See STARR, supra note 34, at 349.
70. Great Lakes Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. at 34.
71. Id. at 33.
72. Jurisdiction of Radio Comm’n Hearings on H.R. 8825 Before the House
Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-26
(1928). The FRC also applied a broad definition of public interest in denying
renewals to licensees whose programming contravened public health and
safety. For example, in 1930 the FRC denied the license renewal application
of KFKB, a station in Milford, Kansas, because its operator, Dr. John
Brinkley, operated the station exclusively for his own commercial interest and
not that of the public. KFKB Broadcasting Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672
(D.C. Cir. 1931). Dr. Brinkley apparently treated the station as a means of
The main
building his experimental “goat gland” medical practice.
programming on the station consisted of three daily programs featuring Dr.
Brinkley answering medical questions from his listeners. Id. Noting that the
doctor’s answers usually included a recommendation for pharmaceuticals that
he marketed himself, it concluded that the licensee’s practice of diagnosing
patients over the radio, in the absence of any in-person examination, was
contrary to the public health and therefore not public interest programming.
Id.
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Although the FCC’s birth in 1934 fostered a more
comprehensive federal approach to communications regulation,
it did not result in a more precise articulation of the public
interest standard. In the FCC’s first decade, devising a
workable, standard definition of public interest programming
was not a priority.73 To the contrary, although its predecessor
had reviewed station programming for public interest content
in license renewal proceedings, the FCC discontinued that
practice, instead approving license renewal applications in
groups, essentially rubberstamping the recommendations of the
FCC’s engineering, legal, and accounting departments, which
performed a content-neutral review of station performance.74
Some early FCC licensing decisions did, however, contain
references to the importance of the public trustee doctrine in
educating the electorate on pressing issues of public concern.
For example, in Mayflower Broadcasting Corp.,75 the
Commission clarified that the statutory duty to broadcast in
the “public interest” imposed on licensees the obligation to be
“sensitive to the problems of public concern in the community
and to make sufficient time available, on a non-discriminatory
Similarly, in
basis, for the full discussion thereof.”76
Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp. (WMBQ),77 the FCC
instructed that a licensee had “a recognized duty to present
well-rounded programs on subjects which may be fairly said to
constitute public controversies of the day within the framework
of our democratic system of government.”78
1. The “Blue Book”
Facing criticism for its piecemeal approach to defining
what duties were required of broadcast public trustees, the
FCC finally turned to clarifying the public interest
programming requirements for broadcasters under the 1934
Communications Act in the early 1940s. FCC Commissioner
Clifford J. Durr began abstaining from voting upon station
license renewal applications, reasoning that the renewal
73. See Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The
FCC’s Weak Track Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C.
L. REV. 1057, 1061-62 (1982).
74. See id.
75. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
76. Id. at 340.
77. 8 F.C.C. 577 (1941).
78. Id. at 577.
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applications did not contain enough information on whether
and how the licensees had been offering public interest
programming to their listeners.79 In response to Commissioner
Durr’s demands, the FCC in 1946 released a staff report
entitled “Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast
Licensees,” which became widely known as the “Blue Book”
because of its blue cover, and which served as the FCC’s first
policy statement explaining the 1934 Communications Act’s
public interest standard.80
The Blue Book specified that licensees were required to
devote an “adequate” amount of broadcast time to the coverage
of local, national and international issues of public concern.81 It
instructed broadcasters that they were expected to air a
“reasonable” number of “sustaining” programs, meaning
programs not sponsored by commercial advertising but funded
by the broadcaster itself, and local live programming.82 It
warned licensees that they should limit advertising to “a
reasonable amount” of overall programming time.83 A new
FCC broadcast license renewal form required applicants to
report on their program offerings in six categories: education,
entertainment, news, religion, discussion and talks.84
Broadcasters fought the Blue Book vehemently.85 Soon
after its release, NAB President Justin Miller waged a threemonth lobbying campaign, attacking the Blue Book’s
articulation of public interest programming preferences as
invalid under the 1934 Communications Act and the First
Amendment.86 Growing weary of the NAB’s intensifying
lobbying, the FCC distanced itself from the Blue Book’s
programming requirements. For the next fourteen years, the
FCC rarely addressed public interest programming and seldom
invoked the Blue Book requirements. Although the license
79. See Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1062, n.20 (citing CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1959)).
80. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LICENSEES
(1946) [hereinafter Blue Book].
81. Id. at 12-39.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 40-47.
84. Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1063 n.24 (citing FCC, BROADCAST
APPLICATION, § IV at 1 (1947)).
85. Id. at 1063 n. 25 (citing Richard J. Meyer, Reaction to the “Blue Book,”
6 J. BROADCASTING 295 (1962)).
86. Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1063 n.25.
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renewal forms still required the information on public interest
programming addressed in the Blue Book, those disclosures
were largely ignored by the Commission’s application
reviewers.87
By the late 1950s, several FCC Commissioners and much
of the viewing public had grown frustrated with the FCC’s
failure to elucidate and actually enforce the public interest
standard. The quiz show scandals in 1958 and 1959, which
involved the very high-profile rigging of highly rated television
quiz shows, and the radio disc jockey “payola” controversy,
where disc jockeys accepted money from record promoters in
exchange for playing their records on the air, also motivated a
number of watchdog groups, private citizens, and elected
officials to demand that the FCC impose and enforce more
meaningful public interest standards on broadcasters.88
2. The 1960 Programming Statement
The Commission attempted again to articulate coherent
and meaningful public interest programming requirements in
the “1960 Programming Statement.”89 Unlike the Blue Book,
and perhaps to avoid the lobbying frenzy that the Blue Book
87. Id. at 1064 (citing ERIK BARNOUW,
THE UNITED STATES: THE GOLDEN WEB 228,

A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN
292-93; Address by Commissioner
K. Cox, “Public Services Responsibilities of Broadcast Stations,” to Boston
Federal Executive Board (Sept. 9, 1965)). An example of the laxity of the
FCC’s approach to evaluations of the quality and quantity of public interest
programming was its treatment of the license renewal application of station
WOAX, which had refused to air any public interest programming. A senior
officer of the licensee’s parent corporation, in fact, had directed that public
interest programming should not be broadcast on the station. 6 Rad. Reg. (P
& F) 1101, 1101-03 (1950). Despite warnings from the FCC that the station
needed to improve its public interest record, the Commission did not take
action against the licensee’s license, although it did reprimand the station’s
management and refused to grant permission for expanded facilities. See 15
F.C.C. 270, 271 (1950); see also 6 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1101, 1101 (1950). For
additional examples of the FCC’s lax enforcement of the Blue Book standards,
see Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1064 n.28.
88. See Commission Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2303-05
(1960) (en banc); see also THOMAS A DELONG, QUIZ CRAZE: AMERICA’S
INFATUATION WITH GAME SHOWS 218-26 (1991); HALBERSTAM, DAVID, THE
FIFTIES 643-66 (1993). The quiz show scandals received so much press
attention that Congress held hearings on the matter. See Hearings on
Television Quiz Shows Before a Special Subcomm. on Legislative Oversight of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959) (pt. 1).
89. See generally Commission Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303
(1960) (en banc).
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sparked, the 1960 Programming Statement noted that the First
Amendment required that licensees be given broad latitude and
discretion in meeting their public interest duties.90 Whereas
the Blue Book threatened to deny renewal of broadcast licenses
in the absence of a record of compliance with the public interest
requirements, the 1960 Programming Statement made no such
explicit warning. Instead, it attempted to balance the First
Amendment right of licensees to decide the content and nature
of their own programming with the statutory duty of
The
broadcasters to air public interest programming.91
Statement clarified that although the First Amendment
forbade the Commission from dictating programming content,
the licensee was bound by the 1934 Communications Act to
broadcast in the public interest in exchange for its free use of
broadcast spectrum.
The 1960 Programming Statement prescribed that the
FCC would grant broadcast license applications only to those
licensees who had demonstrated that they had been operating
their stations in the public interest.92 The 1960 Statement also
provided a nonexhaustive, nonexclusive list of fourteen “major
elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs
and desires of the community in which the station is located.”93
Those elements were:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use
of local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5)
educational programs, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization
by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10)
news programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports
programs, (13) service to minority groups, and (14) entertainment
programs.94

90. See id. at 2306-08, 2311-14, 2316.
91. See id. at 2308, 2314.
92. See id. at 2309, 2310, 2315. It stated that the “principal ingredient” of
a licensee’s public interest broadcasting compliance was a “diligent, positive
and continuing effort . . . to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of
his service area.” Id. at 2312. It emphasized that the licensee was required to
proactively ascertain the public interest programming most needed by the
members of the station’s viewing audience, and not depend on the FCC to
prescribe a certain public interest formulation. Id. at 2314. The Statement
clarified that the “honest and prudent judgments” of the licensee in
determining community public interest programming needs would “be
accorded great weight by the Commission.” Id.
93. Commission Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. at 2314.
94. Id. In propounding this list, the Statement warned that they are
“neither all embracing nor constant . . .. [T]hey do not serve and have never
been intended as a rigid mold or field formula for station operation.” Id. The
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The 1960 Statement did not define these various public
interest programming elements, nor instruct stations or the
FCC application reviewers themselves on what amount or
combination of these elements would satisfy the broadcaster’s
public interest programming requirements under the 1934 Act.
The list was so broad that broadcasters were hard-pressed to
find programming that could not be characterized as fitting at
least one of the enumerated categories of public interest
programming.
The 1960 Statement also directed broadcasters to
determine the needs, tastes and desires of their communities of
license in order to air programming responsive to those needs.
This resulted in the FCC’s adoption of formal “ascertainment”
rules, which required broadcasters to document interviews with
community members in a variety of different areas.95
3. FCC Reluctance to Enforce the 1960 Statement
The FCC rarely cited the Statement in reviewing
broadcasters’ license renewal applications. For nearly two
decades, the FCC’s Broadcast Bureau, the division of the FCC
to which the Commissioners delegated authority to review and
recommend a grant or denial of renewal applications, rarely
recommended denial of license renewal applications on the
grounds that the licensee had failed to satisfy its public interest

1960 Policy Statement also dispensed with the Blue Book’s preference for
“sustaining” (licensee-underwritten) instead of commercially sponsored
programming. The 1960 Statement clarified that commercial sponsorship may
enable viewers to have access to more public interest programming. See id. at
2315.
95. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 (1971).
The
Commission enforced the 1960 Statement by means of a revised license
renewal form that took the Commission over four years to draft and adopt. See
Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1066. The revised form required that the
licensee document its efforts to ascertain and meet the “needs and interests of
the public served by the station.” Id. at 1066 n. 44. The form instructed the
applicant to detail its efforts in three principal programming categories:
“public affairs,” “news” and “all other programs, exclusive of Entertainment
and Sports.” Id. at 1067 n. 45. The form defined “public affairs” programs as
including “talks, commentaries, discussions, speeches, editorials, political
programs, documentaries, forums, panels, round tables, and similar programs
primarily concerning local, national and international affairs.” Id. “Political
programs” were “those which present candidates for public office or which give
expression (other than in station editorials) to views on such candidates or on
issues subject to public ballot.” Id.
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programming requirements.96 The Broadcast Bureau would
perform an apparently superficial review of renewal applicants’
public interest programming representations, and would then
recommend license renewal to the Commissioners in large
groups of sometimes hundreds of applications at a time.97
Although individual Commissioners would, from time to time,
protest the laxity in the Commission’s application (or lack
thereof) of the 1960 Statement, their protests were unheeded
by colleagues.98 For the two decades following the 1960
Statement, the Commission rarely investigated a station’s
compliance
with
its
public
interest
broadcasting
requirements.99 When it did, it almost always approved the
renewal of the license, with no penalties, despite a record of
minimal or no public interest programming.100
96. See Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1068-69.
97. See, e.g., Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee, 1973, 42 F.C.C.2d 900 (1973) (approving the renewal, en masse, of
374 license renewal applications).
98. For example, in 1967, the Commission granted en masse the license
renewals of 265 stations in Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee over the
objections of Commissioners Kenneth Cox and Nicholas Johnson, who found it
unacceptable that 39 of these stations had devoted less than 1% of their
weekly programming schedule to “public affairs” programming, and 12 had
proposed less than 5% news programming. See In re License Renewals in
Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee, 10 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 944, 944-46 (1967)
(Cox and Johnson, Comm’rs, dissenting). Six years later, the Commission
approved the renewal of 374 licenses en masse over the dissent of
Commissioner Johnson, who took issue with the majority having “approv[ed]
the behavior of yet another batch of stations, some good and some bad, without
its ever enunciating any criteria by which to judge whether the licensees’
performance serves the public interest.” Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for
Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 1974 342 F.C.C. 2d 900, 900 (Johnson,
Comm’r, dissenting); see also Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Arkansas,
Louisiana & Mississippi, 42 F.C.C.2d 3, 3 (1973) (Johnson, Comm’r,
dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal
Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d 580,
586-87 (1971) (Notice of Inquiry).
100. See e.g., Titanic Corp., 34 F.C.C.2d 501 (1972) (approving the license
renewal of Duluth, Minnesota FM radio station WGGR despite station’s
adoption of an “all-music” format with regularly commercial advertising and
little or no news or public affairs programming). In rare cases where the
Commission penalized the station by, for example, renewing the license for a
shortened term (e.g., 18 months instead of the standard 3-year license term), a
station’s failure to provide adequate public interest programming was usually
coupled with serious violations of the Commission’s technical or operational
rules, which are not related to programming content. See, e.g., Application of
WSER, Inc., Elkton, MD for Renewal of License, 29 F.C.C.2d 441 (1971)
(granting short-term license renewal as penalty for FCC rule violations
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4. The Codification of the Fairness Doctrine
In addition to issuing its 1960 Statement, the FCC in the
early 1960s attempted to clarify the requirements of the
fairness doctrine, which until that point had existed as a
scattered series of statements in a number of decisions and
orders spanning the previous three decades.101 Congress
codified the “standard of fairness” in its 1959 Amendments to
the Communications Act of 1934, where it reminded
broadcasters of their “obligation . . . to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance.”102
As ultimately interpreted by the FCC, the fairness doctrine
consisted of two interrelated obligations: First, broadcasters
were required to cover vitally important controversies in their
communities; and second, in doing so, broadcasters were
required to provide a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints.103 The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in
1969’s Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, where it emphasized the
important role of broadcasters in promoting “an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas.”104

involving improperly licensed personnel, falsification of station operating logs,
improper transmitter operating power and, as an incidental element, the
broadcasting of “public affairs” programming accounting for only 1.11 percent
of the station’s programming schedule).
101. For example, in 1929, the FRC declared that the public trustee
doctrine required broadcasters to devote “ample play for the free and fair
competition of opposing views . . . [on] all issues of importance to the public.”
See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). In
1949, the FCC again declared that the public trustee doctrine required
broadcasters to cover issues of public importance, and it characterized as
“paramount” the “right of the public to hear a reasonably balanced
presentation of all responsible viewpoints” during such coverage.
Editorializing by Broadcasting Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1258 (1949).
102. 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2584; 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); see also Jerry V.
Haines, Political Broadcasting Amendments to the Communications Act of
1934, in THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR
AMENDMENTS 1934-1996 176 (Max D. Paglin, ed., 1999).
103. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973); see also The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications
Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 1-3 (1974) (Fairness Report), recon. denied, 58
F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
104. 396 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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D. DEREGULATION AND THE DE FACTO DEATH OF THE PUBLIC
TRUSTEE DOCTRINE
The 1980s ushered in a sea of change in the FCC’s
regulatory approach. The FCC was now led by political
appointees steeped in the Chicago School’s sanctification of free
markets as the infallible purveyors of the public interest.105
Abandoning any pretense of enforcing the public trustee
doctrine, in the 1980s the FCC embarked on a “private
marketplace” approach to broadcast regulation. The reoriented
FCC viewed its role as regulating only when marketplace
competition failed. Mark Fowler, the FCC Chairman appointed
by President Reagan, made his deregulatory philosophy clear
by declaring that “television is just another appliance, it’s a
toaster with pictures.”106 In a 1982 Texas Law Review article
co-authored with Daniel Brenner, Fowler asserted that in the
new media marketplace, “traditional broadcasting is just one of
many information delivery systems.”107 Accordingly, Congress
and the FCC needed to “focus on broadcasters not as fiduciaries
of the public, as their regulators have historically perceived
them, but as marketplace competitors.”108 Fowler argued that
in prescribing “public interest” programming, the FCC violated
both the First Amendment and Section 326 of the
Communications Act (which forbids government censorship of
broadcast licensees).109 Speaking to a broadcast industry
association early in his tenure as chairman, Fowler encouraged
a marketplace approach to regulation:
I believe that we are at the end of regulating broadcasting under the
trusteeship model . . . . Under the coming marketplace approach, the
Commission should, so far as possible, defer to a broadcaster’s
judgment about how best to compete for viewers and listeners because
this serves the public interest.110

Fowler’s marketplace approach to regulation prevailed and
the Commission eliminated many of its broadcast regulations,
105. See e.g. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962).
106. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money: The FCC’s Big Giveaway
Show, 241 NATION 402 (1985) (quoting a radio speech delivered by Mark
Fowler).
107. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 51, at 210.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 217-18.
110. Mark S. Fowler, The Public’s Interest, Address at a Meeting of the
International Radio and Television Society (Sept. 23, 1981), in 4 COMM. & L.
51, 52 (Winter 1982).
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including the requirements to ascertain community
programming needs, maintain program logs, air minimum
amounts of public affairs programming and limit advertising
time.111 It announced that it would “no longer routinely review
a licensee’s programming in the uncontested renewal
context”112 because the marketplace itself would correct the
deficiencies of individual television stations in airing public
interest programming. 113 The FCC eliminated many of its
public trustee requirements for license renewals114 and
instituted a “postcard renewal” mechanism, whereby renewal
applications are filed by means of a small postcard form which
virtually guaranteed renewal without any meaningful review of
a licensee’s performance.115 It also increased the term of
television licenses from three to five years116 and increased the
total number of stations one entity could own from twenty-one
to thirty-six stations (twelve each in television, AM radio, and
FM radio).117 The FCC’s sweeping deregulation efforts also
111. See TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1099; see also
Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 977-90 (1981), aff’d in part and
remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communications of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 709 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
112. 98 F.C.C.2d at 1093. When a station’s license renewal application is
contested by means of a Petition to Deny filed by, for example, an aggrieved
citizen taking issue with the licensee’s failure to air programming responsive
to local needs and issues, the Commission declared that the station “should be
able to respond by pointing not only to its own programming that may have
addressed such issue, but also to other television stations available in the
community that could reasonably have been relied upon to address such
issues.” Id. at 1094.
113. See id. at 1087 (“It appears . . . that the failure of some stations to
provide programming in some categories is being offset by the compensatory
performance of other stations. In this respect, market demand is determining
the appropriate mix of each licensee’s programming.”).
114. See 47 U.S.C. 309(k) (2000). The FCC may also impose a forfeiture
sanction (i.e., a fine) for violations of specific rules. Forfeiture Proceedings, 62
Fed. Reg. 43,474, 43,475 (Aug. 14, 1997) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 1.1-1.8004
(2001)). The FCC may also grant a shortened license renewal term as a quasiprobationary period for licensees with concerning public interest records. See
Children’s Television Order, supra note 18, at 10,662-63.
115. See Revision of Applications for Renewals of License of Commercial
and Non-Commercial AM, FM and Television Licensees, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 740, 741 (1981).
116. See Amendment to Section 73.1020 of t he Commission’s rules: Station
License Period, 88 F.C.C.2d 355, 355 (1981). Congress authorized the
extension of license terms by means of the 1981 appropriations law, Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). See id.
117. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,877,
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included its elimination of the fairness doctrine in 1987,
reasoning that it contravened the First Amendment by chilling
the speech of broadcasters.118
The evisceration of the public trustee doctrine continued
into the 1990s. In 1993, the FCC ruled that licensees of “home
shopping” broadcast television stations “are serving the public
interest, convenience and necessity.”119 The FCC made this
decision despite a record showing that these stations devote
virtually all of their airtime to product advertising and sales
programming delivered by satellite uplink, with almost no
airtime devoted to the airing of local public interest
programming.120
On the heels of such sweeping deregulation, it is no wonder
that the FCC’s broadcast license renewal system is a “farce.”121
Absent serious technical, ownership, or criminal violations,
license renewals today are essentially “rubber-stamped”

para. 5 (August 9, 1984). The “seven station” rule had prohibited an
individual from holding a cognizable ownership interest in seven television,
seven AM radio and seven FM radio stations. The revised rule allowed for a
total of 12 stations in each service. The FCC also shut down a proceeding
initiated in 1977 to designate a common standard for AM Stereo broadcasting
by refusing to specify a standard, claiming that “a reliance on market forces . .
. is the most prudent course to follow.” See Radio Broadcast Services, AM
Stereophonic Broadcasting, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,152, 13,155 (Mar. 29, 1982). The
FCC proclaimed that its reliance on marketplace forces to determine a
broadcast standard “is a bold, new step for the Commission to take.” Id. at
13,158. Marketplace forces never coalesced around one AM stereo standard,
and AM stereo never became a viable medium. See Bruce C. Klopfenstein &
David Sedman, Technical Standards and the Marketplace: The Case of AM
Stereo, 34 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 171, 181-85 (1990).
118. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station
WTVH, Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-50 (1987), recon. denied, 3
F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
119. Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 5321, 5328 para. 36 (1993)
(Home Shopping Station Issues).
120. Id. In light of the Commission’s declaration, cable systems were
required to treat home shopping channels the same as all other local television
channels in carrying them on the basic cable subscription tier in compliance
with the “must carry” provisions of section 4(g)(2) of 1992 Cable Act. Id. at
para. 37.
121. Todd Shields, Copps Criticizes Broadcast License Renewals,
WWW.MEDIAWEEK.COM, 23 July 2003 (quoting FCC Commissioner Michael
Copps). Copps also quipped, “It’s not called ‘postcard renewal’ for nothing.”
Molly Peterson, North Carolinians Air Complaints About FCC Media Rules,
CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 27, 2003, at 6.
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regardless of the applicant’s record as a public trustee.122
There has been no revocation of a television station license for
failure to satisfy the public interest standards in a half century,
and the Commission has renewed licenses of stations with
absolutely no local news and public affairs programming.123
Speaking of the FCC’s deregulatory era, Reed Hundt, FCC
Chairman under President Bill Clinton, declared that “[t]he
FCC essentially dismantled the public interest standard in the
early 1980s by conflating the ‘public interest’ with anything
sponsors will support.”124
122. Commissioner Copps has been quoted as saying, “We’ve strayed too
far from the rigorous licensing process that we used to have. Now, unless
you’re a wife beater or a child molester or something like that, you can pretty
much count on getting your license by just filing some papers.” Edmund
Sanders, FCC to Scrutinize License Renewals, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 30,
2003, at C9; see also David Ranii, Media Activists Feeling Feisty, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 4, 2003, at D1.
123. See Henry Geller, Mass Communication Policy: Where We Are And
Where We Should Be Going, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 290, 304
(Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990); see also Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for
Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 527, 533 (1996) (noting that “the
Commission for at least fifteen years has not taken away a single one of the
approximately 1,500 Television licenses or 10,000 radio licenses in this
country for failure to serve the public interest”). Although private citizens can
review their local station’s public inspection file to review their claims of
public interest programming, the FCC does not require those claims to be
specific. Andrew Schwartzman the President of the Media Access Project,
says: “Nobody looks at these files because they are pointless and not specific
enough to be able to make a public interest assessment.” Sallie Hofmeister, Is
Broadcast TV Worth Saving?, CHICAGO TRIB. (June 8, 2003), at 4. In its
Comments submitted in the 2000 Public Interest Obligations Proceeding,
People for Better TV quoted Helen Grieco, President of California NOW, in
describing her experience reviewing two public inspection files:
Earlier this month I visited two stations, KTVU-TV and KRON-TV.
While these stations provide a standard list of community issues, it is
clear from the program reports to the FCC that this list isn’t worth
the paper it’s printed on. Not only are their lists so generic as to be
unhelpful, it’s clear that they don’t change from quarter to quarter
(quite unlike the challenges in our very diverse community).
Comments of People for Better TV, Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket 99-360 at 17-18 (filed Mar. 27, 2000). People
for Better TV also quotes other community leaders who attempted to review
their local stations’ public inspection files and were refused and turned away,
one station in South Carolina recommending that the viewer file a Freedom of
Information Act request. Id. at 27-28.
124. Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest
Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1094 (1996). In
arguing for the promulgation and enforcement of clearer public interest
requirements, Hundt reasoned:
[I]t is clear that Congress meant to require broadcasters to do more
than what they would do anyway in order to compete in the video
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1. Telecommunications Act of 1996
Media deregulation continued into the 1990s, reaching its
apex in the 1996 Telecommunications Act (1996 Act), the most
sweeping and complex reform of federal telecommunications
law since 1934.125 A central purpose of the 1996 Act was the
elimination of many significant cross-market barriers that
prohibited market players in one industry from providing
service in other sectors. 126
The Act further deregulated the broadcast industry,
eliminating all restrictions on the total number of radio
stations owned by one company or individual at one time127 and
ending the national television station ownership cap.128 The
Act raised the limit of common ownership of television stations
to thirty-five percent of the U.S. population, up from twentyfive percent (set in 1985),129 and directed the FCC to revisit the
issue of the caps on the common ownership of television
stations in one local market (known as the television duopoly
marketplace for audience and for advertising revenue. There would
be no need for the Commission to determine whether a licensee is
serving the public interest if all that means is that the broadcaster is
in business competing against other broadcasters and other providers
of video programming . . . . Clearly, broadcasters are subject to
distinct public interest obligations not imposed on other media.
Id. at 1090.
125. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)) (amending the
Communications Act of 1934).
126. For example, subject to a showing of competition in the local telephone
marketplace, the “Baby Bell” regional telephone companies were allowed to
enter the long distance and cable marketplace, long distance companies could
offer local service, and cable television companies – whose rates were
deregulated – could offer telephone service.
127. See 47 U.S.C § 253(a) (establishes that no rule or regulation “may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide
any interstate commerce or intrastate telecommunications service”).
Supporters of the elimination of the radio ownership cap, such as Senator
Conrad Burns (R-Mont.), reasoned that with 11,000 radio stations and an
average of 25 stations in each market, there was sufficient diversity and
competition in American radio and that ownership limits were superfluous.
Senator Burns declared that “[r]adio operators are ready to . . . operate
without stifling ownership rules. They need total deregulation to allow them
to compete in the new digital marketplace.” S.R. REP. NO. 104-23 at 65 (1995).
128. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1)(A) (eliminates
“restrictions on the number of television stations that a person or entity may
directly or indirectly own, operate, or control, or have a cognizable interest
in”).
129. Id. § 202(c)(1)(B) (increases “the national audience reach limitations
for television stations to 35 percent”).
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rule).130 It also ordered the FCC to review all of the broadcast
ownership rules biennially to determine “whether any of such
rules are necessary in the public interest as a result of
competition” and to “repeal or modify any regulation it
determines to be no longer in the public interest.”131
Despite its deregulatory impetus, the 1996 Telecom Act
encompassed a number of new directives justified, in part, by
the public trustee doctrine.
Recognizing that “television
influences children’s perception of the values and behavior that
are common and acceptable in society,” the 1996 Telecom Act
incorporated the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”),
which required all new television sets with screens larger than
13 inches to be equipped with “V-chips” that allow parents and
guardians to block programs with graphic sex or violence not
suitable for children.132 The Telecom Act also directed the FCC
to develop a television ratings code in the event the broadcast
industry failed to develop and adopt its own system.133
E. VERY LITTLE QUID FOR LOTS OF QUO: BROADCASTERS’
COMPLIANCE WITH THE SURVIVING PUBLIC INTEREST
REQUIREMENTS
Today, television and radio broadcasters still enjoy the
privileges of their status as public trustees, but there is little
public service required of them. Several of the requirements
imposed on television licensees, justified by the public trustee
doctrine, include the duty to provide equal employment
opportunities, to not discriminate on the basis of any federally
protected status, and to incorporate into their station signals
closed captioning for the deaf and a video description service for
the blind.134
130. Id. § 202(c)(2). In the Conference Report for the 1996 Telecom Act,
Congress directed the FCC to “revise the rule as is necessary to ensure that
broadcasters are able to compete fairly with other media providers while
ensuring that the public receives information from a diversity of media voices.”
142 Cong. Rec. H 1145 (1996).
131. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h).
132. Id. §§ 551(a)(1), 551(c).
133. Id. § 551(b)(1).
134. See Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of
Broadcast Licensees, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 229-30 (1976); FCC
Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. pt. 79 (2003); Television Decoder Circuitry
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-431, 104 Stat. 960 (1990) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§303(u)); Closed Captioning and Video Description of Video Programming,
Implementation of Section 305 of the Telecommunications Act of 1997, Video
Programming Accessibility, 11 F.C.C.R 19,214 (1996) (Report).
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1. Locally Responsive Programming
Perhaps the most important of the remaining public
interest programming requirements is that broadcasters air
“programming that responds to issues of concern to the
community”135 and maintain and make publicly available
quarterly reports documenting such programming.136 The FCC
continues to recognize that such programming is important to
maintaining an informed electorate and promoting deliberative
democracy.
Despite the core importance of localism to the public
trustee doctrine, recent studies demonstrate that commercial
television broadcasters are airing little or no locally-oriented
public interest programming. In a January 2000 two-week
study of the programming schedules of 142 commercial
broadcast stations across twenty-four television markets,
Professor Philip M. Napoli concluded that broadcasters aired
an average of only 1.1 hours of local public affairs programming
per station, with an average overall total of only 6.52 hours of
local public affairs programming per television market (i.e.,
Of the 47,712 hours of broadcast
metropolitan area).137
programming on the surveyed stations, a mere 156.5 hours or
0.3% were devoted to local public affairs programming, and
1.06% was devoted to both local and non-local (regional or
These figures
national) public affairs programming.138
contrasted sharply with the 4.6% of local public affairs
programming broadcast between 1973 and 1979.139 Napoli
concluded that broadcasters devote very little broadcast time to
public affairs programming and that marketplace incentives
have failed to motivate the provision of such programming.140
135. TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1077.
136. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.3526 (2004); FCC
Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. 73.3527 (2004).
137. PHILIP M. NAPOLI, MARKET CONDITIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PROGRAMMING: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGITAL TELEVISION POLICY, REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE BENTON FOUNDATION 9 (2000). Napoli applied the FCC’s
own definition of “public affairs programming,” which includes: “programs
dealing with local, state, regional, national or international issues or
problems, documentaries, mini-documentaries, panels, roundtables and
vignettes, and extended overage (whether live or recorded) of public events or
proceedings, such as local council meetings, congressional hearings and the
like.” Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 9.
139. TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1081.
140. Napoli, supra note 137, at 15. He writes:
[A]lthough larger markets provide a greater aggregate amount of
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An October 2003 study of forty-five commercial television
stations in seven media markets found that less than one-half
of one percent of total programming was devoted to local public
affairs. It concluded that “there is a near blackout of local
public affairs [programming]” on commercial television.141 By
contrast, 14.4% of the surveyed stations’ programming
consisted of home shopping and “infomercial” shows, 9.9%
consisted of reality and game shows, and 7.9% consisted of
sporting events.142 These findings, and similar findings by
other researchers,143 contradict the fundamental justification
for the FCC’s sweeping 1984 deregulation order which posited
that broadcast licensees “will continue to supply informational,
local and non-entertainment programming in response to
existing as well as future marketplace incentives.”144
Some broadcasters have argued that their local news
programming – some of which includes several hours each
weekday in some larger markets like New York, Los Angeles
and Washington, D.C. – encompasses significant local public
affairs (and therefore, public interest) coverage. These claims
are contradicted, however, by a 1999 study by the Project for
Excellence in Journalism, which examined the local news
local public affairs programming, individual stations do not respond
to increasingly competitive market conditions by producing more
public affairs programming. Nor, for that matter, do they respond by
reducing the amount of local public affairs programming they provide
. . . . Thus, the provision of local public affairs programming appears
highly resistant to economic influences.
Id.
141. See ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, supra note 13; see also Jennifer Harper,
Study Finds ‘Near Blackout’ of Local Public Issues on TV, WASHINGTON
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at A10.
142. See ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, supra note 13.
143. See, e.g., MEDIA ACCESS REPORT AND THE BENTON FOUNDATION,
WHAT’S LOCAL ABOUT LOCAL BROADCASTING (April 1998), available at
http://www.benton.org/publibrary/television/whatslocal.html
(last
visited
October 14, 2004). The report revealed that in a two-week programming
survey of five television markets (Chicago, IL, Phoenix, Ariz., Nashville, TN,
Spokane, WA and Bangor, ME), the forty commercial broadcasters provided
only 46.5 hours (out of 13,250 total programming hours), or 0.35% of the total
programming schedule, of local public affairs programming, which it defined
as “programs devoted to local issues of governance or civic affairs.” In three of
the surveyed markets – Nashville, TN, Spokane, WA, and Bangor, ME – there
was no local public affairs programming aired at all during the two-week
survey. Thirty-five percent of the stations surveyed provided no local news
programming whatsoever and 25% offered no local programming at all,
offering only national network or satellite syndicated programming. See id.
144. TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1080.
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offerings of the top-rated commercial broadcast stations in
twenty cities over a two-week period.145 That study found that
most news stories are low quality, “superficial and reactive.”146
In addition, it is now common practice for network affiliate
stations to devote significant portions of their already scarce
local news programs to the promotion of network programming,
network entertainment celebrities, as well as the recent
releases of affiliated enterprises, like motion picture studios.147
An important form of locally responsive programming is
coverage of political campaigns and elections.148 A 2002 study
of 10,000 local news broadcasts on 122 stations in the top fifty
markets concluded that less than half (44%) of local television
news broadcasts devoted any coverage at all to political
campaigns in the seven weeks leading up to the November
2002 elections.149 Fifty-six percent of broadcasters provided no
political campaign coverage whatsoever.150 Of the forty-four
percent of stations that aired any political campaign coverage,
less than fifteen percent were about local campaigns, including
races for the U.S. Congress.151 The average political story
lasted less than ninety seconds, and fewer than thirty percent
of the campaign stories featured candidates speaking for
themselves.152 Of those, the average candidate sound bite was

145. See Tom Rosenstiel et al., Local TV News, What Works, What Flops
and Why, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, Jan/Feb 1999, available at
http://archives.cjr.org/year/99/1/pej/main.asp.
146. Id.; see also Jim Upshaw, Network Profit Motive Cheats Voters Out of
Information, THE OREGONIAN, December 17, 2000, at F1 (“Stressed by daily
ratings data, many newsrooms tailor coverage more to the hour’s hot cultural
buzz than to long-term social concerns”). Network news programs also have
tailored much of their programming to sensationalistic, tabloid-like fare in
order to draw more viewers and keep them tuned in throughout the entire
broadcast. See id.
147. ROBERT MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA 85-86 (Monthly
Review Press) (2004) (citing multiple examples, like CBS affiliates’ regular
“reports” on contestants on the “Survivor” reality program and ABC affiliates’
promotion of Disney’s 2001 motion picture “Pearl Harbor”).
148. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R.
21,633, 21,647 (1999) (Notice of Inquiry) (“The Commission has long
interpreted the statutory public interest standard as imposing an obligation
on broadcast licensees to air programming regarding political campaigns”).
149. THE LEAR CENTER LOCAL NEWS ARCHIVE, LOCAL TV NEWS COVERAGE
OF
THE
2002
GENERAL
ELECTION
4
(2003),
available
at
http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdf/localTV2002.pdf.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5.
152. Id. at 4.
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only twelve seconds long.153 In 2000, the Center for Media and
Public Affairs documented that seventy-one percent of the
network news election coverage focused not on the substance of
the campaigns, but on the “horserace” elements (i.e., which
candidate was ahead in the polls and by how much).154 It also
reported that network evening news coverage of the
presidential candidates dropped from forty-three seconds in
1968 to less than eight seconds in 2000.155
Of all political coverage, perhaps the most important to our
democracy is coverage of the Democratic and Republican
presidential nominating conventions. Here too, broadcasters
have cut their coverage significantly. In 1972, ABC, CBS and
NBC devoted 180 hours of total airtime to both party
conventions.156 In 2000, that figure plummeted to a scant
twenty-two hours total.157 In 2004, the party conventions were
almost absent from free commercial television. Each of the
three major broadcast networks aired only three hours of live
programming for each of the conventions.158 At 8:05 p.m. on
July 26, 2004, the opening night of the Democratic National
Convention, Al Gore, former Vice President and winner of the
popular vote in the 2000 presidential race, addressed the
delegates. Instead of Gore’s speech, network television viewers
on the East Coast were treated to reruns of situation comedies
on ABC and CBS, and reality programming on Fox and NBC.159
153. Id.
154. Campaign 2000 Final: How TV News Covered the General Election
Campaign, MEDIA MONITOR, Nov./Dec. 2000.
155. Id.
156. See Editorial, Prime-time Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 2004, at
A10
157. See id.
158. See Ostrow, supra note 16; see also Jim Rutenberg, Network Anchors
Hold Fast to Their Dwindling 15 Minutes, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at P1.
Jim Lehrer, who anchored extensive convention coverage on behalf of the
Public Broadcasting Service, addressed the following complaint to the lead
anchors of the ABC, CBS and NBC evening news programs:
We’re about to elect a president…at a time when we have young
people dying in our name overseas, we just had a report from the 9/11
commission which says we are not safe as a nation, and one of these
two groups of people is going to run our country. The fact that you
three networks decided it was not important enough to cover in prime
time, the message that gives the American people is huge. As a
citizen, it bothers me.
Id.
159. See, e.g., TV Guide (Metropolitan New York City Edition), July 26,
2004.
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CBS directed viewers interested in convention coverage to its
website (www.cbs.com) while NBC directed viewers to its cable
networks, MSNBC and CNBC.160 Thus, television viewers
without broadband Internet connections, or cable or satellite
television subscriptions, had very little access to live convention
coverage and analysis.
2. Political Broadcasting
Consistent with congressional directives, the FCC requires
broadcasters to provide “equal opportunities” (also known as
“equal time”) to candidates for public office if their opponents
buy commercial time or are provided airtime by a station.161
This rule received attention in the days leading to the
presidential election, when television station group owner
Sinclair Broadcast Group ordered all sixty-two of its stations,
many located in what were considered swing states (e.g.,
Florida and Ohio), to air “Stolen Honor: Wounds that Never
Heal,” a documentary produced by a Bush family friend that
was widely denounced as blatant anti-Kerry propaganda.162
Sinclair reversed its decision, and aired what was considered a
more balanced program, only after the company lost stock
value and advertising as a result of negative attention.163
In addition to the equal opportunities rule, broadcasters
also must provide candidates for federal elective office
“reasonable access”164 to advertising slots and charge
candidates the “lowest unit charge of the station” for the “same
class and amount of time for the same period” during the fortyfive days preceding a primary election and sixty days preceding
a general or special election.165
Although broadcasters do not air much locally-oriented
political programming, they do air and profit enormously from
the large quantity of political advertising. In the 2000 election,
broadcasters earned $600 million in political ad revenues from
candidates and political parties. In 1996, that figure was $400
160. See Ostrow, supra note 16.
161. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47
C.F.R. §73.1941 (2004).
162. See Paul Farhi, Sinclair Stations to Air Anti-Kerry Documentary,
WASH. POSTL, Oct. 11, 2004, at A07.
163. See Marjorie Heins and Adam H. Morse, A Question of Fair Air Play,
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 68.
164. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (2004).
165. See id. § 73.1942.
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million.166 A number of advocates for regulatory reform have
argued in favor of having Congress require commercial
television broadcasters to provide free blocks of prime time for
use by federal political candidates to introduce themselves and
explain their positions.167 The broadcast lobby defeated those
efforts by invoking First Amendment concerns.168
3. Children’s Educational Programming
The Children’s Television Act of 1990 and the
Commission’s
implementing
regulations
require
that
broadcasters serve the “educational and informational needs of
They also require that advertising on
children.”169
programming directed at children be limited to 12 minutes per
hour during weekdays and 10.5 minutes during weekends.170
In addition, the FCC encourages, but does not require,
television broadcasters to air three hours of educational
children’s programming per week.171
Although the three-hour weekly children’s educational
programming guideline is the only quantified public interest
“expectation” imposed upon broadcasters, here too the
166. Jeff Cohen, T.V. Industry Wields Power in D.C., BALTIMORE SUN, May
4, 1997 at 6F. Former Senator and presidential candidate Bill Bradley
bemoaned the expense of political advertising by saying: “Today’s Senate
campaigns function as collection agencies for broadcasters. You simply
transfer money from contributors to television stations.” Id.
167. See, e.g., Comments of Alliance for Better Campaigns, et al., Public
Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-390, at 1
(filed Mar. 27, 2000) (“A free time requirement would ensure that citizens
have access to the information they need to choose their representatives while
also furthering the broadcasters’ longstanding, but oft-neglected, obligation to
serve the public interest”).
168. See, e.g., Comments of the Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-390, at 20-30 (filed
Apr. 25, 2000).
169. See Children’s Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 103(a)(2) (1994).;
FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(2004). In enacting the
Children’s Television Act, Congress noted that “market forces have not worked
to increase the educational and information programming available to
children.” S. REP. NO. 101-227, at 9 (1989).
170. See 47 U.S.C. § 102(b); FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. §
73.670.
171. See Children’s Television Order, supra note 18, at 10,721; 47 C.F.R. §
73.671 (2004). The Commission also adopted a more precise definition of what
would qualify as children’s educational and informational programming: “any
television programming that furthers the educational and informational needs
of children 16 years of age and under in any respect, including children’s
intellectual/cognitive or social/emotional needs.” Id. at 10,698
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broadcasters have emphasized profit over service. After the
three-hour educational programming guideline was introduced
in 1996, the Wall Street Journal reported that advertising
agencies, which are always looking for ways to target children,
viewed it as a “marketing bonanza.”172 In fact, children
represent one of the most hotly contested television audiences,
considering that industry studies show that children can
influence upwards of $500 billion per year in family
purchases.173
Although the FCC’s new children’s educational
programming guidelines were a boon for advertisers, they have
resulted in little programming benefit for children. In fact, the
New York Times reported in 1997 that instead of creating new
educational children’s programming, many broadcasters simply
reclassified some of their existing Saturday morning children’s
entertainment fare as educational programming.174
4. Obscenity and Indecency
Relying on Congressional mandates and the public trustee
doctrine, the FCC’s rules prohibit broadcasters from airing
“obscene” programming, and require that “indecent”
programming be restricted to between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m.175 Indecency is defined as “language or material that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community broadcast standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or
activities.”176
172. Sally Goll Beatty, White House Pact on TV for Kids May Prove a
Marketing Bonanza, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1996, at B10.
173. See Kim Campbell & Kent Davis-Packard, How Kids Get to Say, I
Want It, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 18, 2000, at 1; see also Gary
Ruskin, Why They Whine: How Corporations Prey on Our Children,
MOTHERING MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1999 (quoting Mike Searles, president of
Kids-R-Us children’s stores, characterizing the children’s advertising
philosophy as “if you own this child at an early age, you can own this child for
years to come”), available at http://www.mediaawareness.ca/english/resources/
articles/advertising_marketing/corp_pray_child.cfm.
174. Lawrie Mifflin, Can You Spell ‘Compliance,’ Boys and Girls? Networks
Go Along, but Just Barely, With New Federal Rules on Children’s Shows, N. Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at C13.
175. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004); 47
U.S.C. § 303 (2000); see also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the Constitutionality of the indecency
restrictions).
176. Action for Children’s Television, 58 F.3d at 657.
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Here too, the FCC has assumed a strikingly permissive
enforcement attitude, only reverting to a more aggressive
regulatory stance when subjected to public scrutiny. In an
October 2003 decision, the FCC’s enforcement bureau
determined that NBC did not violate the rule when Bono, the
lead singer of the Irish rock band U2, uttered “f—-ing brilliant”
during an acceptance speech at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards.
The FCC determined that Bono’s use and NBC’s uncensored
broadcast of the word was not indecent because it was
“adjectival” and did not describe a sexual function.177 After
enduring weeks of ridicule in the print media and on the
Internet, the FCC reversed its decision and ruled that the
No such reversal was
expletive indeed was indecent.178
possible in the matter of the exposure of singer Janet Jackson’s
right breast at the end of her televised Super Bowl 2003 halftime performance. Although Jackson claimed the exposure was
inadvertent and attributable to a “wardrobe malfunction,” the
incident – on one of the most watched programs of the year –
generated a firestorm of public protest, and provided elected
officials and political candidates entering an election year with
an irresistible opportunity to speak in support of family values
and decency on the airwaves.179 Indeed, on September 22,
2004, the FCC proposed that Viacom, Inc., pay $550,000 in
fines for the Super Bowl stunt.180
5. The “Huge Giveaway” - The Transition to Digital Television
The
most
controversial
aspect
of
the
1996
Telecommunications Act involved its provisions concerning the
national transition to digital television (DTV).181 Since 1941,
177. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,859, 19,861
(2003) (Memorandum Opinion and Order); see also Frank Ahrens, FCC
Chairman Seeks Reversal on Profanity, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2004, at E1.
178. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978 (2004)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order).
179. See Bill McConnell, Get Ready to Rumble, BROADCASTING AND CABLE
MAGAZINE, July 5, 2004, at 3; Bill McConnell, Set for a Showdown,
BROADCASTING AND CABLE MAGAZINE, July 26, 2004, at 24.
180. Press Release, FCC, FCC Proposes Statutory Maximum Fine of
$550,000 Against Viacom-Owned CBS Affiliates for Apparent Violation of
Indecency Rules During Broadcast of Super Bowl Halftime Show (Sept. 22,
2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC252384A1.doc.
181. DTV has become synonymous with “Advanced Television” or ATV,
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the nation’s broadcasters have reached their viewers by means
of analog signals formatted according to a standard developed
by the National Television System Committee (NTSC).182 In
response to broadcast industry concerns that the existing
analog television system was becoming obsolete, the FCC
issued a Notice of Inquiry in 1987.183 Upon execution of the
inquiry, the FCC identified a new advanced broadcasting
standard known as “High Definition Television” (HDTV). High
Definition Television is also referred to as Enhanced Digital
Television or “EDTV,” and both fall under the category of
digital television technology, or “DTV”184
The FCC touted DTV as a “quantum leap” in broadcasting
Whereas traditional television has limited
technology.185
capacity or “bandwidth” and is prone to signal attenuation due
to terrain and harsh weather, DTV uses a digital signal,
consisting of binary code that has tremendous capacity.186 In
the same amount of radio frequency spectrum allotted to one
standard analog broadcast channel – 6 MHz – DTV can
transmit a picture with resolution quality rivaling 35millimeter film and sound quality equivalent to digital audio
formats, such as compact discs and Internet mp3 song files.187
Digital Television is also able to multicast and datacast within
the same 6 MHz television “channel.” Using compression
technology, a broadcaster is able to multicast several
“subchannels” along with its main station signal, with quality

which initially referred to a number of television technologies, analog and
digital, designed to take the place of analog television. For an excellent
overview of the terminology and technology involved in the DTV transition, see
Daniel P. Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age, 1 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 97, 99-100 (2003).
182. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, MM Docket No. 87-268, 2 F.C.C.R. 5125, para. 5
(1987) (Notice of Inquiry).
183. See id. at ¶ 2; see also FCC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADVANCED
TELEVISION SERVICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION 2-3 (Nov. 28, 1995).
184. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6520 n.1 (1988); Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R 21,633, 21,634 para. 3
(1999).
185. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,542 para. 11 (1995).
186. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 6 F.C.C.R. 7024 (1991).
187. See id. at 7024 para. 1, n.1.
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superior to that of traditional broadcasting.188 For example, a
broadcaster could simultaneously air a syndicated talk show on
its main station channel and a children’s cartoon program, an
old movie, an “infomercial,” and a stream of CD-quality music
on four of its subchannels.189
Because the language of DTV is the same as that of
personal computers and computing devices, DTV will allow the
integration of new services. In addition to airing a main
station signal and individual “subchannels,” the DTV spectrum
broadcasts data (“datacast”), such as information about
advertised products, Internet links, sports and weather
The FCC
information, and stock market information.190
characterized this capacity in its 1996 report:
Utilizing [HDTV], broadcasters can transmit three, four, five, or more
such program streams simultaneously. [HDTV] allows for the
broadcast of literally dozens of CD-quality audio signals. It permits
the rapid delivery of large amounts of data; an entire edition of the
local daily newspaper could be sent, for example, in less than two
seconds. Other material, whether it be telephone directories, sports
information, stock market updates, information requested concerning
certain products featured in commercials, computer software
distribution, interactive education materials, or virtually any other
type of information access can also be provided.
It allows
broadcasters to send video, voice and data simultaneously and to
provide a range of services dynamically, switching easily and quickly
from one type of service to another.191

At the beginning of its DTV proceeding, the FCC proposed
that broadcasters “be given the opportunity to implement
[HDTV]”192 in order to offer Americans “programs with
188. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.
21,633, 21,634 para. 3 (1999) (“DTV holds the promise of reinventing free,
over-the-air television by offering broadcasters new and valuable business
opportunities and providing consumers new and valuable services”).
189. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,774-75 para. 5 (1996).
190. Id.; see also Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the
Existing Television Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,820-21 para. 29
(1997) (explaining that DTV broadcasters are able to offer non-broadcast
“ancillary and supplementary” services by means of excess capacity in their
DTV channel, such as pay-per-view programming, computer software
distribution services, private data transmissions teletext services, “and any
other services that do not interfere with the required free service”); NICHOLAS
NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 52-53 (1995).
191. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,774-75 para. 5 (1996).
192. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, para. 4 (1992).
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This
significantly improved video and audio quality.”193
requirement would have limited the ability of broadcasters to
exploit the multicast and datacasting capabilities of their new
digital channels. In response to industry lobbying, the FCC
later withdrew the requirement for a minimum amount of high
definition programming. Instead, the FCC declared that
broadcasters would be required to air at least one free, overthe-air signal with “resolution . . . comparable to or better than
that of today’s service.”194 The FCC reasoned that allowing
broadcasters the flexibility to multi- and datacast and offer
priced ancillary and supplementary services would provide
broadcasters “the opportunity to develop additional revenue
The FCC
streams from innovative digital services.”195
concluded that this revenue “will help broadcast television . . .
remain a strong presence in the video programming market
that will, in turn, help support a free programming service.”196
The concern was less about offering “pretty pictures” and more
about encouraging broadcasters to optimize all technical
capabilities of the new digital spectrum.197 The FCC reached
the following conclusion:
We do not know what consumers may demand and support. Since
broadcasters have incentives to discover the preferences of consumers
and adapt their service offerings accordingly, we believe it is prudent
to leave the choice up to broadcasters so that they may respond to the
demands of the marketplace.
A requirement now could stifle
innovation as it would rest on a priori assumptions as to what
services viewers would prefer. Broadcasters can best stimulate
consumers’ interest in digital services if able to offer the most
attractive programs, whatever form those may take.... Further,
allowing broadcasters flexibility as to the services they provide will
allow them to offer a mix of services that can promote increased
consumer acceptance of digital television, which, in turn, will increase
broadcasters’ profits, which, in turn, will increase incentives to
proceed faster with the transition.198

In exchange for greater freedom in the use of their new
digital channels, the 1996 Act requires broadcasters to pay the
federal government a fee of five percent of gross revenues

193. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, para. 1 (1988).
194. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,820 para. 28 (1997).
195. Id. at para. 29.
196. Id.
197. See 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,826 para. 42.
198. Id.
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6. The High Price of “Free” Over-the-Air Television
Unlike the adoptions of the color image and stereo sound
standards, which did not render older television sets obsolete,
the transition to DTV will require all viewers to either
purchase new digital television sets or a “set-top converter
box.”200 To facilitate the transition of American broadcasting
from analog to digital format, the 1996 Telecom Act provided
broadcasters with an additional 6 MHz “channel” of spectrum
to use for DTV service. These new digital channels are
“located” in a higher frequency band that allows broadcasters
to transmit significantly more information in a 6 MHz-wide
channel.
Television broadcasters were required to begin
simulcasting fifty percent of the video programming on their
standard analog signal on their DTV channel by April 1, 2003,
seventy-five percent by April 1, 2004, and one hundred percent
by April 1, 2005.201 “Simulcasting” describes “the broadcast of
one program over two channels to the same area at the same
time.”202
The simulcasting requirements during the transition
period were intended to encourage viewers to adopt DTV
technology and phase out viewers’ dependence on the standard
analog channel for programming not yet available on the DTV
channel.203 December 31, 2006 is currently the deadline for full
DTV transition and termination of NTSC analog
broadcasting.204 However, Congress provided that the FCC
could extend the deadline for individual stations.205 To receive
an extension, eighty-five percent of a station’s viewers must be
unable to receive its digital signal either by means of a digital
television set or a converter box or through a cable or satellite
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(e) (2000); Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary
Use of Digital Television Spectrum Pursuant to Section 336(e)(1) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259, 3267 para. 20 (1998).
200. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627, para. 8, n.1 (1990).
201. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.624(f)(i)-(iii) (2004).
202. 5 F.C.C.R. at para. 8, n. 1.
203. See id.
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A) (2000).
205. See id. § 309(j)(14)(B).
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television provider.206 On December 31, 2006, or when a
broadcaster’s digital signal has achieved eighty-five percent
market penetration, whichever is later, broadcasters must
surrender their former NTSC channels to the FCC, and the
FCC will then auction the spectrum for non broadcast uses.207
When the surrender of NTSC channels occur, it is possible that
as many as fifteen percent of viewers will not have access to a
DTV television, a set-top converter or a cable or DBS
subscription. Therefore, they will have no access to “free”
television broadcasts.
7. The Public Trustee Doctrine in the Digital Landscape
When the FCC initiated the transition from analog to
digital television, it emphasized that “although many aspects of
the business and technology of broadcasting may be different,
broadcasters will remain trustees of the public’s airwaves.”208
The FCC clarified that it limited the eligibility for DTV
channels to existing broadcasters because broadcasters would
continue to have an “obligation to serve the public interest.”209
It declared: “[w]e remain committed to enforcing our statutory
mandate to ensure that broadcasters serve the public
interest.”210
Congress’s decision to grant the additional 6 MHz channel
to broadcasters for digital exploitation was hotly contested.211
Many commentators insisted broadcasters should have paid
fair market value for the new channels.212 For example,
206. See id. § 309(j)(14)(B).
207. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, para. 66 (1992) (stating “[t]he more swiftly ATV
receiver penetration increases, the more rapidly we will be able to reclaim one
6 MHz channel”).
208. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,829-30 paras. 49, 50 (1997) (“As we
authorize digital service . . . broadcaster licensees and the public are on notice
that existing public interest requirements continue to apply to all broadcast
licensees. Broadcasters and the public are also on notice that the Commission
may adopt new public interest rules for digital television.”).
209. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,545-56 para. 33 (1995).
210. Id. at 10,546 para. 34.
211. See Michael Calabrese, The Great Airwaves Robbery, New America
Foundation Public Assets Program, Spectrum Series no. 2, Nov. 2001, p. 1;
Taylor, supra note 21, at 20; Joel Brinkley, FCC Approves 2d Channels for
High-Definition Television, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at D1; see Farhi, supra
note 22, at F1.
212. See Neil Hickey, What’s at Stake in the Spectrum War? Only Billions
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conservative commentator William Safire, who is known for his
defense of the free market, called Congress’s grant of the new
spectrum to television broadcasters for free, without any
auction proceeding and without any additional public interest
commitments from broadcasters, a “rip-off on a scale vaster
than dreamed of by yesteryear’s robber barons.”213 Congress
required the FCC to auction licenses for a number of new
digital, nonbroadcasting services, such as cellular and paging
services, which generated $20 billion dollars for the United
States Treasury.214
Media and academic commentators estimated the value of
the digital spectrum “handout” at between $12.5 billion and
Some commentators argued that giving
$365 billion.215
broadcasters an additional 6 MHz for digital broadcasting was
excessive216 because a 6 MHz digital “channel” offers many
times the bandwidth of a 6 MHz analog channel. Digital
compression technology creates a broadband pipeline capable of
of Dollars and the Future of Television, 35 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 39, 40
(1996). Another commentator called it the “lobbying coup of the decade.”
Taylor, supra note 21, at 20.
213. Taylor, supra note 21, at 20.
214. See Graham, supra note 181, at 97, 112 (citing Press Release, Federal
Communications Commission, FCC Hits $20 Billion Mark in Total Auction
Revenues,
at
http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/nrwl6015.txt)).
215. See The Third of a Trillion Giveaway, CENTER FOR DIGITAL
DEMOCRACY, Sept. 18, 2001, at www.democraticmedia.org (last visited Nov.
27, 2004); Paul Farhi, Broadcast Executives Say Dole Vented Anger at Them,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at F1; Romesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth Bonanza:
How the Networks Plan to Make Even More from a $70 Billion Handout, TIME,
Sept. 1, 1997, at 60; Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New
Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1687, 1728 (1997); Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2560; Taylor,
supra note 21, at 20.
216. See e.g., Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the
Existing Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,813-14 para. 10 (1997)
(citing comments by the Media Access Project, arguing the FCC should only
allocate broadcasters enough spectrum to broadcast one high definition digital
television signal which is considerably less than 6 MHz of spectrum allocated);
see also Graham, supra note 181, at 111 (quoting the Office of Communication,
Inc. of the United Church of Christ et. al.).
Now broadcasters want to build a new and improved business on
more rent-free property while still holding their original allocation
and not committing to the date they are going to give any of it back.
This is a great deal for broadcasters. But is it a good deal for the
public who will have to reinvest billions of dollars in television
receivers in order to gain access to the new business, Advanced
Television?
Id.
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transmitting multiple, separate television signals and services
on a 6 MHz channel.217 Moreover, broadcasters are not
required to utilize the new digital spectrum to transmit high
definition signals. Instead, Congress and the FCC allowed
broadcasters to use the spectrum according to marketplace
demands, thereby allowing broadcasters to generate revenue
from a spectrum that would otherwise be used to broadcast
DTV.218
Broadcasters called the “rip off” argument a “myth.”219
They argued because their analog channels would be returned
after the digital transition period, the additional 6 MHz of
spectrum was a “loan.”220 Belo, an owner of 18 major market
television stations across the country, argued the DTV
transition imposes “immense financial burdens”221 on
broadcasters, because after the transition broadcasters “will be
in the same position they were prior to the transition – they
each will have one 6 MHz television channel.”222 This industry
argument ignores the rather obvious fact that comparing 6
MHz of digital spectrum with 6 MHz of analog spectrum is like
comparing 6 square miles of Upstate New York farmland with
6 square miles of Midtown Manhattan real estate. The latter is
significantly more lucrative and can accommodate many more
profitable uses than the former. Broadcasters’ complaints
about the financial burden of acquiring and maintaining new
digital transmission equipment, estimated at between $1
million to $30 million per station,223 overlook the significant
profit-making benefits they will reap from the new digital
capabilities of multicasting, datacasting and subscription
services.
By codifying the DTV transition plan in the 1996 Telecom
217. Id.
218. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,821 para. 29 (1997).
219. Comments of Belo, Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at iv (filed Mar. 27, 2000).
220. Id. at 18-19 (reasoning that “the second channels . . . are merely being
loaned to broadcasters so that they may simulcast analog and digital
programming while viewers upgrade to digital television sets. Without this
approach, stations would be forced to switch to digital transmission overnight,
leaving millions of viewers with dark and silent television sets the next day”).
221. Id. at iv (estimating the total cost of the DTV conversion at $17
billion).
222. Id. at 19.
223. See Graham, supra note 181, at 113 (citing JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING
TELEVISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION 204 (1997)).
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Act, Congress affirmed that broadcasters remain public
trustees after the transition to DTV: “Nothing in this section
shall be construed as relieving a television broadcasting station
from its obligation to serve the public interest, convenience and
Accordingly, the FCC declared that
necessity.”224
“[b]roadcasters and the public are also on notice that the
Commission may adopt new public interest rules for digital
television.”225
8. The Gore Commission
In 1997, conscious of public discord concerning the grant of
digital spectrum to broadcasters, President Bill Clinton
established the Presidents’ Advisory Committee on the Public
Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, 226
popularly known as the “Gore Commission” because Vice
The twenty-two-member
President Gore supervised it.227
commission represented “the commercial and noncommercial
broadcasting industry, computer industries, producers,
academic institutions, public interest organizations, and the
advertising community.”228 Its final report recognized that the
conversion to digital television “invites a broad reassessment of
established programming practices, competitive strategies, and
regulatory requirements, including the public interest
obligations, that have always been considered fundamental to
broadcast television in this country.”229 The Gore Commission
called the public interest standard the “golden thread that has
run through more than seven decades of broadcasting,”230 and
made ten recommendations for additional public interest
obligations digital broadcasters should assume in exchange for
224. 47 U.S.C. § 336(d) (2000) (“In the Commission’s review of any
application for renewal of a broadcast license for a television station that
provides ancillary or supplementary services, the television licensee shall
establish that all of its program services on the existing or advanced television
spectrum are in the public interest.”).
225. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,830 para. 50 (1997).
226. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,065, 12,065 (Mar. 13, 1997).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST
OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL
BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 3 (Dec. 18,
1998), available at www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf.
230. Id. at 2.
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the benefit of the new digital channel. Most notable of these
recommendations were mandatory public affairs programming
requirements,231 free airtime for political candidates to present
and defend their positions,232 the donation of datacasting
services (such as voting and public hearings information, public
safety and health announcements, and educational and local
public affairs programming) to community and educational
institutions,233 and the creation of a public broadcasting “trust
fund” to ensure the development of quality digital public
programming, while providing permanent funding that would
remove public broadcasting out of the political arena.234
9. The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry on DTV Public Interest
Obligations
On June 3, 1999, “People for Better TV,” a broad coalition
of public interest organizations, medical and educational
associations, and other groups filed a petition for rulemaking
and notice of inquiry with the FCC.235 The coalition asserted
that “the advent of digital broadcasting requires the
Commission to consider public interest obligations anew, and
clarify whether existing guidelines apply.”236 It urged the FCC
to open a proceeding to “articulate a digital public interest
standard that matches in scope and effectiveness the
magnificent capability of the digital television technology . . .
.”237 Specifically, it requested that the Commission consider
adopting all of the Gore Commission’s recommendations “as a
starting point”238 and that it reinstitute the public interest
programming requirements enumerated in the 1960
Programming Policy Statement.239
231. Id. at 48.
232. Id. at 59 (proposing that “the television broadcasting industry to
provide 5 minutes each night for candidate-centered discourse in the 30 days
before an election . . . . Stations would choose the candidate and races,
Federal, State and local, in the election that deserved more attention”).
233. Id. at 52-54.
234. FINAL REPORT, supra note 229, at 50.
235. Petition by People for Better TV for Rulemaking and Notice of
Inquiry, Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket
No. 99-360 (filed June 3, 1999).
236. Id. at 7.
237. Id. at 22.
238. Id. at 17.
239. Id. at 17-18. It also requested that the Commission place special
emphasis on services to the disabled and non-English speakers, public access
opportunities to multicast subchannels, privacy protection and rate regulation
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The FCC released a notice of inquiry on December 20,
1999.240 Several months later, then-FCC Chairman William
Kennard received a joint letter from Senators Byrd,
Brownback, Lieberman, and McCain expressing their concern
about the content of contemporary television broadcasting and
urging the Commission to demand higher programming
standards from broadcast licensees:241
[T]he time has come for the Commission to engage in a broad
reexamination of the public interest standard, and the license
renewal process, to determine if in fact the broadcasters are serving
‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity,’ and whether the
standard of service we expect of broadcasters should be clarified.242

In addition to the Senators’ letter, the FCC received
comments from a variety of broadcasters and individuals and
public sector organizations. Predictably, many of the public
interest advocates agreed with, and added to, the initial
demands presented by People for Better TV in its initial
petition,243 while the broadcast commentators argued
for pay-per-view programming. Id. at 20.
240. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 15 F.C.C.R.
22,946 (1999) (Notice of Inquiry).
241. BILL KENNARD, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST
OBLIGATIONS OF TELEVISION BROADCASTERS AS THEY TRANSITION TO DIGITAL
TELEVISION (2001) (quoting a Letter from Hon. John McCain, Chairman (RAriz.), Senate Commerce Committee; Hon. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), Ranking
Minority Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee; Hon. Robert C.
Byrd (D-W. Va.), Ranking Minority Member, Senate Appropriations
Committee; Hon. Sam Brownback (D-Kan.), Member, Senate Commerce
Committee to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (May 25, 2000)
[hereinafter McCain letter]).
242. KENNARD, supra note 241. (quoting the McCain letter). Referring to
the broadcast industry’s continuing resistance to concrete and expanded public
interest requirements, the Senators wrote:
The denials and excuses we routinely hear today from the industry
raise serious questions about the commitment of many broadcasters
to serving the public interest, as they are obligated to do by law. We
must remember that broadcasters are trustees of a public resource
worth billions of dollars, which they get access to for free, in return
for a pledge to act as responsible stewards of the airwaves. The
license they receive is a legally-binding contract, an especially
important one given television’s immense influence on our children
and our culture. And much to our dismay, the evidence presented in
this letter strongly suggests that many licensees, along with their
network parents, are breaching this public trust, and harming rather
than serving the public interest.
Id.
243. See, e.g., Comments of the Benton Found., Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 2000)
(requesting that the FCC adopt clearer public interest requirements based on
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vehemently against any change to the existing public interest
requirements.244 The National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB), the largest national trade association for broadcasters,
argued that that the imposition of any new public interest
requirements would be “premature” given that digital
broadcasting is still in its infancy and has not had the time to
develop.245
Four years later, the Notice of Inquiry proceeding is still
pending. Its only tangible byproduct was a January 18, 2001
Report to Congress from then-FCC Chairman Bill Kennard “on
the Public Interest Obligations of Television Broadcasters as
They Transition to Digital Television.”246 This unenforceable
Report “attempts to distill a number of broad principles for
broadcasters that, if followed, would go a long way toward
a “Viewers’ Bill of Rights,” demanding more localism in programming,
treatment of public affairs and children’s educational television, and balanced
coverage of controversial issues in the community); Comments of The Alliance
for Better Campaigns et al., Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 2000) (requesting that FCC
require broadcasters to provide “more in-depth discussion of [political]
campaign issues by providing free air time for candidates on their stations”);
Reply Comments of United Church of Christ et al., Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Apr. 25, 2000)
(requesting adoption of “quantifiable public interest obligations for digital
licensees”); Comments of Children Now, Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 24, 2000) (arguing,
inter alia, for the modification of the current requirement for three hours of
educational and informational children’s television by making the quantitative
minimum a proportion of all programming aired on all multicast streams).
244. See Comments of CBS Corp., supra note 24 (“Although these proposals
are advanced in the name of the ‘public interest,’ in many cases they are little
more than recycled versions of the regulatory policies of another era, properly
abandoned by the Commission as unnecessary years ago.”); Comments of Belo,
supra note 219 (insisting that the FCC has no authority to promulgate
additional public interest programming requirements and that any additional
guidelines should be developed by broadcasters themselves and applied
voluntarily).
245. Comments of Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, Public Interest Obligations
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 3 (filed Mar. 27, 2000)
(“Rather than prematurely adopting such rules, the Commission should at this
time be more concerned with insuring a successful and expeditious digital
transition.”) And Belo, a large station group owner, argued that the transition
itself would provide adequate compensation to the American public: “When the
DTV transition is complete, the public will receive very substantial benefits in
the form of free over-the-air services with greatly improved signal quality (e.g.,
HDTV) and expanded programming choices (through SDTV multiplexing). In
other words, the transition to DTV, in and of itself, serves the public interest.”
Comments of Belo, supra note 219, at 19.
246. See KENNARD, supra note 241.
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The Report’s “principles”
serving the public interest.”247
harkened back to the pre-1980s public interest requirements.
They include broadcasters’ responsibility “to air programming
responsive to the issues of concern to their communities,”248
their interest in “air[ing] local public affairs programming daily
in addition to news coverage,”249 cognizant of the distinction
between public affairs programming and news programming,250
and the importance of “us[ing] good journalistic practices in
covering local issues of public concern so as to present
conflicting viewpoints and give persons attacked a reasonable
right of reply.”251
II. WHY THE BROADCAST PUBLIC TRUSTEE DOCTRINE
FAILED
A. FIRST AMENDMENT CONTRADICTIONS
Reflecting on the FCC’s tortuous history of interpreting
and enforcing the 1934 Communications Act’s “public interest”
standard, former FCC Commissioner Ervin Duggan remarked
that “successive regimes at the FCC have oscillated wildly
between enthusiasm for the public interest standard and
distaste for it.”252 Critics of the standard have called it “vague
to the point of vacuousness, providing neither guidance nor
constraint on the regulatory agency’s action.”253
Although the FCC’s seven decades-old struggle to define
the public interest standard can be attributed in part to the
shifts in political winds and regulatory philosophies, as well as
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (implicitly citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.1810(d)(1)(iii) (repealed 1984)
(defining “news programming” as “dealing with current local, national and
international events, including weather and stock reports, and commentary,
analysis, or sports news when they are an integral part of a news program.”)).
251. Id.
252. Ervin S. Duggan, Congressman Tauzin’s interesting idea,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 20, 1997, at S18; see also Erwin G. Krasnow &
Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for the Holy
Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 607 (1998) (“If the history of this elusive
regulatory standard makes anything clear, it is the fact that just what
constitutes service in the ‘public interest’ has encompassed different things at
different times.”).
253. GLEN O. ROBINSON, “Title I, The Federal Communications Act: An
Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose,” in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 at 3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
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the vagueness of its legislative origins, the fundamental cause
of the FCC’s difficulty and the doctrine’s failure is its inherent
tension with the First Amendment and the anti-censorship
provision of the Communications Act of 1934. Although the
Communications Act delegates to the FCC the authority to
issue licenses for use of public spectrum “consistent with the
public interest,”254 it also has a strongly worded censorship
prohibition:
Nothing in this [Act] shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.255

In 1973, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress
essentially required the FCC to “walk a ‘tightrope’ to preserve
the First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its
successor, the Communications Act,” while ensuring that
broadcasters operate in the “public interest.”256
At its essence then, this tension is one between two
conflicting interpretations of the First Amendment. On the one
hand, there is the perspective that the First Amendment is the
notion of the “free marketplace of ideas” that must be protected
from all government restriction and influence. In his dissent in
the 1919 Abrams v. United States case,257 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote that “the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”258 In other words, the unencumbered exchange of
conflicting ideas comes closest to yielding truth and the
common good.
A related but somewhat conflicting free speech theory is
associated with James Madison, one of the Constitution’s
principal authors and a champion of the Bill of Rights. The
Madisonian view of the First Amendment values free speech as
a means to civil enfranchisement, political and economic
equality, and democratic empowerment.259 To Madison, the
First Amendment was at the core of American democracy. It
254. 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2000).
255. § 326 (2000).
256. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
257. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
258. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
259. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 46 (James Madison).
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was intended to create and perpetuate an educated, informed
and empowered electorate and a responsive democratic
government.260
In contrast to the Holmesian view, the Madisonian
perspective was not principally interested in keeping the
“marketplace of ideas” free from government interference, but
was concerned with ensuring that all voices were present and
heard in the marketplace.261 Justice Louis Brandeis expressed
a Madisonian view of the First Amendment in his opinion in
Whitney v. California,262 where he posited “the greatest menace
to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle
of the American government.”263
In addition, as Professor Cass Sunstein has observed, the
Holmesian “free marketplace of ideas” perspective presumes
that all viable ideas have access to the marketplace and to
public consideration.264 The Madisonian perspective does not
so presume, and instead posits that government has a role in
facilitating the availability of public fora in which individuals
can meet to share their ideas in matters of democratic concern.
Madison’s conception of the First Amendment lies at the
heart of the broadcast public trustee doctrine. The Gore
Commission characterized the purpose of American broadcast
regulation as realizing Madison’s ideal:
From the beginning, broadcast regulation in the public interest has
sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and culture,
over and above what the marketplace may or may not provide. It has
sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic
dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, and
more robust, culturally inclusive communities.265

And FCC Commissioners continue to justify their actions
by characterizing “free over-the-air television” as having a
260. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH,
at xvii (1995).
261. Id. See also Ronald W. Adelman, The First Amendment and the
Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1125, 1132-37 (1996) (discussing the
conflict between the Madisonian and Hlmesian perspectives).
262. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 375 . For an excellent discussion of Justice Brandeis’s free
speech views, see Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 653 (1988).
264. See Sunstein, supra note 260.
265. See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 7, at
21.
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“special and critical role in our communities and in the nation’s
marketplace of ideas.”266
The Supreme Court has addressed the tension between the
free speech rights of broadcasters and the interests of audience
members and the government in a number of cases. In FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court called the
public interest standard the “touchstone for the exercise of the
Commission’s authority.”267 While recognizing the standard as
necessarily broad and imprecise, the Court characterized it “as
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field
of delegated authority permit”268 and as “a supple instrument
for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress
has charged to carry out its legislative policy.”269
One month later, in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,270
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “no person is to have
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the
granting of a license.”271 In holding that economic injury to an
existing station is not an element the FCC must consider in
evaluating an application for a new station, it declared that “it
is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against
competition but to protect the public.”272 The Court warned,
however, that “[t]he Commission is given no supervisory control
of the programs, of business management or of policy.”273
The Supreme Court addressed the first broad attack on the
constitutionality of the public trustee doctrine in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,274 in which broadcasters
challenged the constitutionality of the FCC’s “chain
broadcasting” regulations, which had prohibited certain

266. Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698-746 MHz Spectrum Band,
17 F.C.C.R. 1022, 1124 (2002) (Report and Order) (Separate Statement of
Commissioner Michael J. Copps); see also Review of the Commission’s
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, para. 179 (2003)
(Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (recognizing the
relevance of television ownership limits in “protect[ing] the public’s First
Amendment interest in a robust marketplace of ideas”).
267. 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
271. Id. at 475.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 319 U.S. 190 (1934).
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practices between radio networks and their affiliate stations.275
The networks argued that the FCC’s authority was limited to
that of a signal interference traffic cop, that the public interest
standard was unconstitutionally vague, and that the
regulations violated their free speech rights.276 In upholding
the regulations, the Court articulated a spirited defense of the
public trustee doctrine and its resulting FCC public interest
regulations. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter
wrote:
The [1934 Communications] Act itself establishes that the
Commission’s powers are not limited to the engineering and technical
aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet we are asked to
regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave
lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the
Act does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the
traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the
composition of that traffic.277

Justice Frankfurter then went on to dispose of the
networks’ First Amendment argument by articulating what has
become known as the “scarcity rationale”:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently
is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is
why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental
regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it
must be denied.278

The Court also ruled that the public interest standard was
not unconstitutionally vague, but was sufficiently broad to
prevent “stereotyp[ing] the powers of the Commission to
specific details in regulating a field of enterprise the dominant
characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding.”279

275. Id. at 193-94 (prohibited practices included exclusive affiliation and
territorial exclusivity agreements and dual network operation).
276. See id. at 209.
277. Id. at 215-16.
278. Id. at 226.
The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing
that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network
practices . . . is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right
of free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however, the
right to use the facilities of radio without a license. . . .Denial of a
station license on that ground [public interest] . . . is not a denial of
free speech.
Id. at 226-27.
279. Id. at 219.
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1. Does Red Lion Still Roar?
Perhaps the strongest Supreme Court language in support
of the public trustee doctrine is found in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. FCC280 decision, where the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and the related
political editorializing and political attack rules. As noted
above, the fairness doctrine required licensees to “cover vitally
important controversial issues of interest in their communities”
and “provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of
contrasting viewpoints on those controversial issues of public
importance that are covered.”281
In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the FCC’s rules
and declared that broadcasters enjoy limited First Amendment
rights because of the scarcity of the public spectrum they are
permitted to use as a means of reaching their audience.282
Specifically, the Court stated that “[w]here there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”283
The Court asserted that the purpose of the First Amendment is
“to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee.”284 The Court reasoned
that this purpose, coupled with the scarcity rationale, made the
First Amendment interests of audience members more
important than those of broadcasters: “It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which

280. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
281. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, supra note 118, at 5043 n.1; see
also The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 13 (1974). The related personal attack and political editorial rules required
that when “an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like
personal qualities of an identified person or group” in the course of covering an
issue of public importance, or “[w]here a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses
or (ii) opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates,” the broadcaster was
required to provide the attacked or opposed parties a “reasonable opportunity”
to respond on the air. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-75 (citing 47 C.F.R §§ 73.123,
73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (repealed)).
282. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 390.
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is paramount.”285
The Red Lion articulation of the scarcity rationale has
weathered withering criticism from scholars, regulators,
judges, and broadcasters themselves.286 Critics have attacked
it by characterizing scarcity in different ways. Judge Robert
Bork, for example, questioned the validity of the distinction
between spectrum scarcity and the scarcity of other means of
communication. In 1986, he wrote that the constitutional “line
drawn between the print media and the broadcast media,”
which is justified by the scarcity of broadcast spectrum, “is a
distinction without a difference.”287 He reasoned:
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it is
unclear why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a
way that would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of the
print media. All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint,
ink, delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go into the
production and dissemination of print journalism . . . . Since scarcity
is a universal fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and
not another.288

The conflict in Judge Bork’s reasoning is in how scarcity is
interpreted.
Broadcasters have interpreted scarcity as
referring to the number and diversity of media sources
available to viewers and listeners. In other words, they point to
285. Id. In discussing the Constitutional foundations of broadcasters’ roles
as public trustees, the Court wrote:
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed
stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license
permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to
be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to
the exclusion of fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
Id. at 389.
286. See, e.g., THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 5-32 (1994); LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 200-09 (1987); Fowler
& Brenner, supra note 51, at 221-226 (Mark S. Fowler is the former FCC
Chairman); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Logan, Jr., supra note 215
(author is an FCC Attorney); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of
Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1007-20 (1989). But cf., Hundt,
supra note 123, 542-43.
287. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501,
508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
288. Id.

VARONA_A1

2004]

12/29/2004 1:45:38 PM

CHANGING CHANNELS

59

overall numerical source scarcity as opposed to the Supreme
Court’s notion of allocational or license scarcity. Those who
argue that Red Lion is obsolete tend to make arguments based
on numerical source scarcity – specifically, the notion that
broadcast speech regulation is no longer constitutionally
legitimate because citizens now have many nonbroadcast as
well as broadcast “channels” through which to receive and
express information. For example, in arguing against the
imposition of any new public interest requirements, CBS stated
that in light of high levels of subscribership to cable and DBS
services with dozens, if not hundreds of channels; access to the
Internet; the use of videotape; and DVD recorders and players,
“spectrum scarcity is a wholly theoretical construct, bearing no
relation to the reality of the modern media marketplace.”289
The National Association of Broadcasters similarly argues that
“[n]ot only has the number of broadcast facilities exploded”
since Red Lion was decided, “but the vast increase in the
number and variety of nonbroadcast outlets (including cable,
Direct Broadcast Satellite and the Internet) makes the idea of
‘scarcity’ of media voices seem almost quaint.”290
These attacks on the scarcity principle misconstrue the
meaning of scarcity as defined by the Supreme Court in Red
Lion.291 The Red Lion Court focused on allocational and not
overall numerical scarcity. The notion that spectrum scarcity
is no different than the scarcity of newsprint or ink or delivery
trucks ignores the fact that broadcast spectrum is inherently
scarce because “there [is] room for only a few”292 broadcast
licensees in each community and the demand for those licenses
greatly outpace the supply of spectrum.293 As the Red Lion
289. Comments of CBS Corp., supra note 24, at 26.
290. Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, supra note 245, at 12-13.
291. For an excellent analysis of the various permutations of the scarcity
rationales advanced in broadcast regulation, see Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U L. REV. 990, 1007-20
(1989); see also Graham, supra note 181, at 129-34.
292. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 388.
293. Henry Geller addressed the broadcasters’ arguments about the
“explosion” of the number of broadcast stations since Red Lion was decided by
writing:
The scarcity relied upon in Red Lion is that many more people want
to broadcast than there are available frequencies or channels. That
same scarcity indisputably exists today. Red Lion was a radio case,
and in 1969 when it was decided, there were roughly 7,000 stations.
It is ludicrous to argue that the public trustee scheme is
constitutional at 7,000 but unconstitutional at 11,500 (the number of
stations broadcasting today).
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Court made clear, “only a tiny fraction of those with resources
and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same
time if intelligible communication is to be had.”294 The
imbalance between overwhelming broadcast license demand
and extremely limited supply is still in place today.
The use of broadcast spectrum is “rivalous,” meaning that
its medium is of fixed capacity and prone to interference if
speakers are not “channeled” and restricted in their activities.
Newsprint, by contrast, is nonrivalous. Anyone wishing to be a
newspaper publisher may be one. The same can be said with
Internet content. Anyone who wishes to “webcast” a program
or publish a document on the Internet may do so with a
personal computer and an Internet connection. And although
there are economic constraints to entry into newspaper and
Internet publishing (e.g., the cost of newsprint, ink, the PC,
etc.), there are similar economic barriers to entry into
broadcasting (e.g., purchase of technical equipment,
construction and powering of a transmitter, hiring of talent,
etc.). The core distinction between broadcasting and other
media is that the means by which broadcasters speak are
publicly owned, whereas the media used by newspaper
publishers, cable companies, and other competitors are not.295
Moreover, the broadcast industry itself perpetuated the
inherent scarcity of television licenses by successfully
pressuring Congress to limit the eligibility for digital television
broadcast licenses solely to existing analog broadcast
licensees.296
In contesting the continuing validity of the Red Lion
scarcity rationale, broadcasters have cited a footnote in the
1984 FCC v. League of Women Voters of California297 decision,
in which the Supreme Court invalidated section 399 of the
Public Broadcasting Act, which prohibited the editorializing of
any noncommercial (public) television station receiving federal
Corporation for Public Broadcasting funds. Footnote eleven of
the Court’s decision noted that “spectrum scarcity has come
Geller, supra note 20.
294. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 388.
295. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (striking down Florida’s right of reply statute, requiring newspapers to
allow a right of reply to political candidates it criticized, because it infringed
upon the editors’ free speech and press rights).
296. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (2000).
297. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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under increasing criticism in recent years.”298 It acknowledged
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler’s assertion that the advent of new
technologies like cable and satellite television had rendered the
scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation obsolete.299 The
Court concluded, however, that it was not ready to “reconsider
[its] longstanding approach without some signal from Congress
or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so
far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation
may be required.”300
Broadcasters have argued that this footnote represents a
significant weakening of the scarcity rationale in the eyes of
the Supreme Court.301 They have noted that in the FCC’s 1987
Syracuse Peace Council302 decision, where it repealed the
fairness doctrine, a majority of the Commission, at the height of
its deregulatory program, appeared to adopt a number of the
arguments against the scarcity rationale by noting that “in
recent years . . . there [has] been an explosive growth in both
the number and types of outlets providing information to the
public,” and that because of that growth, “the Supreme Court’s
apparent concern that listeners and viewers have access to
diverse sources of information has now been allayed.”303 That
characterization, broadcasters argue, is the “signal” the
Supreme Court was waiting for to invalidate the scarcity
rationale.
Despite broadcasters’ hopes that Red Lion had been
declawed (or at least tamed), both the Supreme Court and
Congress have continued to rely upon it. In enacting the
Children’s Television Act of 1990,304 the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,305 and the
298. Id. at 376 n.11.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Comments of CBS Corp., supra note 24, at 16 n.23;
Comments of Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, supra note 245, at 13 n.30.
302. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, supra note 118, at 5053.
303. Id. at 5053. But see Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and
Political Editorial Rules, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,973, 19,973 (2000) (“[W]e take this
opportunity to make clear that much of the discussion in Syracuse Peace
Council accompanying the Commission's repeal of the fairness doctrine has
been repudiated.” (footnotes omitted)).
304. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(a)-(b) (2000) (explaining that the Commission
shall prescribe the nature of services rendered by licenses stations); S. REP.
NO. 101-227, at 16 (1989) (describing how broadcasters serve as public
trustees).
305. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (2000) (requiring DBS operators to reserve four

VARONA_A1

62

12/29/2004 1:45:38 PM

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 6:1

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress utilized the Red
Lion scarcity rationale and the public trustee doctrine, at times
expressly and at other times impliedly.
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed the
Red Lion rationale as it addressed new controversies. In FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation,306 the Supreme Court affirmed the
FCC’s indecency policy as it applied to a New York radio
station’s airing of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue.307
In his opinion for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited
Red Lion stating that “of all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.”308 Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC,309 the Court upheld the FCC’s “must
carry” rules, which require cable systems to carry the broadcast
television stations in their service areas.310 The Court reasoned
that “must-carry” rules are constitutional, because cable
systems are natural monopolies creating bottleneck conditions
that prevent many cable subscribers from accessing their local
television stations.311 The Court refused to extend Red Lion to
cable systems, reasoning that “[t]he broadcast cases are
inapposite in the present context because cable television does
not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the
broadcast medium.”312
More recently, the Court refused to apply the Red Lion
principle to the Internet, reinforcing the particular scarcity of
broadcast spectrum. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
reasoned in Reno v. ACLU313 that “the Internet can hardly be
considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.
It provides
relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds. . . . [O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level
to seven percent of their channel capacity for noncommercial educational
programming).
306. 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
307. See id.
308. Id. at 748.
309. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
310. See id. at 636-61.
311. See id. at 649; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-862, at 50 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1232; S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 1 (1991), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1133-34 (stating that “[t]he purpose of this legislation
is to promote competition in the multichannel video marketplace[,] . . . provide
protection for consumers against monopoly rates and poor customer service,
[and limit] the cable operators’ and programmers’ market power”).
312. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 638-39.
313. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium.”314
Despite the prevailing constitutionality of the scarcity
rationale and the public trustee doctrine it supports, the FCC
has lacked the will to walk the First Amendment “tightrope.”
Since the early 1980s, the FCC has generally abandoned any
attempts at passing judgment on the subjective content of
broadcaster speech. For example, in the case of the children’s
educational television rules, which is the only one of the
remaining public interest rules to have a quantitative
requirement (of these three hours per week), the Commission
ordinarily relies on the good faith judgment of broadcasters as
to whether programming meets children’s educational and
In essence, although the FCC
informational needs.315
putatively requires a three-hour children’s educational
programming commitment, it defers to broadcasters’ “good
faith” characterizations of what programming satisfies the
Commission’s criterion.316 Reed Hundt, FCC chairman in the
314. Id. at 870 (ruling, in a 7-2 decision, that the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech). Moreover, in a
December 2003 decision, the Court cited Red Lion in reasoning that the FCC’s
rules requiring broadcast stations to maintain certain public records on
programming and political advertising “seem likely to help the FCC determine
whether broadcasters are carrying out their ‘obligations to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance,’ and whether broadcasters are too heavily favoring entertainment,
and discriminating against broadcasts devoted to public affairs.” McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 240-41 (2003). The Court rejected arguments that the
provisions at issue in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violated the First
Amendment. See id. at 242-43. The Court also cited Red Lion as support for
its statement that “the FCC’s regulatory authority is broad.” Id. at 237.
315. See Children’s Television Order, supra note 18, at 10,701.
316. In defending this deferential approach to children’s television
regulation, former FCC Commissioner James Quello wrote about the difficulty
of discerning between programming that satisfies public interest requirements
from programming that does not:
Aside from the fact that this proposal is unconstitutional, as a
practical matter, do you feel comfortable having the government
decide what qualifies as educational television? I can just see a
future Public Notice announcing that “The Commission will be
meeting next Tuesday to discuss the educational merits of “Yogi
Bear.” Also on the agenda, ‘Whether the television version of Catcher
in the Rye is appropriate for kids.” You see my point – these are
decisions you should be making – not the United States government.
James Quello, The Push for More Government Is On, and This Time It’s About
Government in Your Living Room, available at http://www.cni.org/Hforums/
roundtable/1996-01/0083.html (posted from James Quello’s website Jan. 15,
1996).
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Clinton Administration, has vociferously supported the
imposition of stricter public interest broadcasting requirements
on television licensees, but has also articulated deep frustration
with the doctrine and its inherent First Amendment tensions.
In a 1995 speech, he said, “[e]ither our rules actually require
something unknowable of broadcasters, in which case they
should be rejected as constitutionally intolerable, or they
actually require nothing of broadcasters, in which case they are
a meaningless hoax on the American public.”317
In the current edition of the FCC’s The Public and
Broadcasting,318 its brochure on broadcasting regulation for the
general public, the agency makes plain its abdication of content
regulation and reliance on the judgment of individual
broadcasters. Under the heading, “The FCC and Freedom of
Speech,” the brochure states, “[t]he First Amendment and
federal law generally prohibit us from censoring broadcast
material and from interfering with freedom of expression in
broadcasting. Individual radio and TV stations are responsible
for selecting everything they broadcast and for determining
how they can best serve their communities.”319 Essentially,
therefore, although the Supreme Court continues to uphold the
Red Lion scarcity rationale against constitutional attack, the
FCC has exerted a much more cautious and “hands off”
approach to content regulation. It is no wonder, then, that the
agency has never successfully elucidated and enforced the
public interest standard.
B. THE FALLACY OF TELEVISION AS A “FREE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS”
Considering its track record, there is little dispute that
Congress’ reliance on the public trustee doctrine to promote a
“marketplace of ideas” was misplaced. The “marketplace of
ideas” metaphor, upon which the public trustee doctrine is
rooted, commands that “public discussion is a political duty”
and recognizes “that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people.”320 In discussing the importance of public deliberation
317. Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. &
COM. 527, 538 (1996).
318. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE PUBLIC AND
BROADCASTING,
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/
public_and_broadcasting.html (June 1999).
319. Id.
320. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
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in democratic self-government, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn
observes that because citizens of a democracy are their own
sovereigns, they must have access to “the unhindered flow of
accurate information” and the fora in which to debate, in order
Commercial television,
to make the wisest decisions.321
however, neither provides citizens with an “unhindered flow of
accurate information,” nor a forum in which to deliberate.
The first reason why television is a poor conduit for
engendering true democratic deliberation is that it is too
passive. Inertia, not democratic participation, is what modern
commercial television seems to best promote. Television, by
design, is not interactive. The “vision” that it transmits is
Television can be isolating to
mediated and narrow.322
viewers,323 and it can distort the “reality” it claims to transmit.
Few observers of American media and politics are unaware of
the dissonance between televised and in-person performances.
A recent and blatant example of the distorting nature of
television is the so-called “scream speech” delivered by thenDemocratic presidential candidate Howard Dean after his loss
in the Iowa caucuses on January 19, 2004. The footage, aired
repeatedly on broadcast and cable news programs, showed
what appeared to be a shrieking Dean, prompting
commentators to call his performance a “meltdown” and stark
evidence of his lack of presidential temperament.324 What
television did not capture, however, was that inside of the
ballroom, the crowd noise was so high that Dean’s voice could
barely be heard.325 Dean’s “meltdown” speech was aired
repeatedly on every major television news program, but only
one television reporter – Diane Sawyer, the co-host of ABC’s
Good Morning America – explained that although Governor
Dean’s animated, high-volume performance appeared
concurring).
321. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 19 (1960).
322. See JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
TELEVISION 24 (1978).
323. See id. at 168 (“Television isolates people from the environment, from
each other, and from their own senses.”).
324. See, e.g., Al Kamen, A Meltdown in History, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2004, at A25; A Sweet Effort to Get Young People to Vote, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2004, at A17.
325. See Tim Graham, Media-Powered Howard, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan.
30,
2004,
at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/tgraham200401300919.asp
(last
visited Nov. 27, 2004).
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appropriate to those in the room with him, the televised version
of the speech made him sound frenzied (he was using a
handheld “unidirectional” microphone designed to mask the
noise of the crowd in the room).326 Videotapes from news crews
using their own omnidirectional camera-mounted microphones
demonstrated that Dean’s voice could barely be heard over the
crowd’s noise.327 The televised version of reality – the “scream”
footage – became the reality of the Dean campaign, and the
campaign failed to regain its footing.328
In addition to often distorting the “realities” it depicts,
television is prone to presenting artificially narrow and
strictured perspectives on complex subjects.
Far from
presenting a diversity of conflicting ideas and philosophies,
television presents whatever perspective producers think will
attract the most viewers and, by extension, advertising. And
although the fairness doctrine required broadcasters to present
opposing views on controversial subjects of public importance,
the doctrine has not been enforced since 1987.329 The death of
the fairness doctrine, in fact, has led to the birth of broadcast
networks like News Corporation’s (i.e., Rupert Murdoch’s) Fox
Television Network, which is known for programming that is
heavily slanted toward conservative and specifically
Republican-party positions.330
C. COMMODIFICATION OF VIEWERS
The public trustee doctrine has failed to create its intended
“free marketplace of ideas” over the airwaves not only because
of its inherent First Amendment contradictions, but also
because of the core commercial nature of television. In fact, the
only real marketplace commercial television promotes is that of

326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED:
DEMOCRACY, THE INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING 184-85
(2004).
329. See cases cited supra note 103; sources cited supra note 118.
330. See A.O. Scott, Tallyho! Spin, Flag Waving and Shouting to Catch a
Fox, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at E1 (reporting on success of “Outfoxed”
documentary, distributed via Internet and DVD, which purports to document
politically biased coverage on Fox News Channel and in news programming on
the Fox Television Network); Chris Vognar, Point of View Explored: ‘Outfoxed’
Documents Fox News Strategy on War Coverage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
23, 2004, at 7B.
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Despite the seven decades of
viewers for advertisers.331
congressional and FCC rhetoric perpetuating the legal fiction of
public trusteeship in broadcasting, broadcasters – most of them
publicly traded entities – are, in fact, comprised of
businesspeople accountable primarily to shareholders and
advertisers.332
Although mythologized as fiduciaries of the ephemeral
“public interest,” broadcasters in reality are required to operate
as fiduciaries for their shareholders. And although the public
interest standard in the 1934 Communications Act, as
amended, remains vague and essentially unenforced, the law of
corporate fiduciary duty is well-settled in requiring that public
corporations pursue and sustain the highest returns possible on
their shareholders’ investments and operate the corporation for
Actions by a
the exclusive benefit of shareholders.333
broadcaster in the public interest, and that are above and
beyond the perfunctory showing required to earn renewal of the
station’s license, would likely be a violation of those fiduciary
duties.334 This service of two gods – the public interest and the
bottom line – would not be problematic for broadcasters if the
public interest and shareholder interests were the same.335 But
331. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 499, 514 (2000) (characterizing “eyeballs as the commodity” in
commercial television).
332. See generally Peter Marks, Networks Cede Political Coverage to Cable,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at A18. In reflecting on commercial television’s
public trustee status, CBS News anchor Dan Rather said, “We have a public
responsibility beyond delivering stockholder value. In some ways, we have
abrogated that civic trust.” Id.
333. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating
that a “business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end.”); Milton Friedman, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (1982)
(positing that it is impossible for a corporation to act generally in the public’s
interest and still fulfill its fiduciary duties to shareholders).
334. Prof. Ronald J. Krotoszynski deftly makes this argument in The
Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television
Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2116 (1997) (stating that “[a]t
most, an executive could pursue public interest objectives to the extent
necessary to avoid placing the station’s license in jeopardy.”).
335. My colleague, Professor Shelby Green, notes, however, that the law
does not require corporate directors to make business decisions on the basis of
profit maximization alone, but permits them to take public trustee
considerations into account in exercising their business judgment. See Shelby
D. Green, Defending the “Time Culture”: The Public and Private Interests of
Media Corporations, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 391, 406-08 (1991) (citing
Pennsylvania’s business corporation statute, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
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they are not.
At the advent of broadcasting, many broadcast stations
were
operated
as
community-based,
“mom-and-pop”
businesses.336 Today, most broadcast stations are merely profit
centers within vast publicly traded conglomerates, whose
primary mission is to sell advertising.337 As economists Bruce
M. Owen and Steven S. Wildman wrote in their book Video
Economics, “[a]dvertising is central to broadcast networks
because the economic forces favoring mass consumption of
media messages are reinforced by the simultaneous production
of audiences for sale to advertisers as a by-product.”338
Advertising is a very lucrative product. The annual pretax profit margins at some of the nation’s better run television
stations can top fifty percent, leading industry analysts to
describe owning a television station as “owning a money
Advertising time on commercial broadcast
machine.”339
television increased by over twenty percent between 1991 and
2000,340 with some thirty-minute programs in 2001 devoting a
full nine minutes to commercial advertising.341 The demand for
television advertising time is so great, and the sale of such time
so lucrative, that broadcasters have applied digital compression
technology to shorten programming blocks in order to shoehorn
additional commercials into highly rated fare.342 In recent
years, broadcasters have relied on “product placement”
advertising, where advertisers pay for the conspicuous
placement of their product in key scenes or the manipulation
1721(c) (Purdon 1990), which was the first of many state corporations statutes
authorizing directors to consider factors other than stockholder returns in
making business decisions).
336. See Sallie Hofmeister, Is Free TV Worth Saving in a 500-Channel
World?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1.
337. See generally id.
338. See MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing the television
marketplace and stating that “the sponsors and advertisers are its real public;
the viewers are the ‘product’ it can ‘deliver’; and programs are merely the bait,
the means to obtain the product.”); BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN,
VIDEO ECONOMICS 151 (1992); Christine Y. Chen, The Bad Boys of Radio,
FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 119 (quoting Clear Channel CEO Lowry Mays as
saying, “[w]e’re not in the business of providing well-researched music. We’re
simply in the business of selling our customers products.”).
339. See Paul Taylor, Too Little Time: How Broadcasters Betray the Public
Interest They’re Supposed to Serve, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, at 8.
340. See id. at 10.
341. See Louis Chunovic, TV Clutter Reaches All-Time High, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Mar. 11, 2002, at 1.
342. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 146.
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and consumption of their products by key personalities.343
Most recently, advertisers and television executives have
managed to churn more advertising revenue from already
heavily commercialized programming, and capture viewers who
tend to “channel surf” or fast-forward through commercial
blocks, by “digitally embedding” product trademarks and logos
in televised scenes. For example, Major League Baseball
broadcasts have featured digitally inserted product billboards
behind home plate during baseball games (including the World
Series), and CBS’s coverage of New Years Eve 2000 featured
digitally inserted billboards, covering up real billboards for
In addition,
competitor NBC and other corporations.344
program-length commercials, more commonly known as
“infomercials,” have proliferated the television airwaves,
generating $14 billion via TV sales in 2001.345
Because advertising, not public interest programming, is
the true currency of the broadcasting realm,346 advertisers
343. For example, the regular consumption of Coca-Cola® by actors on the
Warner Brothers’ Network’s “Young American” series cost the soda company
$25 million. Coca-Cola paid the same sum for prominent product placement in
the 2002 Fox “American Idol” series. See Dan Bronson, Figured Out,
REP.,
Apr.
28,
2003,
HOLLYWOOD
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_
id=1875575 (subscription required, last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
344. Michael McCarthy, Ads Show Up in Unexpected Places: Line Between
Reality, Marketing Gets Fuzzy, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2001, at 1B.
Broadcasters have begun digitally inserting products and logos in reruns of
highly rated programs such as Law & Order. See Stuart Elliott, Advertising:
Reruns May Become a Testing Ground for Digital Insertion of Sponsor’s
Products and Images, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at C6; David Goetzl, TBS
Tries Virtual Advertising: Network to Sell Product Placement Deals for Reruns
of ‘Law & Order’, ADVERTISING AGE, May 21, 2001, at 8.
345. See Michael Schneider,’Wild’ Infomercial Struts Its Stuff: ‘Girls Gone
Wild’ Reinvigorates Frequently-Maligned Ad Format, VARIETY, Dec. 9, 2002, at
32.
346. The Supreme Court acknowledged the centrality of advertising in
requiring cable systems to carry local television stations on their basic service
tiers in its 1994 TurnerI decision, where it reasoned:
By preventing cable operators from refusing carriage to broadcast
television stations, the must-carry rules ensure that broadcast
television stations will retain a large enough potential audience to
earn necessary advertising revenue – or, in the case of noncommercial
broadcasters, sufficient viewer contributions – to maintain their
continued operation. In so doing, the provisions are designed to
guarantee the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of
the Nation’s communication system, and to ensure that every
individual with a television set can obtain access to free television
programming.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994).
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wield extraordinary influence over broadcasters and their
programming. Advertisers want the programs they sponsor to
surround their commercials with non-controversial and upbeat
programming that maximizes viewership and builds goodwill in
their products.347 They buy commercial time on the programs
with the highest ratings, and avoid placing advertising on
programs that take controversial social positions.348
Before tobacco companies were pressured by the Federal
government to voluntarily cease television advertising in 1971,
tobacco manufacturers used television as a primary means for
promoting cigarette smoking.349 Philip Morris’s advertising
agreement with CBS and Desilu Productions, the producers of
the celebrated “I Love Lucy” comedy, is known as the first
major deal involving product placement.
The program’s
original opening sequence featured stick figures of Lucille Ball
and Desi Arnaz climbing on a huge pack of Philip Morris
cigarettes.350 Desi Arnaz regularly appeared in scenes in a
smoking jacket and storylines often featured both stars
Brown & Williamson
conspicuously smoking cigarettes.
Tobacco Company, an original competitor to Philip Morris,
instructed the television producers carrying its advertising that
“[t]obacco products should not be used in a derogatory or
harmful way.
And no reference or gesture of disgust,
dissatisfaction or distaste be made in connection with them.”351
347. For example, Procter & Gamble, a preeminent television advertiser
whose Ivory soap and Tide detergent commercials airing during radio and
television dramas beginning in the 1940s spurred the phenomenon of “soap
operas,” is credited for setting the precedent for insisting on strict content
controls in the programming surrounding its commercials. See generally,
ALECIA SWASY, SOAP OPERA: THE INSIDE STORY OF PROCTER & GAMBLE
(1993).
348. See, e.g., Green supra note 335, at 402 n.35 (providing examples of
advertisers pulling commercials from socially controversial programming);
Sunstein supra note 331, at 515.
349. In 1969, the FCC threatened to ban cigarette advertising on television
and radio and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed new rules
requiring television and radio tobacco advertising to feature prominent health
warnings. See Clara Sue Ross, Pushing Puffing Post-Posadas, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1461, 1461 (1988). In reaction to those proposals, and especially the
threat of broadcasting health warnings, the tobacco industry voluntarily
acceded to a ban on radio and television advertising. See id. at 1461-62; H.R.
REP. NO. 98-805 (1984) (addressing how to properly communicate the health
consequences of smoking).
350. See Liz Doup, Smoke Signals Stories, S. FLA. SUN – SENTINEL, June
30, 2003, at 1D.
351. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 240 (2004).
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Although television broadcasters rarely aired news or
documentary programming concerning the deleterious health
consequences of smoking before smoking advertising was
barred from television in 1971, they were much more willing to
air such programming once they were no longer dependent on
tobacco advertising.352
Because advertising, not programming, is the commercial
broadcasters’ product, broadcasters make programming
decisions primarily with an eye toward optimizing viewership
and, correlatively, increasing the bottom line. It is little
surprise, then, that public interest programming is scarce and
typically relegated to the least desirable blocks in the broadcast
schedule, if it is aired at all.
1. Consolidation of the Broadcast Industry
Another reason why television broadcasting has failed to
create a free marketplace of ideas is that it is no longer a
locally oriented medium. Localism in programming always has
been a core component of the public trustee doctrine.353
Congress and the FCC have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of broadcast licensees serving their local
They believed that locally oriented
communities.354
programming would promote political engagement, build
communities, and protect local health and safety.355 The
original system of broadcast license grants to local broadcasting
stations also served an important political function for the
members of Congress who voted it into existence, creating jobs
and a means of advertising for local constituents.356 During the
first fifty years of broadcast regulation, Congress and the FCC
also valued diversity in station ownership, consistent with the

352. Id. at 251.
353. For an excellent treatment of the nexus between the public trustee
doctrine and localism and the effects of ownership concentration, see Victoria
F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Angels Earning
Wings, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 613 (2004).
354. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to issue licenses
throughout “the several [s]tates and communities”).
355. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast
Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in
Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,287291 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (discussing the
importance of localism in station ownership rules).
BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
356. See STEPHEN G.
REGULATORY POLICY 533 (5th ed. 2002).
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notion articulated in 1945 by Justice Hugo Black that the First
Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”357
The demise of local and national television station
ownership caps, and the outright elimination of longstanding
prohibitions on the common ownership of a television station
and other media outlets in the same city have come with
sweeping broadcast regulation.358 As a result, commercial
television broadcasting has become one of the most
consolidated industries in the nation.
Consolidation has
resulted in a sharp reduction of locally oriented public interest
programming,359 as well as ownership of television stations by
women and minorities.360
The five major American commercial television networks
each are part of a multimedia conglomerate with integrated
television, radio, cable, Internet, motion picture, and publishing
properties.361 Together, these corporations – Viacom, Inc.,
357. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
358. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2004) (discussing multiple
ownership rules).
359. See generally William R. Davie & Jung-Sook Lee, Television News
Technology: Do More Sources Mean Less Diversity?, J. BROADCASTING &
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 453 (1993); Petros Iosifides, Diversity Versus
Concentration in the Deregulated Mass Media, 76 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM.
Q., 152 (1999); Harvey J. Levin, Program Duplication, Diversity, and Effective
Viewer Choices: Some Empirical Findings, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 81 (1971).
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
360. See
generally
FEDERAL
FEMALE/MINORITY BROADCAST OWNERSHIP DATA 2003, (providing a summary
of
data
regarding
female
and
minority
ownership),
at
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/data.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). At the
same time, observers have complained about the stereotyping or outright
absence of minorities in television news and entertainment programming. See,
e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of
Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming,
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293 (2003); Greg Braxton, NAACP Will Fight Network TV
Lineups, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1999, at A1; Steve Johnson, Getting Color on
Television: African-Americans on TV: A History of Talent, Ambition and
Frustration, CHI. TRIB. TEMPO, Feb. 1, 2002, at 1.
361. For example, General Electric, Inc., through its affiliate, the National
Broadcasting Company, Inc., delivers network television services, operates
television stations, and provides cable, Internet and multimedia programming
and distribution services. See GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC., SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 10-K: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION
13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2003
(filed March 1, 2004) available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054504000013/frm10k.h
tm.
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General Electric Co., Walt Disney Co. (ABC), News Corp., and
Time Warner, Inc. – earned $255 billion in 2003 revenues.362
The five corporations control seventy-five percent of all
primetime viewing on broadcast and cable television.363 Far
from competing antagonistically, the five firms engage in
extensive joint ventures across media.364 For instance, “News
Corporation shares a financial interest with its ‘competitors’ in
sixty-three cable systems, magazines, recording companies, and
satellite channels in the United States and abroad.”365
For large broadcast station group owners, acquiring
additional stations has an immediate positive impact on the
bottom line. The more viewers and wider geographic footprint
a broadcaster can claim, the higher the rates it can charge for
advertising.366 With more stations in its portfolio, a group
owner can economize on programming by re-airing the same
content across the country and largely ignoring or giving short
shrift to local viewing needs. For example, station group owner
Sinclair Broadcasting, which owns sixty-two television stations
across the country, implemented what it calls “Central
Casting,” whereby one team of anchors, commentators and
weathercasters broadcast one standard evening news broadcast
to all sixty-two of Sinclair’s television stations.367 Moreover,
individual media conglomerates owning dozens of stations and
integrated with multiple distribution channels (for example,
television, radio, motion pictures, DVD sales, publishing, etc.),
have tended to develop television programming that can be
repackaged and reused in all of its media properties.368 In
1990, the four major commercial broadcast networks (ABC,
362. See Center for Public Integrity: Investigative Journalism in the Public
Interest,
Media
Tracker,
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/
telecom/industry.aspx?act=broadcast (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
363. See Tom Wolzien & Mark Mackenzie, Returning Oligopoly of Media
Content Threatens Cable’s Power, WEEKLY NOTES (Bernstein Research, New
York, N.Y.), Feb. 7, 2003, at 3.
364. See Ted Turner, My Beef with Big Media, WASH. MONTHLY,
July/August 2004, at 30, 35 ( “These big companies are not antagonistic; they
do billions of dollars in business with each other. They don’t compete; they
cooperate to inhibit competition.”).
365. Bagdikian, supra note 351, at 9. Similarly, Time Warner has twentytwo major joint ventures with other major media corporations. Id. at 31.
366. See Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2562 (2003).
367. See Jim Rutenberg & Micheline Maynard, TV News That Looks Local,
Even If It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at C1.
368. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 351, at 3 (explaining that “owners prefer
stories and programs that can be used everywhere and anywhere”).
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CBS, Fox, and NBC) owned, in whole or in part, only 12.5
percent of the new programming they aired. In 2000, that
figure was 56.3 percent, and in 2002 it was 77.5 percent.369
The life-and-death risks of media consolidation and
ownership concentration were evidenced vividly in the radio
industry in January 2002. Clear Channel Communications
(Clear Channel) owns all six of the commercial radio stations in
the Minot, North Dakota market.370 Clear Channel dominates
the national radio industry, owning 1,240 radio stations in 292
markets across the country.371 It airs the same prerecorded
programming across entire regions and eschews local
In early 2002, a hazardous
programming altogether.372
chemical spill occurred in North Dakota.373 Attempts by
emergency response personnel to engage the local radio
stations in broadcasting warnings to local residents were futile.
All six of the stations were operated by remote control, and
were airing prerecorded satellite feeds from Clear Channel
headquarters in San Antonio, Texas.374 Corporate
consolidation has also resulted in programming decisions that
some critics have contested as influenced inappropriately by
corporate headquarters.
After commentator Bob Costas
referred to China’s “problems with human rights” and
“property rights disputes” during NBC Sports coverage of the
1996 Olympic Summer Games in Atlanta, Georgia, NBC issued
a surprisingly humble apology to the Chinese government after
it demanded one.375 Critics questioned whether NBC would
have been so contrite if its parent company, General Electric,

369. See Turner, supra 364, at 32. Turner states that:
Today, the only way for media companies to survive is to own
everything up and down the media chain – from broadcast and cable
networks to the sitcoms, movies, and news broadcasts you see on
those stations; to the production studios that make them; to the cable,
satellite, and broadcast systems that bring the programs to your
television set . . . Big media today wants to own the faucet, pipeline,
water, and the reservoir. The rain clouds come next.
Id. at 33-34.
370. See Jennifer Lee, On Minot, N.D., Radio, A Single Corporate Voice,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at C7.
371. See generally MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 20; Katy Bachman,
Fighting Through the Static, MEDIAWEEK, May 5, 2003, at 20, 20; Rutenberg
& Maynard, supra note 367.
372. See Bachman, supra note 371, at 24.
373. See id. at 22.
374. See id.
375. See NBC Apologizes to China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at B8.
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were not actively investing hundreds of millions of dollars in
the lighting, plastics and medical equipment markets in the
Chinese mainland.376
Despite the manifestly negative impact of media ownership
concentration on public interest programming, the FCC in late
2002 opened a rulemaking proceeding proposing the further
relaxation of the ownership rules.377 Especially controversial
were the FCC’s proposals to liberalize the local and national
television station ownership caps and to eliminate the
prohibition on the common ownership of a television station
and newspaper in the same city.378
Although the major networks’ news operations failed to
give substantial coverage to the FCC’s proposals,379 public
television stations aired extensive critical pieces on the
controversy380 and several activists launched grassroots
campaigns to motivate citizens to protest the proposals.381
Despite its limited airplay, the FCC’s notice resulted in the
filing of nearly 800,000 opposition comments in the form of emails and postcards,382 99.9 percent of which were opposed to
376. See id; Editorial, A Gutless Apology, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 27, 1996,
4A. Similarly, in late 1998, ABC News planned to air an exposé on
questionable hiring practices at Disney World. See Trudy Lieberman, You
Can’t Report What You Don’t Pursue, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June
2000, at 44, 45. The resort allegedly had failed to perform criminal
background checks on employees and had hired convicted pedophiles to work
at its park. See id. Shortly before the segment was due to air, Disney
chairman Michael Eisner, told National Public Radio that he thought it would
be “inappropriate,” stating, “ABC News knows that I would prefer them not to
cover [Disney].” Id. Following that interview, ABC News pulled the Disney
World exposé from its lineup. See generally id.
377. See generally Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503
(2002).
378. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2003) (discussing multiple ownership rules).
379. See William Safire, Big Media’s Silence, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at
A33 (explaining that “[m]ost network newscasts dutifully covered the
scandalous story as briefly and coolly as possible, failing to disclose how much
it meant to their parent companies, which were lobbying furiously for gobbleup rights.”).
380. For example, Bill Moyers’ Now covered the media consolidation issue
WITH
BILL
MOYERS,
at
extensively.
See,
e.g.,
NOW
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/mediaconsol.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004);
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_bmjfcc.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2004); http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/bigmedia.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2004).
381. See Eric Boehlert, Congress to Big Media: Not So Fast, SALON, July
23,
2003,
available
at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature
/2003/07/23/fcc/print.html.
382. See id.
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increased media consolidation.383 While some of these e-mails
likely were duplicates, the response is still telling
On June 2, 2003, the FCC decided in a strict party-line
vote to allow one company to own television stations that would
reach a maximum of 45 percent of the national television
It also weakened the
audience, up from 35 percent.384
newspaper-television cross-ownership rule and liberalized the
cap on the common ownership of radio and television stations
in the same market.385
Spurred by the unprecedented groundswell of interest in
the FCC’s decision, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of
the Senate Commerce Committee, called a hearing on the
FCC’s decision a mere two days after it was released. At that
hearing, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell remarked that the
preexisting media ownership restrictions were made obsolete
by the existence today of hundreds of cable networks and the
Internet.386
Congress and the courts heard the public’s outcry against
the FCC’s Consolidation order. Both the Senate and the House
of Representatives voted to block the Order, and restored the

383. See Media Ownership Rules and FCC Reauthorization: Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2003)
(statement of Michael J. Copps, FCC Commissioner).
384. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast
Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in
Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, Report and Order, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,286, 46,353 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
385. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast
Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in
Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,348354 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
386. See Media Ownership Rules: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation (2003) (statement of Michael K.
Powell, FCC Chairman) (stating, “Here is what we learned about the media
marketplace. It is marked by abundance. For example, we found the number
of outlets and the number of independent owners have risen dramatically over
the course of the last 40 years.”). Commissioner Michael J. Copps later
explained:
I strongly dissented to this decision. I dissented on grounds of
substance. I dissented on grounds of process. I dissented because I
believe the Commission’s actions empower America’s new Media Elite
with unacceptable levels of influence over the ideas and information
upon which our society and our democracy so heavily depend.
Media Ownership Rules and FCC Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2003) (statement of
Michael J. Copps, FCC Commissioner).
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national audience-reach cap.387 On June 24, 2004, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit invalidated the FCC’s elimination
of the ban on one entity’s owning both a broadcast station and a
newspaper in the same market, as well as its loosening of the
caps on the common ownership of same-market television and
radio stations.388
That Congress and the courts have reversed the broadcast
industry’s victory in getting the FCC to dilute the ownership
restrictions was not so much an indication of the weakening
political power of the industry, but a result of the broadcasters’
internal disagreement about whether the caps should be
liberalized. Viewing additional stations as an opportunity to
extend their advertising reach, the networks and other large
station group owners (like Gannett, Paxson and Tribune)
lobbied intensively in favor of the loosened rules.389 The
smaller group owners and independent stations opposed the
new rules, fearing an increase in the power and leverage of the
networks.390
D. THE POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE OF BROADCASTERS
Although
the
First
Amendment
and
economic
contradictions inherent in the public trust doctrine explain why
the doctrine has been weak and difficult to enforce since its
inception, they do not explain why Congress and the FCC have
for so long done nothing to replace the public trustee model
with a means to better compensate Americans for the
broadcasters exploitation of public spectrum. Why is it, in
other words, that instead of taking broadcasters to task,
Congress and the FCC have essentially joined the broadcasters
387. See Stephen Labaton, FCC Media Rule Blocked in House in a 400-to21 Vote: Move to Limit Reach of Networks Sets Up Face-Off with Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2003, at A1; Stephen Labaton, Senators Take Steps to
Reinstate Limits on Media Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A1.
388. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (2004). The Court
held that the FCC failed to properly justify its new rules and, specifically,
failed to properly account for the effect of further media consolidation on
diversity and localism:
The Commission’s derivation of new Cross-Media Limits, and its
modification of the numerical limits on both television and radio
station ownership in local markets, all have the same essential flaw:
an unjustified assumption that media outlets of the same type make
an equal contribution to diversity and competition in local markets.
Id. at 435.
389. See generally id.
390. See generally id.
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in espousing the value and importance of the public trustee
doctrine while doing very little to articulate and enforce specific
public interest programming standards?
The unique and overwhelming influence of the
broadcasting industry has enabled it to perpetuate the public
trusteeship for such a long period despite its obvious
dysfunction. Understanding the nature and peculiarity of
broadcasters’ political power is important in reforming the
extant regulatory regime.
The “Captured” FCC
Independent regulatory agencies like the FCC391 are
required to act within the limits of the authority delegated to
them by Congress, but are generally outside of the influence of
the President and other executive branch officials.392 Following
the birth of the ubiquitous American administrative state393
during the New Deal era394 and the resulting dormancy of the
391. Independent regulatory agencies are typically modeled after the first
modern administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
was created in 1887. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary Edles, Established by
Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1128 (2000); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1194-95 (1986).
392. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-96 (1988); Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 586-91 (1984) (examining the limited president power
in nominating agency officials and otherwise influencing agency decision
making).
393. For an excellent overview of the history of the American regulatory
state, see Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The
Federal Aviation Administration, ‘Agency Capture,’ and Airline Security, 10
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 385 (2002); see also Rabin, supra note
391 (noting that the ICC was created to remedy perceived discriminatory
practices among railroad companies).
394. Before the New Deal and its programs intended to stimulate the
economy out of the Great Depression, agency power and influence were
limited, as a result of narrow Congressional delegations of authority as well as
restrictive court interpretations of agency authority. See A.A. Berle, Jr., The
Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 430, 441-42
(1917); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992). The New Deal spurred the
creation of numerous agencies aimed at alleviating poverty and resulted in the
birth of the ubiquitous American administrative state. See RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 32 (3d ed. 1999). In
particular:
The banking system came under federal control, the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts regulated stock exchanges and the sale of securities,
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nondelegation doctrine,395 the courts have deferred to Congress’
judgment in delegating increasingly broad and general
authority to expert agencies.396 In 1989, Justice Blackmun
noted in Mistretta v. United States that the Court’s
permissiveness in reviewing Congressional delegations of
authority was “driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”397 It is no wonder that the FCC’s expansive
the National Industrial Recovery Act established a minimum wage
and set maximum hours for workers and the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) regulated the relations between labor unions
and management.
Id. (internal citations omitted). In response to the mushrooming agencies and
their burgeoning authority, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1946 as a means of standardizing agency procedural safeguards. See
generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000). Administrative agencies increased in
number, size and authority throughout the twentieth century, reaching
another heyday in the 1960s and 1970s spurred in part by President Johnson’s
“Great Society” initiatives, See SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR
LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY 3-13 (1969); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 33-34 (3d ed. 1999) (detailing the
creation between 1960 and 1980 of the Departments of Energy, Education and
Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration, and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, and the increase in authority and size of the Food and
Drug Administration).
395. The Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. As
a result, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot delegate its power to
legislate to administrative agencies by means of statutes with vague or
indeterminate standards. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ( “That
Congress cannot delegate legislative power . . . is a principle universally
recognized”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (declaring the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) void as an attempted delegation of
legislative power to the President); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring the provision of NIRA concerning “codes
of fair competition” an unconstitutionally vague delegation of authority).
396. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 427-30 (1989) (outlining the shift
from comprehensive congressional policymaking to widespread delegation of
authority to agencies).
397. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (upholding
Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the United States Sentencing
Commission); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
Reviewing courts defer to agency interpretations of vague language in
enabling statutes, even if those interpretations are abstract and questionable,
so long as they are “reasonable.” See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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authority to regulate communications in furtherance of “the
public interest,” therefore, has survived since the agency’s
creation in 1934.398
As American administrative agencies increased in number,
size, and authority, observers began to question the influence of
the regulated entities on the work of the regulators. Agency
“capture,” which has been referred to as a government
“pathology,”399 typically occurs when regulated entities, such as
corporations and entire industries, “succeed, through lobbying
or other influential devices, in replacing what would otherwise
be the public-policy agenda of the agency with its own private
and self-serving agenda.”400 The result is “subsidizing private
interests at the expense of public good.”401
The concept of capture was first articulated by Marver

398. Although the courts have grown tolerant of Congress’ sweeping
delegations of legislative authority, a number of scholars and other observers
have expressed alarm at the constitutionality of “permit[ting] unelected
administrators to define fundamental regulatory policies” when “agencies exist
outside traditional conceptions of our tripartite national government.”
Seidenfeld, supra note 394. Although these scholars posit that agencies may
have too much unfettered authority, others contend that agencies empowered
with broad delegations of rulemaking authority actually may further the
democratic principle of deliberative decision making by involving regulated
entities and interested citizens in the process of making law. See, e.g.,
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); Christopher
Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991
DUKE L. J. 561, 588-99 (discussing the role of broadly empowered
administrative agencies in “sound governance.”); James O. Freedman,
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV., 307,
307-09 (1976); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1279-80 (1984); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration
and Public Deliberations: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L. J. 1617, 1631-41
(1985) (discussing role of agencies in fomenting public discussion and
involvement in administrative lawmaking); Seidenfeld, supra note 394, at
1515 (“[O]n the whole, civic republicanism is consistent with broad delegations
of political decision making authority to officials with greater expertise and
fewer immediate political pressures than directly elected officials or
legislators.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-87 (1975) (discussing the
importance of delegation of political decisions to administrative agencies as
means of achieving regulatory efficiency and avoiding political impasses);
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
399. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997).
400. Niles, supra note 393, at 390.
401. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986).
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Bernstein,402 who observed that in an agency’s “life cycle,” the
“early stages of the cycle are characterized by vigorous and
independent regulation” but that in later stages “the agency
often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the
industry it is charged with regulating.”403
Capture theorists have posited that agency capture is a
prevalent condition404 of federal government because so many
regulated industries have large lobbying operations in
Washington, that give them the ability to monitor regulators’
activities, participate actively in rulemaking and inquiry
proceedings,405 and seduce regulators by easing their
workloads, by, for example, providing them extensive industry
information that the regulators lack the resources and will to
acquire objectively.406 Professor Mark Seidenfeld explains that
“[a] regulated entity frequently is a large corporation with
resources to appeal agency decisions at every level.”407 He also
observes that “regulated entities and special interest groups
often contribute significantly to political campaigns.”408
Capture theorists have also pointed to the infamous
“golden revolving door,” shuttling key staff between
employment positions with the regulators and regulatees, as a
condition for capture.409 Professors Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst note that once an agency is captured by the industry it
regulates, “the regulatory scheme is maintained in the interest
of the regulated industry by bureaucrats who look to both
402. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 79-97 (1955).
403. Merrill, supra note 399, at 1060. Professor Richard Stewart described
agency capture as the overrepresentation of client interests in the process of
agency decision that results in persistent bias in favor of such interests. See
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682-83 (1975).
404. Professor Thomas W. Merrill writes that by the late 1960s, “agency
capture had come to be regarded as something more akin to the universal
condition of the administrative state.” Merrill, supra note 399, at 1060.
405. Professor Mark C. Niles posits that the APA’s requirements for noticeand-comment rulemakings and hearings in advance of certain agency actions,
intended to foster transparency and deliberative democracy, afford multiple
avenues for well-funded regulated entities to exert “hyper-influence” in agency
dealings and ultimately “capture” the agency. See Niles, supra note 393, at
388-89.
406. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Niles, supra note 393, at 399.
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Congress and to the industry for their rewards.”410 According
to Mashaw and Harfst, these rewards include “social and
business relations and the prospects of further career
opportunities in the private sector.”411
Observers have identified a number of federal agencies
that appear to have been captured by the entities they regulate.
It has been argued, for example, that the FAA was captured by
the airline industry,412 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by
nuclear power companies,413 the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service by meat and
processed foods industries,414 and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms by the National Rifle Association (NRA),
the gun lobby.415
There is little doubt that the FCC has been “captured” by
the broadcast industry.
The broadcasters’ largest trade
association, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),
has been called a “lobbying juggernaut in Washington” with
“legendary clout” that wins legislative and regulatory victories
by “steamrolling the opposition.”416 Senator John McCain (RAriz.), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, which
oversees the FCC and other federal telecommunications
agencies, has described the broadcast lobby as “one of the most
powerful influences here in Washington”417 comparing them to
“locusts.”418
The NAB has annual revenues of $56 million,419 making it
one of the richest trade lobbies in Washington. It spent over $7
410. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 16 (1990), quoted in Niles, supra note 393, at 395.
411. Id.
412. See generally Niles, supra note 393.
413. See Seidenfeld, supra note 406, at 464-65.
414. See Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food
Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 142, 142 (1998).
415. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000).
416. Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2560.
417. Alicia Mundy, Big John Takes Charge, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 16, 1996, at
17, 20.
418. Id. (speaking of the broadcasters’ reaction to “the first notice of the
word auction.”); see also Dan Carney, HDTV: Don’t Blame the FCC for Tuning
Out, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 5, 2001, at 52 (characterizing the broadcasting
industry as “accustomed to getting its way in Washington.”).
419. See Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2561 (noting that much of its
revenues are generated by its annual convention in Las Vegas, attended by
90,000 industry participants).
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million in Washington lobbying expenses in 2002.420 Its
contributions to federal political candidates are lavish.421 At
the height of the deliberations on the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, when Congress was deciding whether broadcasters
should pay for or agree to additional public interest obligations
in exchange for their digital spectrum, the broadcast industry
targeted the largest of its contributions to the chairmen of the
Senate and House telecommunications subcommittees, Sen.
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) (receiving $515,499) and Rep. Jack
Fields (R-Tex.) (receiving $221,228).422 The fifty largest media
firms spent $111 million in lobbying in the four years after the
1996 Telecom Act.423 In light of this generosity with political
dollars, few doubt the veracity of NAB president Edward O.
Fritts’s boast that “no one has more sway with members of
Congress than the local broadcaster.”424
The NAB’s generosity also extends to the FCC regulators
themselves. In May 2003, the Center for Public Integrity
released a report finding that between May 1995 and February
2003, the FCC officials had accepted nearly $2.8 million in
airfare, lodging and entertainment expenses.
The vast
majority of these funds were provided by the broadcast and
telecommunications entities which are regulated by the FCC.425
420. See id.
421. In the 2002 election cycle, radio and television stations (not including
the networks and entities that own them) donated $5,417,845 to federal
campaigns and political parties. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, TV/Radio
Stations: Long-Term Contribution Trends, available at www.opensecrets.org.
Media conglomerate Viacom alone made $1 million in donations to
Congressional campaigns in 2002. Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols,
Media Democracy’s Moment, THE NATION, Feb. 6, 2003, at 16, 16 (reporting
that media corporations contributed roughly $75 million to congressional
candidates between 1993 and 2000).
422. See Arthur E. Rowse, A Lobby the Media Won’t Touch; The Media
Lobby Itself, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1998, at 8, 11.
423. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 55 (citing the Center for Public
Integrity).
424. Taylor, supra note 21, at 20.
425. See Bob Williams & Morgan Jindrich, Ctr. for Public Integrity, On the
Road Again – and Again: FCC Officials Rack Up $2.8 Million Travel Tab With
Industries
They
Regulate,
(May
22,
2003),
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=15
see
also Bob
Herbert, Editorial, Cozy With the FCC, N. Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at A35. For
its 2003 annual convention, the NAB paid $26,309 to fly in, lodge and feed 17
FCC officials, including all five of the commissioners. See Bob Williams &
John Dunbar, Ctr. for Public Integrity, FCC Plans to Nix Industry-Paid
Travel, WELL CONNECTED, Sept. 2, 2003 (noting that FCC Chairman Michael
Powell had initiated a review of the FCC’s travel budgeting to “substantially
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In 1999, Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.), then chairman of the House
Commerce Committee, the committee that oversees the FCC,
accepted an all-expense paid ($18,910) trip to Paris, France for
him and his wife, courtesy of Time Warner and Instinet.426
Also notable is that Tauzin’s daughter, Kimberly Tauzin,
served as a key lobbyist at the NAB during the 1990s.427
The broadcast industry’s largesse in providing free travel
to its FCC regulators appears to have had the (intended) effect
of giving industry lobbyists unusually unfettered, closed-door
access to these policymakers.
In advance of the FCC’s
controversial June 2, 2003 vote to relax or altogether eliminate
certain longstanding media ownership caps, key FCC
regulators met seventy-one times with broadcast industry
lobbyists and senior executives in closed-door meetings to
discuss the proposals.428
The “Captured” Congress
The term “agency capture” does not properly describe the
extent of the broadcast industry’s influence in Washington,
considering that Congress itself is so beholden to broadcast
interests that its link to broadcasters has been characterized as
that of an “umbilical cord.”429 Perhaps the most compelling
evidence of broadcasters’ power on Capital Hill was their
reduce”
reliance
on
industry
funding),
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=62 .
426. Charles Lewis, Media Money, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct.
2000, at 20-22.
427. Id. at 22.
428. See Bob Williams, Ctr. for Public Integrity, Behind Closed Doors: Top
Broadcasters Met 71 Times with FCC Officials, WELL CONNECTED, May 29,
2003, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=83&sid=200.
429. See KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 89-90 (citing ROBERT
MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON
AMERICAN POLITICS 243 (1968)); see also BREYER, STEWART ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 533 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that
from its inception the broadcast licensing regime “provided ‘pork barrel’ to
local congressional districts; local television stations provided jobs for
constituents and also provided a way for local merchants to advertise
efficiently their local goods and services to local consumers”). Interestingly,
the symbiotic relationship between politicians and the media is much older
than broadcasting. Upon his assumption of the presidency in 1829, Andrew
Jackson found “plush political appointments” for fifty-nine newspaper
reporters assigned to cover Washington and earmarked $25,000 annually to
lavish upon the editor of the Washington daily newspaper. MCCHESNEY, supra
note 147, at 28, (citing TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE
NEWS MEDIA AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 26-32 (1998)).
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reaction to then-Senator Bob Dole’s insistence that
broadcasters pay fair market value or accept more extensive
public interest obligations in exchange for their new digital
channels by means of a spectrum auction. Once Dole had
recruited Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) to his effort to make
broadcasters pay,430 the NAB launched a $9.5 million
advertising campaign, by means of what they called “public
service announcements,” urging viewers to tell their Members
of Congress to save “free TV” and not impose a “tax on free
television” that would force the cancellation of “your favorite
shows.”431
Facing a flurry of telephone calls, e-mail messages and
letters from constituents alarmed by the NAB’s ads, Dole
accused the broadcasters of misleading their viewers and
“bullying Congress.”432 Despite his anger, he backed off his
insistence on auctions and resigned on June 11, 1996 to run for
President – an endeavor in which it pays to have broadcasters
on your side.433 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the 1996
Telecom Act incorporating the free giveaway of digital
spectrum to broadcasters, and Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the new
Senate Majority Leader, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich (RGa.) sent a letter to the FCC directing it to grant the new
digital channels to broadcasters without engaging in an
auction.434 The NAB’s success in killing the spectrum auction
concept and obtaining the new spectrum for free was such a
significant lobbying coup that the usually sober National
Moreover, the DTV
Journal called it “spectacular[].”435
spectrum giveaway is but one of the NAB’s legislative successes
in recent years.436
430. Mundy, supra note 417, at 20 (statement of Senator John McCain) (“I
want to see taxpayers get value from this resource, which the spectrum is. It’s
not visible like most natural resources, like an oil resource, or public land, a
gold mine you can see or touch. And I agree that there is certainly some
legitimacy to the argument that broadcasters want to make this transition to
[digital TV], and need time to change over. But to get this absolutely free? . . .
No way.”) (alteration in original).
431. Rowse, supra note 422, at 9.
432. Id. Senator McCain agreed, calling the NAB’s ads “an absolutely false
scare tactic.” Taylor, supra note 21, at 21.
433. See Mundy supra note 417, at 20 (“Logic says that in an election, you
don’t go ticking off broadcasters if you can avoid it.”).
434. Rowse supra note 422, at 9; Taylor supra note 21 at 20.
435. Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2561.
436. Id.
In recent years, the NAB has helped torpedo FCC efforts to encourage
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The core of the influence that the broadcast industry holds
over Congress is not money nor lobbying muscle, but exposure.
Most Americans get their news from television.437 As most
news programs cover at least some federal political stories,
elected officials are keenly interested in getting favorable
exposure on their constituents’ local television stations. It is in
their best political interests, therefore, to avoid offending the
very broadcasters who report on their successes and failures in
Washington, as well as their personal lives, to the voters and
donors back home.438 This is particularly true given an elected
official’s awareness that these broadcasters also have the power
not to report on them at all.439
The nourishment in the umbilical cord connecting
broadcasters and Congress, however, flows in both directions.
The broadcast lobby often lobbies Congress in order to persuade
low-power FM radio. It has stymied attempts to provide free or
deeply discounted airtime to politicians. It has worked to allow
greater consolidation within the radio industry. It has maintained
local broadcasters’ guaranteed placement on cable and satellite TV
systems. And it has worked to kill new taxes or user fees on
broadcasting.
Id.
437. See Sallie Hofmeister, Is Free TV Worth Saving in a 500 Channel
World?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1.
438. Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2562 (statement of former
Congressman Henson Moore (R-La.))(“Obviously, the broadcasters report the
news, so I think most people in elective politics listen to them.”); see also,
KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 90 (“Broadcasters control a very important
commodity to politicians – electronic media exposure.”) As commentator Paul
Taylor put it, broadcasters “hold the ticket to every congressman’s heart –
access to the six o’clock news.” Taylor, supra note 21, at 21. Broadcasters
“live in a world where image is a fragile commodity, where paranoia is a
survival tool and where it’s taken as a given that if the station manager, the
news director and the anchorman think you’re a helluva guy, that’s a very
good thing.” Id.
439. But it’s not just what broadcasters can say about elected officials that
gives them power; it’s also what they do not say. Congressman Barney Frank
(D-MA) notes:
We know they have enormous discretion over what goes on the air
each night and what doesn’t. It’s not that members of Congress fear
out-and-out retribution. It’s more subtle. They worry that the station
might decide to just ignore the shit out of them. Now I happen to be
at the stage in my career where if they never say another word about
me, a blessing on their head. But, for a lot of members, it can have a
chilling effect.
Taylor, supra note 21 at 21; see also Rowse, supra note 422, at 11 (“When you
consider how reliant politicians are on the media for both access and campaign
donations, it’s hardly surprising that, when it comes to personal contacts,
nobody has a greater ability to open doors than newspaper publishers and
broadcasters.”).
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prominent members to do the broadcasters’ bidding at the FCC.
Because the FCC is an independent regulatory agency outside
of the protective layers of the executive branch, it is especially
Former FCC
susceptible to congressional influence.440
Commissioner Glen Robinson described it this way: “The chief
purpose for lobbying Congress today is not so much to obtain
legislation but rather to gain Congressional leverage to
pressure the agency to take some particular action.”441
Another contributor to the broadcast industry’s political
influence is its selective coverage of itself. The broadcast
industry avoids drawing attention to its own dealings in
Washington. After the industry’s controversial but stealthy
success in pressuring Congress to give it digital spectrum for
free, Senator McCain remarked: “What troubles me is that the
voters never got a clear picture of this giveaway on television.
‘The Fleecing of America,’ ‘It’s Your Money,’ – where were
they?”442
No national television networks covered the “great
spectrum giveaway” in their network news programs.443 Their
440. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 88-89. Newton Minow, FCC
Chairman in the Kennedy Administration, recounts that shortly after his
confirmation, House Speaker Sam Rayburn put his arm around him and
warned, “Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of the
Congress; you belong to us. Remember that and you’ll be all right.” Id. at 89
(citing Newton N. Minow, Politics and the Regulatory Agencies, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 383, 384. (1968) (book review)).
441. KRASNOW ET. AL., supra note 44, at 89-90 (quoting Glen O. Robinson,
The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 69 VA. L. REV. 169, 175 (1978)). An unnamed FCC official called
broadcast lobbyists “downright arrogant” when they demand specific favors
from the Commission. Instead of presenting their arguments dispassionately,
“they come in with the attitude: ‘[i]f you don’t do what we want, we’ll kill you
on the Hill.” Rowse, supra note 422, at 11; see also KRASNOW ET AL., supra
note 44, at 90 (noting the "tense mutual interdependence" of Congress and
broadcast lobbyists (quoting ROBERT MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: THE
INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS 243 (1968))).
442. William Safire, Editorial, Broadcast Industry Abuses Power as it Seeks
to Protect Itself, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 24, 1997, at A14.
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt agreed:
It’s bad enough that broadcasters are being given both digital and
analog channels in perpetuity, without paying money or in-kind.
Worse is that there have been no major televised discussions of the
issues. The number one missing piece in the puzzle is, why wasn’t
this story about TV covered on TV?
William Safire, Broadcast Lobby Triumphs, N. Y. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at
A21.
443. Rowse, supra note 422, at 9 (“[T]he fact that congressional leaders
could hand out such a treasure trove of public property without causing an
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stunning lobbying achievement went largely without any public
scrutiny.444 Newspapers largely failed to fill the silence,
possibly because of their own significant interests in
commercial television stations and the profit making potential
they stood to gain as a result of the giveaway.445 Lack of
coverage minimizes public outrage over favorable treatment for
broadcasters, and keeps the public unaware and unmotivated
to demand reform from their legislators in Washington.446
Finally, as with other “captured” agencies, the FCC is
legendary in Washington politicolegal circles for its “golden
uproar was due not so much to expert lobbying as to thin news coverage.”); see
also Jeff Cohen, TV Industry Wields Power in DC, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May
4, 1997 at 6F (characterizing the digital spectrum giveaway as “a rip-off that
never got mentioned on any of the nightly network news segments”). Cohen,
director of media watchdog group, FAIR, says: “with vast influence over
Congress – and confidence that its clout will be ignored by network reporters –
the TV lobby is one of the key obstacles to political reform in our country. It’s
a mark of television’s power that this obstacle remains so shrouded.” Id.
444. See e.g., Neil Hickey, What’s at Stake in the Spectrum War? Only
Billions of Dollars and the Future of Television, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
July/Aug. 1996, at 39, 40.
A somnolent press…has failed ignominiously to report the story,
either because most journalists simply don’t know about it, or don’t
understand its importance, or think it’s too complex to convey or, in
the case of TV people, are loath to roil the waters and inflame the
public’s passions on an issue in whose outcome TV networks and
stations have a huge monetary interest.
Id.
445. The Washington Post owns six television stations, the New York
Times eight television stations and Gannett, the publisher of USA Today and
92 other newspapers across the country, owns 20 television stations. Rowse,
supra note 422, at 9. A study involving 100 newspapers discovered that “every
one whose owners got little TV revenue editorialized against the spectrum
‘giveaway,’ whereas every one with high TV revenues editorialized in favor of
giving broadcasters free use of spectrum.” Id. (quoting James H. Snider &
Benjamin I. Page, The Political Power of TV Broadcasters: Covert Bias and
Anticipated
Reactions,
(1997),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_1237_1.pdf.
446. In fact, a Lake Snell Perry & Associates poll commissioned by the
Benton Foundation in 1998 found that most Americans (71%) were unaware
that broadcasters do not pay for their use of broadcast spectrum, and that
most (56%) believed that broadcasters paid from hundreds of thousands to
millions of dollars for their broadcast licenses. Comments of the Benton
Found., Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket
No. 99-360, at 4-5 (filed Mar. 27, 2000) (quoting data from Lake, Snell, Perry
& Associates, Television in the Digital Age: A Report to the Project on Media
Ownership and the Benton Foundation, December 1998.) The poll found that
most Americans surveyed (79%) favored a proposal to require digital
broadcasters to pay 5% of their revenues to a fund subsidizing public
television, and that 80% supported the imposition of specific, quantified public
interest obligations in exchange for use of the spectrum. Id. at 5.
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For example, the two premier
revolving door.”447
communications law practices in Washington, are headed by
two former FCC Chairmen, Charles D. Ferris448 and Richard
And there are numerous recent examples of
Wiley.449
prominent attorneys who left senior policymaking positions at
the FCC for senior lobbyist jobs representing industry players
before their former FCC colleagues.450
III. REDEMPTION: PAST PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND
A NEW IDEA
A. PAST PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The dysfunction and obsolescence of the public trustee
doctrine has elicited a great number of proposals for reform
aimed at having television broadcasters finally “pay their debt”
to the American people. As detailed above, Senator Bob Dole
led a number of his colleagues in demanding the replacement of
the public trustee doctrine with the requirement that
447. See Niles, supra note 393, at 399.
448. FCC chairman between 1977 and 1981, now a name partner at Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC, and with whom I worked at
Mintz Levin between 1994 and 1996.
449. FCC general counsel, commissioner and chairman between 1970 and
1977; founding partner of Wiley, Rein & Fielding.
450. On December 15, 2003, Marsha J. MacBride, former FCC chief of staff
under chairman Michael Powell started her position as the executive vice
president for legal and regulatory affairs at the NAB. Ted Hearn, MacBride
Joins NAB’s Legal Staff, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003, at 24 (“In her
new role, MacBride will steer the NAB’s lobbying efforts at the FCC,
essentially seeking favorable regulatory rulings from old colleagues for
thousands of radio and television stations.”). In late 2002, longtime
telecommunications lawyer and lobbyist Nancy Victory left her firm to become
President Bush’s senior communications policy advisor as Administrator of the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).
Following her appointment, industry lobbyists threw a lavish, $480 per
person, party to celebrate her appointment. Ten days later, she pressured the
FCC to side with the lobbyists in a spectrum dispute. Lobbyists Held Party
for Bush Telecommunications Official, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at A19;
Editorial, Cozying Up, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at A20. On September 15,
2002, Dorothy Attwood, former chief of the FCC’s Wireline Competition
Bureau, left her FCC job to become the senior vice president for federal
regulatory strategy for SBC Communications, “helping the telecom giant work
to reshape the rules she helped draft.” Phone Booth Revolving Door,
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2003, at 7. Gene Kimmelman of the
Consumers Union remarked, “to actually set foot in the place that soon after
you leave a top policy role, it’s just stunning. She’s just symptomatic of the
whole captured-agency problem.” Id. at 8.
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commercial broadcasters pay fair market value for their digital
channels.451 Their arguments could not, however, withstand
the formidable political influence of the broadcast lobby, and
the 1996 Telecom Act passed with the free digital license “giveaway” provisions intact.
Others have argued that in light of the lucrative
opportunities provided broadcasters by means of the DTV
transition, the FCC should demand more public interest “quid”
for the digital spectrum “quo.” For example, the proposals of
the Gore Commission and a number of advocacy organizations
participating in the FCC’s proceedings on the digital TV public
interest obligations, such as the Media Access Project,
advocated more quantifiable and specific public interest
obligations. They urged the FCC to require broadcasters to use
the expansive capacity and capabilities of their new digital
channels to air a minimum amount of public affairs,
educational and children’s television.452 They also suggested
that the FCC require that broadcasters play a central role in
campaign finance reform by providing free airtime to political
candidates in advance of elections.453
In April 2004, a coalition of media watchdog organizations
petitioned the FCC to adopt new “public interest processing
guidelines,” to be enforced during the review of broadcast
The coalition’s
station license renewal applications.454
proposed guidelines include a minimum of three hours per
week on the broadcaster’s primary digital programming signal
451. See supra notes 430-435 and accompanying text.
452. See, e.g., Comments of the Media Access Project, Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licenses, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27,
2000); Comments of Benton Found., Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broadcast Licenses, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 2000)..
453. See, e.g., Media Access Project, Promoting Civic Discourse and
Protecting
Free
Speech
in
Broadcast
Media,
(2004),
at
www.mediaaccess.org/programs/civicdisc.
454. See ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, BENTON FOUND., CTR. FOR
CREATIVE VOICES IN MEDIA, CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, COMMON CAUSE,
INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION OF GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., MEDIA
ACCESS PROJECT, NEW AM. FOUND., & OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION OF THE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS PROPOSED
PROCESSING GUIDELINES (April 7, 2004 ) (petition submitted to the Federal
Communications
Committee),
available
at
www.ourairwaves.org/docs/index.php?DocID=56. The coalition proposes that
broadcast license renewal applicants whose applications document compliance
with all of the proposed guidelines “will receive staff level approval” within the
FCC, whereas failure to comply with the guidelines would result in referral of
the application to the full Commission for review. Id. at 2.
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of “local civic or electoral affairs programming” that is
“designed to provide the public with information about local
issues.”455
To the extent that various proposals, old and new, for
increased public interest programming are valiant attempts to
revive the public trustee doctrine, they deserve serious
Congressional and FCC consideration.
Unfortunately, as
demonstrated above, the chances for Congress and the FCC to
adopt heightened public interest requirements are remote at
best. Even if new, strict public interest guidelines were
adopted, their enforcement would still be in the hands of an
agency unwilling to enforce judgments about the nature and
purpose of broadcast content.
More extreme proposals to replace our current regime with
one more akin to the British model – in which the state
provides significant programming and operating subsidies to
government-controlled broadcasters, financed by “license” fees
for radio and television receivers456 – have not received any
substantial attention since the NAB succeeded at quashing
such proposals during the initial regulatory debates of the late
1920s and early 1930s.457 The BBC model itself has withered
under persistent attacks by British commentators who
characterize it as paternalistic and elitist.458 British media
critic Ien Ang claimed that to the BBC governors, “public
service broadcasting” was nothing but “enlightened cultural
dictatorship, in which a single set of standards and tastes was
455. “Local civic programming includes broadcasts of interviews with or
statements by elected or appointed officials and relevant experts on issues of
importance to the community, government meetings, legislative sessions,
conferences featuring elected officials, and substantive discussions of civic
issues of interest to local communities or groups.” Id. at 2. In addition, the
proposed guidelines include a requirement that broadcasters who are affiliates
of a national network (i.e., ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox, UPN and WB) must transmit
“independently produced programming,” defined as programming produced
“by an entity not owned or controlled by an owner of a national television
network,” for at least 25 percent of the primary channel’s prime time schedule.
Id. at 4. The proposal also includes reporting requirements. Id.
456. For an excellent description of the British model see STARR, supra note
34, at 340-41.
457. MCCHESNEY, supra note 147 at 40-41.
458. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. BAKER AND GEORGE DESSART, DOWN THE TUBE:
AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN TELEVISION 46 (1998)
(quoting a Labour Member of Parliament as dismissing the BBC as “run very
largely by people who do not know the working class point of view, do not
understand the working class point of view, but are seeking evidently to mould
the working class.”)
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imposed on the entire national audience.”459
Henry Geller, a highly respected television industry
analyst and former FCC General Counsel, proposed the more
moderate idea of an annual “spectrum usage fee” of up to three
percent of a broadcast licensee’s gross advertising revenues,
that the government would use to increase funding for the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), the entity
chartered by Congress in 1967 to administer and fund public
television programming.460 The CPB would utilize the crosssubsidy to fund more and better quality public affairs,
educational and cultural fare on public television stations.461
Geller’s idea is compelling in light of the persistent
underfunding of American public television stations,462 the
difficulties public broadcasters had in upgrading their facilities
to the digital format,463 and because public broadcasters – as
not-for-profit organizations – generally do not have the same
profit making pressures as their commercial brethren. Instead,
they tend to have organizational missions that are more
aligned with the public interest aspirations of the public
trustee doctrine.
Although the Geller proposal would be a significant
improvement on the status quo, a number of important
concerns counsel against its adoption. First, it would not

459. IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 109 (1991) (“What
[BBC Chief] Reith strived for was the creation of a common national culture:
the BBC’s self-conception was that of a ‘national church’ to whose authority all
citizens must be subjected.”).
Interestingly, American novelist and
philosopher Ayn Rand criticized the American broadcasting regulation model
as suffering from a similar elitism as that afflicting the BBC. She called the
public interest standard “the intellectual knife of collectivism’s sacrificial
guillotine…. a blank check on totalitarian power over the broadcasting
industry, granted to whatever bureaucrats happened to be appointed to the
[Federal Communications] Commission.”
AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE
UNKNOWN IDEAL 126 (1967).
460. Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 362-66 (1998).
461. See HENRY GELLER & TIM WATTS, THE FIVE PERCENT SOLUTION: A
SPECTRUM FEE TO REPLACE THE ‘PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS’ OF
BROADCASTERS (New Am. Found. Spectrum Series Working Paper #3, 2002),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/
Pub_File_844_1.PDF.
462. See generally Monroe E. Price, Public Broadcasting and the Crisis of
Corporate Governance, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (1999).
463. See Geneva Collins, Public TV Seeks ‘Flexibility’ In Money-Making
Uses
of
DTV,
CURRENT,
Feb.
22,
1999,
available
at
www.current.org/dtv/dtv903a.html.
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counter the possibility that Congress would simply use the
commercial-to-public television cross-subsidy as an excuse to
reduce federal funding for the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, resulting in little or no net increase in funding
for public television. This is an especially realistic possibility
considering that certain members of Congress continue to insist
that Congress cease funding public television.464 Second, it still
would not guarantee the provision of locally oriented,
responsive public interest programming to the American
public. The FCC would be no less restrained by the First
Amendment in prescribing the quantity and characteristics of
public interest programming on public television stations as it
is in requiring such content from commercial licensees.
In addition, although public broadcasters have a better
track record in providing public interest programming, critics
have bemoaned the structure of the American public television
industry as too beholden to Congressional whims, political
appointees at the CPB and other government funding sources.
Public television producer and industry expert Roger P. Smith,
in fact, complains that “[o]ur state television acts in the
interest of and selectively promulgates ideas that contribute to
the perceived interest of a cadre of occupants of elective
office.”465 The Geller proposal, if implemented, may help
alleviate the chilling Congressional influence on public
television broadcasters, but it may also exacerbate the problem
by allowing public television broadcasters to rely more on
publicly administered funds and less on the contributions of
their viewers.466 Moreover, public broadcasting, like the BBC,
464. See, e.g., Karen Everhart Bedford, What to Kill First? The Right
nominates CPB — to Save Tax Money and "Privatize the Left", CURRENT, Jan.
16, 1995, available at http://www.current.org/mo501.html.
465. ROGER P. SMITH, THE OTHER FACE OF PUBLIC TV: CENSORING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 9 ( 2002). He writes:
All the programs you watch on public TV must meet the approval of
gatekeepers in the United States Congress and the Executive Branch
of the Federal Government. . . . Billed as ‘yours’ on its station breaks,
public TV is yours the way a Stealth bomber is yours. . . it’s paid for
largely with your tax money and made in your name according to the
decisions of a few dozen men whose inclinations have led them to
pursue public office as your representatives.
Id.
466. On the other hand, public television’s dependence on the generosity of
viewers and corporate donors has resulted in what some have described as a
vulnerability to commercial exploitation and control. See, e.g., Susan E. Linn
and Alvin F. Poussaint, The Trouble with Teletubbies: The Commercialization
of PBS, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, May-June 1999, at 18, available at

VARONA_A1

94

12/29/2004 1:45:38 PM

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 6:1

has endured criticism for being culturally elitist and exclusive
in its programming decisions.467
Finally, public television stations – like their commercial
counterparts – are permitted to use the expansive capacity in
their new digital channel for ancillary profit making uses,
including leasing spectrum to paging companies, pay-per-view
enterprises and other services.468 These new opportunities may
help remedy the longstanding challenges public broadcasters
have faced and that Geller addresses in his proposal.
B. PAYING THE OVERDUE DEBT: BROADCASTERS AS DIGITAL
DIVIDE BRIDGE BUILDERS
This article presents a novel approach to fixing the
persistent problem of the public trustee doctrine. Congress and
the FCC should require commercial television broadcasters to
assume an important role in making broadband469 Internet
access available to more Americans, particularly those who do
not currently have such access because they cannot afford it or
because it is not offered in their communities. Under this
approach, broadcasters would not only be required to continue
satisfying their minimal and constructively unenforced public
interest programming requirements (for example, political
broadcasting and children’s educational television) but would
also be required to help bridge the “digital divide” with a
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleI
d=4581.
467. See, e.g., Editorial, Public Television and ‘Elitism', N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1995 at A20 (acknowledging and rejecting as “myth” public television’s
reputation in some circles as an “elitist” enterprise).
468. See Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Capacity by
Noncommercial Licensees: Before the Fed. Communications Comm., 14
F.C.C.R. 3259 (2001) (Report and Order).
469. “Broadband” simply means a connection to the Internet allowing for
much higher speed – and therefore capacity – for information to be delivered
to the customer’s computer. Whereas a broadband Internet connection’s speed
is approximately 2 megabits per second (mbps), a “narrowband” Internet
connection has a maximum speed of 56 kilobits per second (kbps). See Enrico
C. Soriano, et al., A Look at Key Issues Currently Shaping Broadband
Deployment and Regulation, 21 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 1, 1 n.6 (July
2004);
see
also
Fed.
Communications
Comm.,
Broadband,
at
www.fcc.gov/broadband (last modified Mar. 3, 2003). In practical terms, a
broadband Internet connection can be as much as 100 times faster (and more
capacious) than narrowband, allowing for the transmission of near-television
quality video and audio programming, and the quick downloading of
documents and other files. Fed. Communications Comm., Broadband, at
www.fcc.gov/broadband (last modified Mar. 3, 2003).
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relatively small portion of the significant profits they realize in
exploiting public spectrum.
First articulated in the mid-1990s, the “digital divide”
refers to the disparity in access to computers, the Internet and
other high technology by, primarily, the poor, people of color,
the undereducated, and the aged.470 Although Internet access
of any kind (narrowband as well as broadband) has become
more widespread across socioeconomic strata throughout the
last five years, persistent gaps remain. A study completed in
August 2003 found that although Internet access rates had
improved for most Americans, Internet access among AfricanAmericans (51%) still significantly trailed that of whites
(64%).471 Another study completed in April 2003 by the Pew
Internet and American Life Project found that although race
remains a determinant of Internet access, the fundamental
predictive factor is that of household income.472 In light of the
relatively high cost of home PCs and monthly Internet Service
Provider (ISP) subscriptions for even basic dial-up
(narrowband) access,473 a household income above $50,000
470. In discussing the “digital divide,” President Bill Clinton said: “There
is a growing digital divide between those who have access to the digital
economy and the Internet and those who don’t, and the divide exists along the
lines of education, income, region, and race.” John Schwartz, U.S. Cities Race
Gap In Use of Internet: Clinton Bemoans ‘Digital Divide’, WASH. POST, July 9,
1999, at A1.
471. PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICA’S ONLINE PURSUITS:
THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WHO’S ONLINE AND WHAT THEY DO 5 (Dec. 22,
2003),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIP_Online_Pursuits_Final.PDF.
In October 2000, the Department of
Commerce released a report concluding that white (46.1%) and Asian
American/Pacific Islander (56.8%) households had Internet access at a level
more than double that of African-American (23.5%) and Latino (23.6%)
households. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD
DIGITAL INCLUSION: A REPORT ON AMERICANS’ ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY
TOOLS,
12
(October
2000),
available
at
http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf. This report was the fourth in a series
of annual reports. Among households earning $75,000 and above annually,
Internet access was at 77.7%, whereas only 12.7% of households with annual
earnings of less than $15,000 per year had Internet access. Id. at 8.
472. AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET AND AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE EVERSHIFTING INTERNET POPULATION: A NEW LOOK AT INTERNET ACCESS AND THE
DIGITAL DIVIDE 5 (Apr. 16, 2003) ("Independent of all other factors, having an
income above $50,000 annually predicts internet use."),
available at
www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=88.
473. In a December 2004 article, Consumer Reports estimated the cost of
an Internet-ready personal computer with the bare requirements for
acceptable Internet access as falling between $500 and $700. Ratings: Desktop
REPORTS,
December
2004,
at
Computers,
CONSUMER
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annually is most predictive of Internet access.474 That study
also noted that educational level and age were significant
determinants as well, with less educated and older Americans
less able, or less willing, to access the Internet.475
Not all policymakers agree that the “digital divide” merits
concern.
FCC Chairman Michael Powell, for example,
dismissed the “so called digital divide” as “a Mercedes divide,”
chiding: “I’d like to have one; I can’t afford one . . . .”476
Although some dispute the severity and longevity of the digital
divide, there is general consensus among lawmakers,
educators, the telecommunications industry and its critics that
the digital divide continues to exist.477
None other than President George Bush has spoken in
support of government initiatives seeking to expand access to
broadband Internet service. In a June 24, 2004 speech at the
Department of Commerce, he set a goal to make broadband
Internet access universally available in the United States by
2007.478 Citing that the United States ranks tenth in the world
in terms of per capita access to broadband Internet services,
President Bush noted that “[t]he spread of broadband will not
only help industry, it’ll help the quality of life of our
He noted that to achieve universal access,
citizens.”479
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/content/display_report.jsp?FOLDER%3
C%3Efolder_id=516851&ASSORTMENT%3C%3East_id=333133&bmUID=110
1003920336. A monthly subscription to a narrowband, dial-up ISP (such as
AOL and MSN) is approximately $20.00. Broadband Internet: Worth the
REPORTS,
September
2002,
at
Switch?,
CONSUMER
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/content/display_report.jsp?FOLDER%3
C%3Efolder_id=334697&ASSORTMENT%3C%3East_id=333133&bmUID=110
1004274458. By contrast, broadband connections cost approximately $35 to
$40 per month, if available at all in a customer’s service area, and are
typically provided by standard telephone companies using upgraded Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) wiring or cable television companies using cable
REPORTS.COM,
modems.
See
generally
BROADBAND
www.broadbandreports.com.
474. Lenhart, supra note 472, at 5.
475. Id. at 8-9.
476. Stephen Labaton, New FCC Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at C1.
477. See President George Bush, Speech to U.S. Dept. of Commerce (June
24, 2004) transcript available at http://www.multied.com/elections/2004/
2004mainelec/Bushspeeches/Technology.html. [hereinafter Bush Broadband
Speech]; Allen S. Hammond, The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 135-36 (2002).
478. See Editorial, Broadband Penetration, BALT. SUN, April 28, 2004, at
18A.
479. See Bush Broadband Speech, supra note 477.
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broadband Internet service must be deployed to the areas of the
country where it is still unavailable, and it must be made more
affordable.480 The campaign staff of the 2004 Democratic
Presidential candidate, John Kerry, released a statement
making a similar commitment to broadband Internet access.481
Unfortunately, as noted by a number of observers, both the
President and Senator Kerry failed to support their rhetoric
with tangible proposals to reach the goal of universal service by
2007.482
1. The Internet as the True “Free Marketplace of Ideas”
Having broadcasters subsidize access to the Internet for
those poor or underserved households may help achieve,
finally, the unmet aspirations of American broadcast regulation
“to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic
dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population,
and more robust, culturally inclusive communities.”483 With
the Internet, Congress and broadcasters for the first time have
the opportunity to help create the “free marketplace of ideas”
envisioned by Justice Holmes, where ideas are traded and
truth distilled without the encroachment and influence of
government. The Internet is the quintessential, egalitarian
public forum. Anyone with access to it can speak and be heard
as well as hear (or read) the ideas of others, all with almost no
government interference.484 Writer Declan McCullagh suggests
that individuals should “[t]hink of the Internet as an unlimited
expanse of public park, where soapboxes are available for free
480. Id.
481. See Political Disconnect: Bush, Kerry Tout Broadband for All, But
Critics Say Neither Has Concrete Plan for Achieving Critical Goal, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004, at 1B
482. See id. The Kerry campaign suggested using public money to subsidize
access to underserved areas as well as a tax credit for those providers who
serve those areas. Id. In his speech before the Commerce Department, the
President stated that a ban on taxing broadband access should help make it
more affordable. Bush Broadband Speech, supra note 477.
483. From the beginning, broadcast regulation in the public interest has
sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and culture, over and
above what the marketplace may or may not provide. See CHARTING THE
DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 7, at 21.
484. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 24 (1999) (citing Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Of
Governance and Technology, INTER@CTIVE WEEKONLINE, October 5, 1998
(“Some things never change about governing the Web. Most prominent is its
innate ability to resist governance in almost any form”)) available at
http://web.archive.org/web/19990922122310/www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/n
ews/0,4164,357750,00.html.
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to anyone who wants one.”485 The problem, of course, is that
McCullagh is half right. He is right that once one has access to
the Internet’s “public park,” one can climb on a soapbox and
speak at no additional expense. The problem, however, is that
the park’s admission price is too steep for many Americans, and
the park’s entrance gates are too far away for others. While the
advent of the Internet has lowered barriers among those who
have access to it, it has exacerbated divisions between those
who can afford the Internet – and the new digital era’s
marketplace of ideas – and those who cannot.
Notwithstanding barriers to access, the Internet has
already proven itself to be a more useful tool for democratic
interaction and deliberation than television.
Whereas
television broadcasting is by definition passive, the Internet is
Whereas
fundamentally interactive and participatory.486
television provides narrow, homogenized content designed
primarily to attract the greatest number of viewers (and
advertising dollars), the Internet offers an almost limitless
array of information streams and opportunities for active
engagement. The Internet has become America’s expansive
public forum where diverse people meet, exchange ideas, trade
goods and engage in many of the other activities traditionally
performed in the “town square.” As Justice Kennedy noted in
1996, “[m]inds are not changed in the streets and parks as they
once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur
in mass and electronic media.”487 In 2004, those words are
especially descriptive of the Internet.
The Internet holds promise for the Madisonian view that
political equality among all citizens is achieved only when all
485. Declan McCullagh, Democracy Online Project, Testimony before
Democracy Online Task Force (May 22, 2000), available at
http://www.mccullagh.org/speeches/democracyonline.052200.html.
486. Lloyd Morrisett, the cofounder of the Children’s Television Workshop,
acknowledges that “[b]roadcasting, as a technology, does not naturally
stimulate discussion among the people who receive the broadcast. Networked
computers offer quite a different model.” Lloyd Morrisett, Technologies of
Freedom?, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA 28 (Henry Jenkins & David
Thorburn, eds., 2003). Media theorist George Gilder agrees. At the 1997
Camden Conference on Telecommunications, he posited that the Internet is
“inherently” democratic whereas television is inherently undemocratic. Doug
Schuler, Reports of the Close Relationship between Democracy and the Internet
May Have Been Exaggerated, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA 72.
487. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
801-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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citizens have the ability to participate in democratic
deliberation and debate.488 The Internet provides us with a
relatively unrestricted and broad exchange of information. It
already is facilitating what Justice Holmes’s described as a
“free trade in ideas”489 and the sort of “public discussion” that
Justice Brandeis termed “a political duty.”490 Internet access,
particularly by means of a broadband connection, allows users
to watch Congressional floor debate and committee hearings
and a panoply of public affairs programming, such as panel
discussions on political campaigns and the war effort,491 gives
users free access to hundreds of newspapers from around the
United States and the world492 and access to federal and state
agency filing, regulations, and open rulemaking proceedings
(many of which accept comments from the public through the
respective agency’s website).493 Congress and the executive
branch, virtually all federal agencies, and many state and local
governments have significant presences on the Internet, with
web sites that provide citizens access to information involving
important entitlement and public safety programs and the
ability to file comments, complaints or concerns electronically
with government agencies and elected representatives.
Users can use the Internet to engage in political activism
through advocacy sites aligned with their interests, and can
view issue-specific programming and engage in pertinent
“chats” on those sites.494 Users can obtain in-depth information
488. It also is consistent with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which echoes the Madisonian perspective: “Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference or to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 19
(1948) available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
489. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
490. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). Justice Brandeis
warned that “the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.” Id.
491. See, e.g., www.cspan.org (C-SPAN’s extensive video streaming and
archived video feeds).
TIMES
website);
492. See,
e.g.,
www.nytimes.com
(N.Y.
www.washingtonpost.com (WASH. POST website); www.timesonline.co.uk
(LONDON TIMES website).
493. See, e.g., www.hhs.gov (Department of Health and Human Services);
www.dol.gov (Department of Labor website).
494. See, e.g., www.hrc.org (Human Rights Campaign website);
www.nrlc.org (National Right to Life Committee website); www.naral.org
(National Abortion Rights Action League website); www.nrdc.org (Natural
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about political candidates through their campaign websites,
and also can see what kind of campaign contributions the
candidates are receiving and from whom.495 Users could peruse
thousands of “blogs” or “web logs,” which are websites
maintained by individual writers and commentators on
political,496 legal,497 cultural498 or other issues, or they could
create their own “blog” and express their own views, including
expressions of political dissent.499
A.J. Liebling said that “freedom of the press is guaranteed
only to those who own one.”500 Today, access to the Internet is
tantamount to owning one’s own “press.” Indeed, bloggers and
their blogs are changing the face and definition of the modern
press.501 Matt Drudge, the publisher of the online “Drudge
Report,” is credited with breaking the story about President
William J. Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky, scooping all
of the mainstream press in the process.502 Professor Lawrence
Lessig, a “blogger” himself,503 wrote that the Internet, and
especially blogging and other interactive activity, has “turn[ed]

Resources Defense Council website); www.nra.org (National Rifle Association
website).
495. See, e.g., www.fec.gov (Federal Elections Commission website).
496. See, e.g., www.andrewsullivan.com (renowned blog of conservative
political writer and commentator Andrew Sullivan); www.dailykos.com
(popular liberal political blog authored by Markos Moulitsaz Zuniga). The
“Daily Kos” site typically receives 4 million unique visits per month. See
Marlon Manuel, Boston E-Party, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 25, 2004, at 1E. It
has been credited with raising tens of thousands of dollars in a matter of days
for key Congressional races. See Farhad Manjoo, At The Speed of Blog,
July
23,
2004,
at
SALON.COM,
www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004/07/23/blog_money/index_np.html.
497. See, e.g., www.volokh.com (“The Volokh Conspiracy,” blog launched by
law professor Eugene Volokh).
498. See, e.g. www.artsjournal.com/blogs/.
499. Although access to the great majority of blogs is free, a number of
bloggers ask for donations and some of the more popular writers receive
significant contributions in response, in some cases significantly higher sums
than average salaries for reporters at major daily newspapers and television
stations. See Kathy Kiely, Freewheeling ‘Bloggers’ Are Rewriting the Rules of
Journalism, USA TODAY, December 30, 2003, at 1A (noting that in 2002,
Andrew Sullivan, a popular blogger, ran a “pledge drive” on his blog and
claims to have raised nearly $100,000).
500. A.J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (2d rev. ed., 1975).
501. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV.
429, 471-72 (2002) (noting that the Internet is necessitating new
interpretations of traditional notions associated with the freedom of the press.)
502. See Kiely, supra note 499, at 1A.
503. See http://www.lessig.org/blog/.
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the audience into the speaker.”504
The Internet enables people to meet who otherwise would
not likely have crossed paths, both by means of “chat rooms” as
well as by directing users to in-person, community meetings
with likeminded people.505 It also has allowed socio-politically
oppressed and isolated minorities to find one another and build
mutually supportive communities through online fora.506
The Internet’s effect on the American political process has
been transformative, and promises to further revolutionize the
way citizens, political candidates and elected officials engage in
policy debates and conduct electoral politics. Joe Trippi,
campaign director for former Vermont Governor Howard
Dean’s campaign for the 2004 Democratic nomination, calls the
Internet “the last hope for democracy”507 and credits it with
enabling the Dean campaign to amass 600,000 supporters and
a $60 million campaign fund with little by way of traditional
television and radio advertising.508 Trippi posits that the
Internet “reversed some of the more insidious aspects of
television” by “making people talk to each other again.”509 Gen.
Wesley Clark, another candidate for the 2004 Democratic
504. Quoted in TRIPPI, supra note 328, at 144. “A well-structured blog
inspires both reading and writing. And by getting the audience to type,
candidates get the audience committed. Engagement replaces reception,
which in turn leads to real space action.” Id.
505. See, e.g., www.meetup.com (allows users to organize and attend
affinity meetings in their communities).
506. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free
Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 162 (2003)
(documenting how the Internet serves as an important tool for gay men and
lesbians for political and community organizing, socializing, and for isolated
individuals living in hostile surroundings, the creation of “a virtual community
that constitutes an emotional lifeline”); see also Gallaudet University, Deaf
Internet Resources, (listing extensive Deaf community online resources,
including discussion groups, advocacy organizations, and assistive resources)
available at http://pr.gallaudet.edu/dir/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
507. TRIPPI, supra note 328, at 4.
508. Id. at xvii-xix. Trippi characterizes the Dean campaign as, “the
opening salvo in a revolution, the sound of hundreds of thousands of
Americans turning off their televisions and embracing the only form of
technology that has allowed them to be involved again, to gain control of a
process that alienated them decades ago.” Id.
509. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original). David Winston, one of the creators of
the successful conservative “townhall.com” website, sponsored by the Heritage
Foundation, writes that “[w]ith the advent of the Internet, digital technology
changed fundamentally from computing to communications.” David Winston,
Digital Democracy and the New Age of Reason, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW
MEDIA, supra note 485, at 135.
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nomination, announced his candidacy only after being “drafted”
by a web-based “Draft Clark” campaign.510 The candidate that
defeated both Clark and Dean to become the Democratic
nominee for president, Senator John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), used
the Internet to disseminate detailed issue papers, organize
volunteers, disseminate campaign propaganda, including
campaign video and advertisements, and, most notably, raise
$57 million online before his July 29, 2004, deadline for raising
private contributions.511
State and local electoral campaigns, which tend to get
scant coverage on commercial television stations, also have
turned to the Internet to disseminate campaign messages and
attract and interact with donors and voters. For example, after
purchasing the least paid television and radio advertising of
any of his opponents, Jesse Ventura surprised the nation by
winning the 1999 Minnesota gubernatorial race, a victory
credited to his campaign’s strategic use of the Internet and
enlistment of “netizens” to fundraise and solicit votes on the
web.512
As noted earlier, Matt Drudge’s website broke the ClintonLewinsky story. In reaction to the ensuing political firestorm
and the Congressional impeachment proceedings against thenPresident Clinton, two concerned citizens launched a web site,
www.MoveOn.org,513 which organized a grassroots effort to
510. Id.
511. Paula Dwyer, The Amazing Money Machine, BUSINESSWEEK, August
2, 2004, Kerry’s campaign raised $5.2 million through its website
(www.johnkerry.com) on July 30, 2004 alone. Glen Johnson, Money Belt
Tightens on Kerry, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2004, A17. available at
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/conventions/articles/2004/07/30/money_be
lt_tightens_on_kerry_1091167467.
512. See Henry Jenkins & David Thorburn, The Digital Revolution, the
Informed Citizen, and the Culture of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW
MEDIA, supra note 485, at 3. Jenkins and Thorburn also point to the “Nader
Traders” web-based program in the 2000 presidential election, where voters in
predominantly democratic states like New York and Massachusetts were able
to “swap votes” with Nader supporters in states, like Florida, where thencandidate George W. Bush either was in the lead or in a competitive race with
Vice President Al Gore. A total of 15,000 vote swaps were effectuated, with
1,400 Nader supporters in Florida voting for Gore pursuant to a “swap.” Id. at
4. The vote-swapping plan elicited controversy, with some critics calling it the
“Napsterization” of the American political system. Id.
513. See
MoveOn.org,
What
is
MoveOn
all
About?,
at
http://www.moveon.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
MoveOn.org
describes itself as “a catalyst for a new kind of grassroots involvement,
supporting busy but concerned citizens in finding their political voice.” Its
identity statement includes the following:
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oppose the impeachment proceedings and pressure Congress to
“move on” to more important business.514 Within weeks of its
launch, the site had 450,000 registered users.515 After the
House of Representatives voted to impeach, the MoveOn.org
organizers solicited contributions of money and volunteer hours
to for candidates in 2000 running against those members of
Congress who voted in favor of impeachment. The site raised
$13,000,000 and 700,000 volunteer hours in short order.516 The
political establishment not only took notice. It has been
emulating MoveOn.org’s success, with many political
candidates and special interest groups militating grassroots
activists and raising significant sums of money from their
highly interactive websites.517
Internet political discussion boards and blogs also are
credited for drawing attention to stories initially ignored by the
broadcast media. It was the Internet that publicized the
questionable remarks of then-Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott (R-Miss.) at a birthday party for Republican Senator
While lauding Senator
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.).518
Thurmond’s career, Lott lamented that the nation would have
been better off if his segregationist presidential campaign had
prevailed in 1948.519 The mainstream media ignored the story
for days until the Internet protests grew so heated that
television network news programs and major newspapers
finally led with the story, leading to Lott’s resignation from the
position.520 The Internet also has transcended the dysfunction
With a system that today revolves around big money and big media,
most citizens are left out.
When it becomes clear that our
“representatives” don’t represent the public, the foundations of
democracy are in peril….Our nationwide network of more than
2,000,000 online activists is one of the most effective and responsive
outlets for democratic participation available today.
Id.; see also Gary Wolf, Weapons of Mass Mobilization, WIRED , Sept. 2004, at
131 (detailing the political mobilizing and fundraising power of MoveOn.org).
514. See Roger Hurwitz, Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The
Ironies of Democracy in Cyberspace, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA, supra
note 485, at 109.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. See Samantha M. Shapiro, The Dean Machine Marches On, WIRED ,
Sept. 2004, at 139.
518. See, e.g., Marlon Manuel, Boston E-Party, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July
25, 2004, at 1E; Aman Batheja, Web Journals Gaining Readers and Influence,
FORT-WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 27, 2004.
519. Id.
520. See Conventioneering.com, NEW YORK TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A22.

VARONA_A1

104

12/29/2004 1:45:38 PM

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 6:1

of a mainstream media that will not shed light on its own
questionable dealings with Congress and the FCC. It was also
MoveOn.org’s Internet activism that generated most of the
750,000 complaints to Congress opposing the FCC’s June 2003
decision to allow for more consolidation of the television
industry.521 MoveOn.org generated a petition with 170,000
“virtual” signatures urging the FCC to reverse its decision.522
In addition to engaging in political activism and
community affairs, those with Internet access in their homes
can use the web to send e-mail, pursue an education,523 peruse
employment ads and apply for work, control financial affairs by
means of online banking and investment sites, shop, and
521. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan to Alter Media Rules Spurs Growing
Debate, WASH. POST, May 28, 2003, at A1; David D. Kirkpatrick, Media
Deregulation Foes Make Murdoch Their Lightning Rod, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2003, at C6.
522. See Ahrens, supra note 521.
523. Educators have touted “Internet literacy” as an important educational
tool, and one that must be incorporated into modern curricula. See Jessica L.
Malman, Connecting Students to ‘The Net:’ Guiding Principles from State
Constitutions, 7 GEO. J. POVER’ LAW & POL’Y 53, 57-59 (2000). But cf.
ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, FOOLS GOLD: A CRITICAL LOOK AT COMPUTERS IN
CHILDHOOD (Colleen Cordes & Edward Miller eds., 2001) (challenging the
notion that computers are good for children by citing excessive computer
dependence as the cause of children’s musculoskeletal and vision problems;
obesity; emotional, social and creative underdevelopment; and plagiarism),
available
at
http://www.allianceforchildhood.net/projects/computers/computers_reports_foo
ls_gold_contents.htm.
Politicians also have recognized the value of the
Internet in education and to children (and to themselves). President Bill
Clinton touted the importance of connecting elementary and high schools to
the Internet in his 1997 State of the Union Address, saying:
[W]e must bring the power of the information age into all our schools.
[I challenge] America to connect every classroom and library to the
Internet by the year 2000, so that, for the first time in our history,
children in the most isolated rural towns, the most comfortable
suburbs, the poorest inner-city schools, will have the same access to
the same universe of knowledge.
President’s Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 136, 139 (Feb. 4, 1997). President Clinton
also touted the Internet as an equalizer, “bringing down barriers of race and
gender, of income and age.” Commencement Address at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 34 WKLY. COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1050 (June 5, 1998), reprinted in President Clinton, Digital Divide,
Remarks by the President at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1998
TECH
L.
J.
(June
5,
1998),
available
at
Commencement,
http://www.techlawjournal.com/agencies/slc/80605clin.htm.
Clinton stated that “until every student has the skills to tap the enormous
resources of the Internet, . . . America will miss the full promise of the
Information Age.” Id.
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perform research on any topic. More importantly, the Internet
has become a national resource for political engagement and
debate, and access to all levels of government.
Despite its impressive track record in bolstering
democratic activities, by no means is the Internet a panacea for
all that ails American democracy. To the contrary, the
migration of so much of American civic, cultural and
commercial life to the Internet has ushered in a new set of
concerns. Professor Cass Sunstein warns that although the
Internet offers the interactivity and virtually limitless choice of
content that that television lacks, its ability to narrowcast very
specialized content risks fragmenting and polarizing our
society.524 Sunstein observes that the Internet enables users to
create a virtual “Neighborhood Me,” in which all of the
information and people they are exposed to are filtered to
ensure a commonality of viewpoint and experience.525 A
deliberative democracy functions best, however, when and
where citizens are exposed to people different from themselves,
in terms of ideas, experiences, backgrounds and outlooks. He
observes that, “[u]nplanned, unanticipated encounters are
central to democracy itself.”526 These surprise, sometimes
unwanted encounters with previously unknown and different
people and opinions often broaden people’s perspectives and
change minds.527 The danger of not having Internet “street
corners” where we encounter and assimilate difference, is that
our society will become so polarized and segmented that
extremist forces, untempered and uninformed by the exposure
to adversarial forces, would flourish.528
Critics also note that the Internet has become just as or
even more commercialized than television, with access to many

524. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 8-9, 71-73 (2001).
525. See id. at 236.
526. See id. at 8. “The role of street corners is one of exposing us to the
unknown . . . confronting different ideas.” Id. at 15. Professor Sunstein’s
warning finds ample support in the counsel of some of the best known
democratic theorists. John Stuart Mill, for example, wrote that:
It is hardly possible to overstate the value, in the present state of
human improvement, of placing human beings in contact with other
persons dissimilar to those with which they are familiar. Such
communication has always been, and is peculiarly in the present age,
one of the primary sources of progress.
John Stuart Mill, 3 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 594 (1848).
527. SUNSTEIN, supra note 524 at 35.
528. Id. at 8.
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websites restricted only to those who pay for subscriptions.529
Professor Lawrence Lessig has written extensively about how
software code – the Internet’s infrastructure – has the power to
restrict access to fora that should be open to all. He warns that
“[t]he world we are entering...is not a world where freedom is
ensured.”530
Moreover, the Internet can be a dangerous place, both for
children as well as vulnerable adults.
Websites abound
depicting pornography and violence, advocating hate against
minorities, and victimizing visitors with fraudulent commercial
schemes.531
Professors Lessig and Sunstein’s and others’ concerns
about the Internet are valid. To be clear, the Internet is not a
panacea for democracy. Much of the Internet already is highly
commercialized, and depending on its evolution, the Internet
possibly could become more isolating and factionalizing, and
more overrun with content that is pornographic or hateinciting. What is also clear, however, is that democracy itself is
not a cure-all for what ails society. To the contrary, our
traditional town squares often were loud, dirty and chaotic
spaces, often dominated by commerce, and at times polluted by
crime, hate-speech and peddlers of pornography and fraud. In
essence, although far from perfect, the Internet’s benefits far
outweigh its dangers.
2. Existing Models for Interindustry Cross-Subsidies
Federal communications regulation has relied on universal
access cross-subsidies, such as the television-to-Internet access
subsidy proposed here, since the inception of the telephone.
Alexander Graham Bell, the telephone’s inventor, himself
expressed the importance of universal service and the notion
529. Douglas Schuler, supra note 486, at 70 (noting an estimated 90
percent of all Internet web pages are for financial gain). “The future
infrastructure will likely focus on entertainment and that which brings in the
most revenue – sex, violence, special effects – and devote little attention to
services that educate, inspire, or help bring communities together.” Id.; see
also, SUNSTEIN, supra note 524, at 18.
530. Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace (presented at the Taiwan
Net
’98
conference,
in
Taipei,
March,
1998),
available
at
http:www.lessig.org/content/articles/works/laws_cyberspace.pdf.
531. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 361, 364-70 (1996) (documenting constitutional and other legal
challenges involving pornography and violence on the Internet); Julie L. Henn,
Targeting Transnational Internet Content Regulation, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 157
(2003).
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that “a telephone in every house would be considered
indispensable.”532
Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 states that
the purpose of American telecommunications policy is “to make
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States . .
. a rapid, efficient, nationwide and world-wide wire and radio
communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges.”533 Initially, the FCC interpreted the 1934 Act’s
universal service provision as requiring monopolist telephone
companies to offset the additional expense of providing service
to remote, rural and low-income customers by charging higher
rates of corporate and residential customers in dense areas.534
Over time, the FCC permitted telephone companies to
subsidize less-profitable residential service with higher
business rates, and local service with long distance rates.535
Today, telecommunications providers are federally
subsidized by means of a Universal Service Fund (USF) to
provide “Lifeline Assistance” and “Link-Up America” discounts
on initial telephone connections and monthly rates for lowincome households.536 The USF is administered by the quasigovernmental Universal Service Administrative Company
(USAC).
USAC also administers the “E-Rate” program, enacted as
Section 254 of the 1996 Telecom Act.537 One of the most recent
532. ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLUTION
BELL SYSTEM’S HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876-1909, at 12 (1985).
Universal service programs have their origin in the United States Postal
Service (USPS). At the inception of the postal service, Congress opted to forgo
authorizing postal service only to those routes that were self-supporting and
instead funded the construction of post roads connecting the courthouses of all
county seats in the nation. In seeking to serve the entire nation, the USPS
essentially subsidized newer, money-losing routes with revenues from those
that were urban and already well-traveled. See STARR, supra note 34, at 88;
see also RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL
SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE 49 (1995).
533. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
534. Christine M. Mason, Universal Service in the Schools: One Step Too
Far?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 237, 239 (1997) (citing Barry D. Fraser,
Telecommunications Competition Arrives: Is Universal Service Out of Order?,
15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1, 4 (1995)); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 21 n. 125 (1996).
535. Mason, supra note 534, at 239; see also Livia Solange West,
Deregulating Telecommunications: The Conflict Between Competition and
Universal Service, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 165-66 (1996).
536. Mason, supra note 534, at 239-40.
537. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
OF THE
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iterations of a universal service cross-subsidy in American
telecommunications regulation, E-Rate requires “[e]very
telecommunications
carrier
that
provides
interstate
telecommunications services,” (primarily regional and long
distance telephone companies) to subsidize a new universal
service fund intended to provide deeply discounted Internet
access, and other Internet-oriented telecommunications
services, to elementary and high schools and libraries.538 At a
hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee in October
2003, FCC Chairman Michael Powell reported that as a result
of the E-rate program, “[ninety-nine percent of America’s
schools are connected to the Internet.”539
Although it has been broadly perceived to be a success, the
E-Rate program has also had its critics, some arguing that the
placement of computers in a school building has not translated
into an improvement of students’ technological literacy as
compared to access to the Internet at home.540
538. Id. § 254(d), (h). The 1996 Act specifically directs the FCC to empanel
a Federal-State Joint Board (Joint Board) to propose the various mechanisms
necessary to collect and distribute the subsidy. § 254(a)(1). The Joint Board
released a report on November 8, 1996, recommending that eligible schools
and libraries receive discounts on Internet and telephone access, and internal
connections, of between 20 and 90 percent, subject to an annual cap of $2.25
billion. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Recommended Decision,
12 F.C.C. R. 87, at ¶ 440 (1996) (Recommended Decision). The FCC adopted
the Joint Board’s recommendations, with minor modifications, on May 8, 1997.
Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997) (Report
and Order).
539. Michael K. Powell, FCC Chairman, Statement before Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (Oct. 30, 2003),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC24057A1.pdf.
540. Randy Bell, an education professor at the University of Virginia notes:
One of the big myths out there is that students have good access to
computers and high technology. That’s not really true. Most
computers are in labs, not classrooms. So even if a teacher has the
inclination and ability to do creative things with computers, he or he
doesn’t have good access.
Kristen Loschert, Are You Ready? High Tech Teaching, NEA TODAY, Apr. 1,
2003, at 10.
The National Education Association notes that only one-third of teachers
characterize themselves as “well-prepared” or “very well-prepared” to
integrate the Internet and computers into instruction. Id.
The NEA
estimates that the average American elementary school student has little if
any access to computers in his or her classroom, and typically develops
computer literacy at home if his or her home is equipped with a computer and
the Internet. Id. Many of those children with no Internet access at home have
no access to the Internet at all.

VARONA_A1

2004]

12/29/2004 1:45:38 PM

CHANGING CHANNELS

109

3. Options for Structuring a TV-to-Internet Cross-Subsidy
Specific details on how a television-to-Internet crosssubsidy should be configured would require extensive planning
and negotiation among the FCC, television licensees and the
trustees of the cross-subsidy funds, similar to the significant
amount of planning invested in devising the E-Rate program.
One obvious and streamlined option, however, would be to have
the television cross-subsidy administered coextensively with
the existing E-Rate and telephone Lifeline assistance programs
already administered by the USAC. Contributions could be
assessed on a sliding scale, so as to not overburden small
broadcast licensees, and could, for example, take the form of a
three percent to five percent “tax” on each licensee’s annual
advertising revenue.541 The USAC would then transmit the
subsidies to residential Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for
the funding of discounted rates for customers meeting certain
income guidelines (similar to the Lifeline telephone program).
Moreover, should President Bush’s proposal for a greatly
increased government commitment to expand broadband
Internet access to low income and underserved communities be
implemented, a television cross-subsidy could be incorporated
into that program. Cross-subsidy proceeds could also be
directed to programs being instituted now to expand broadband
access to areas of the country that cannot access broadband
Internet because of the need for upgraded infrastructure (i.e.,
high capacity coaxial or fiber optic cabling).
A television-Internet cross-subsidy could also contribute to
recent proposals for an Internet “information commons,” such
as the “Digital Opportunity Investment Trust” proposed by
Lawrence K. Grossman and Newton Minow, which would
“[support] innovative and experimental ideas and techniques to
enhance learning; broaden knowledge; encourage an informed
citizenry and self-government; make available to all Americans
the best of the nation’s arts, humanities, and culture; and teach
the skills and disciplines needed in this information-based
economy.”542
541. This is similar to the public broadcasting cross-subsidy proposed by
Henry Geller. See Henry Geller, supra note 460, at 364-365.
542. NEWTON MINOW & LAWRENCE GROSSMAN, A DIGITAL GIFT TO THE
NATION: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF THE DIGITAL AND INFORMATION AGE 5
(2001); see also The Digital Promise Project, Creating the Digital Opportunity
Investment Trust: A Proposal to Transform Learning and Training for the 21st
Century, Report to Congress, (Oct. 2003), available at www.digitalpromise.org.
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Public funding for expanded Internet access for the poor
and underserved, as well as funding for initiatives such as the
“information commons,” would be especially appropriate under
the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine. The public forum
doctrine provides that the government has an obligation to
make public places available to the citizenry for purposes of
self-expression and deliberation.543 Free speech and democratic
deliberation among citizens from different walks of life and
with diverging and conflicting opinions normally do not take
place in private homes, but in the streets, sidewalks and town
squares connecting those homes.
The effect of the public forum doctrine has been to
subsidize speech in public places by providing the public with
those fora in which speech can flourish.544 Justice Roberts in
Hague v. CIO,545 notes that “[w]herever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.”546
As discussed above, it was this very interest in subsidizing
a public forum for a “marketplace of ideas” that motivated
Congress in 1934 to conceive of the public trustee doctrine in
the first place. Congress provides a constructive subsidy to
broadcasters in not requiring them to pay for the public
spectrum they utilize as their medium in exchange for their
service to the public interest and the democratic needs of the
polity in particular.
As our traditional public fora are supplanted by Internet
facsimiles such as discussion boards, chat rooms, web logs, and
other interactive services, the open availability and fair
regulation of those fora become critical to the preservation of
our First Amendment values.547 A television-to-Internet crosssubsidy, therefore, not only should support expanded access to
543. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 399 (1990) (crediting
Hague with elucidating the public forum doctrine); Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Concept of the Public Forum¸1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12.
544. Balkin, supra note 543, at 402-03.
545. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
546. Id. at 515.
547. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 524. For an excellent treatment on the
application of the public forum doctrine to Internet spaces, see Noah D. Zatz,
Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic
Environment, 12 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 149 (1998).
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broadband service by underserved and low income households,
but it also should help underwrite government efforts to create
“virtual” sidewalks and street corners that are open and free
and not restricted by the corporate content controls and other
restraints identified by Professors Lessig and Sunstein.
4. The Viability of a Television-to-Internet Cross-Subsidy
After decades of attempts to reform the public trustee
doctrine have stalled or failed in the face of its First
Amendment, political and economic complexities, a reasonable
inquiry would be why and how a proposal to require
broadcasters to subsidize Internet access would be viable and
achievable. What makes this proposal viable is that it avoids
or counteracts some of the principal complications and resistors
to reform of the existing public trustee regime.
First, an Internet cross-subsidy avoids the First
Amendment complications that have frustrated repeated
attempts by public interest-minded FCC officials, members of
Congress and public interest organizations to impose tangible
public interest broadcasting requirements on commercial
television licensees. As in the case of other telecommunications
cross-subsidies, such as the 1996 Telecom Act’s E-rate program,
the payment of an Internet access subsidy would not implicate
the broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.
Second, much of the infrastructure for such a cross-subsidy
is already in place within the Universal Service Administrative
Company (USAC), the government agency responsible for
collecting and distributing already existing and successful
telephone and Internet cross-subsidies.
Third, the manifest grassroots organizing power of the
Internet itself may help a television-to-Internet cross-subsidy
overcome the significant political power historically exerted by
the troika of Congress, the FCC, and the broadcast lobby,
against previous reform proposals. Militated by Internetpowered public interest organizations and supportive elected
officials, the same “netizens” who have demonstrated such
political muscle over the last several years may direct enough
attention and political pressure to get this proposal adopted by
Congress.
Fourth, expanding the reach and scope of the Internet is in
the broadcasters’ best interests. Before the transition to the
digital television format, TV stations’ analog signals were
incompatible with the language of the Internet. Now as players
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in the digital media market, television broadcasters, both
individual local stations and national networks, are uniquely
positioned to exploit the reach and flexibility of the Internet.
Many already have established expansive and lucrative
services on the web, offering some of the digitally formatted
content they air on their second DTV channels by means of
The future promises even more increasing
websites.548
convergence between television and other digital media.549 In
much the same way that the quest for high ratings drives
broadcasters’ efforts in maximizing the range of their
transmitter antennae and in gaining signal carriage on area
cable systems, so too do broadcasters seek the most attention to
their Internet websites.
The broadcasters’ commercial
interests in expanding the universe of potential “eyeballs” over
the airwaves should translate readily into cyberspace.
Finally, as commercial broadcasters continue to exploit
their new digital spectrum as well as lucrative opportunities on
the Internet, the disparity between the permissive regulatory
regime
overseeing broadcasters,
which constructively
subsidizes broadcasters in exchange for their public trusteeship
of the nation’s airwaves, and the restrictive regulation imposed
upon other digital telecommunications regulatees, will become
increasingly stark and untenable. The DTV transition, in fact,
privileged broadcasters with a significant advantage over their
new competitors in the digital industry. In 1993, Congress
instructed the FCC to auction nonbroadcast initial licenses for
a variety of services, including paging, cellular, PCS and direct
broadcast satellite.550 Auctions for these services began in July
1994 and by 1996 had generated $20 billion in revenue for the
548. Innovative products now in development to exploit the new merged
TV/PC/Internet environment include interactive advertising, gaming, movies
on demand, and information on demand (for example, the ability to browse
player statistics while watching a sporting event). Andrew F. Hamm, Next
Virtual Game Center: Your TV Set, SAN JOSE BUS. J., Jan. 6, 2004, available at
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3890273/.
Television executives are especially
interested in the ability to exploit interactivity in advertising, providing
consumers with additional information, including an immediate purchase
option, during commercial breaks. One executive called interactivity “the holy
grail of advertising.” Id. (quoting John Roberts, vice president of interactive
TV for the Game Show Network).
549. Ira Magaziner predicts: “The Internet will be on television. Broadcast
television will be on personal computers. Telephone calls will be able to be
made from both of them.” Ira Magaziner, Democracy and Cyberspace: First
Principles, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA, supra note 485, at 113, 118.
550. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000).
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U.S. Treasury.551 The licensees for new PCS services alone
paid in excess of $12 billion for their licenses, 552 which remain
subject to certain public interest and renewal requirements.553
Digital broadcasters will compete with these new licensees in
an increasing array of fora without facing the burden of the
high debt loads taken on by the non-broadcast licensees when
they acquired their spectrum licenses.554 This disparity in
treatment raises troubling regulatory consistency issues and
may constitute a violation of constitutional equal protection
guarantees.555
551. FCC Press Release, FCC Hits $20 Billion Mark in Total Auction
Revenues,
(Apr.
5,
1996),
at
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/1996/nrwl6015.txt.
552. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum
Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529,
536 (1998).
553. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)-(5) (2000) (requiring FCC to promulgate
technical, construction and renewal requirements for auctioned licenses,
consistent with “public interest, convenience and necessity”).
554. In addition to empowering the FCC to license nonbroadcast spectrum,
existing digital broadcasters will eventually compete with newly licensed
analog broadcasters. In its Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress authorized
the Commission to auction licenses for new commercial analog television and
commercial radio stations. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33,
111 Stat. 251 (Aug. 5, 1997) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)). The FCC initiated
a rulemaking proceeding and implemented a new broadcast license auctioning
mechanism in late 1998, and has begun auctioning new broadcast licenses.
See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act –
Competitive Bidding for Commercial Broadcast and Instructional Television
Fixed Service Licenses; Reexamination of the Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings; Proposals to Reform the Commission’s
Comparative Hearing Process to Expedite Resolution of Cases, 13 F.C.C.R.
15,920, ¶ 3 (1998) (First Report and Order) [hereinafter Broadcast Auction
Order]; 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(B) (2000) (exempting “initial licenses or
construction permits for digital television service given to existing terrestrial
broadcast licensees to replace their analog television service licenses”).
Television broadcasters already licensed in 1997 and converting to digital
transmission were exempted from the spectrum auctions and will continue to
use their spectrum for free. § 309(j)(2)(B).
555. U.S. Const. amend. V. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits any state from denying “to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The
Fifth Amendment does not contain a similar equal protection clause, but the
Supreme Court held in 1954 that such a clause could be inferred. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The Supreme Court has said that the equal
protection guarantee requires federal and state governments and their
delegates to treat similarly situated persons and corporate entities similarly.
Compare with FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993);
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (interpreting the
equal protection clause as requiring that “all persons similarly situated should
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CONCLUSION
Few observers other than the broadcasters themselves
disagree with the conclusion that after seven decades of
existence, the public trusteeship model in television regulation
has failed to achieve its intended purpose of enhancing our
democracy with expansive public interest programming and a
“free marketplace of ideas” on the public’s airwaves. Congress
viewed its free provision of radio frequency spectrum to
broadcasters in a manner reminiscent of its 1862 allocation of
federal lands to higher education institutions – the so-called
“land grant” colleges.556 Those public lands were designated for
use in the public’s interest, specifically the education of an
informed citizenry, and they indeed have been utilized in
satisfaction of that intent. By contrast, television licensees
have exploited the public spectrum entrusted to them not for
the primary benefit of their viewing public, but for the interests
of their advertisers and shareholders. In reality, television
broadcasters are much more analogous to mining companies
that exploit federal lands for great private profit.
The
difference, however, is that the miners pay significant rents to
the United States Treasury for the privilege of mining public
resources, whereas television broadcasters, cloaked in the
mythology of public trustees, do not.557
The result of this fundamental dysfunction of the broadcast
public trustee doctrine has been the continued shortchanging of
the American public and the unfair subsidization of television
licensees who now compete in a digital environment against
other FCC licensees who paid significant sums of money for
their spectrum licenses. Although public interest advocates
and the public itself have proposed a variety of reforms
be treated alike.”).
556. See Morrill Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, § 1, 12 Stat. 503 (introduced
by Justin Smith Morrill of Vermont). The 1862 “Morrill Act” granted federal
land to each state, resulting in the creation of such prominent institutions as
Rutgers University, Pennsylvania State University, and the Universities of
Vermont, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Id.
557. Professor Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., put it this way:
Giving commercial broadcasters licenses to use the public’s airwaves
with the admonition that they must use the resource in the public
interest is not much different from handing the national forests over
to Georgia Pacific, Weyerhauser, and other paper companies and
telling them to use the forests in the public interest.
Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2109 (1997)
(reviewing MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 2).
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involving new public interest programming requirements,
Congress and the FCC have failed to implement those reforms
for the reasons detailed above. At its essence, Congress’s
construction of the public trustee doctrine is premised on
irreconcilable contradictions that doomed it from the start.
First, Congress depends on the FCC to elucidate and
enforce the public trustee doctrine, but then prohibits the FCC
from censoring broadcast speech or otherwise “interfer[ing]
with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.”558 Although the Supreme Court in Red Lion
and its progeny has interpreted the public trustee doctrine as
limiting the free speech rights of broadcasters, the FCC has
opted against “walking the tightrope” between permissible and
impermissible content regulation to elucidate and enforce
public interest programming requirements.
Second, there is little doubt, given the evidence presented
above, that the agency’s reticence to apply stricter public
interest requirements is exacerbated by the unique political
influence of the broadcasters themselves. With Members of
Congress beholden to broadcasters for positive coverage
immediately before and between elections, it is not surprising
that the broadcast lobby has become one of the most obvious
“textbook” examples of an industry “capturing” its regulators,
and in this case, the Congress itself. That the American public
has not become more aware of the collusion between the
broadcast industry and lawmakers itself is evidence of
broadcasters’ power to set the national agenda and direct focus
away from their own dealings.
Third, Congress erred in expecting commercial
broadcasters both to operate as public trustees in serving local
public interest viewing needs and to run competitive
commercial enterprises that optimize revenue for owners and
shareholders. Time has taught that broadcasters cannot serve
the two gods of public interest programming and the
maximization of advertising revenue.
Fourth, the expectation that television would serve as a
“free marketplace of ideas” proved to be illusory. By definition,
television offers a narrow and finite point of focus to a broad
audience that cannot interact with it or with one another.
These contradictions not only conspired to doom the public
trustee doctrine from its inception, but they also have
558. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000).
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frustrated attempts to incorporate reforms in the broadcast
regulatory regime. For example, demands for quantified and
strict public interest programming requirements have failed
consistently in the face of the broadcasters’ appeals to the First
Amendment, reinforced by their political influence. Similarly,
appeals to broadcasters themselves to voluntarily assume more
public interest obligations also have failed, in light of the
commercial pressures they face to air programming that
attracts the biggest viewership and, consequently, the highest
advertising revenue.
The proposal to require commercial television broadcasters
to subsidize broadband Internet access in underserved and
underprivileged communities may be the most viable and
effective option for reform because it circumvents many of the
obstacles that have blocked past reform efforts. For example, it
does not implicate the broadcasters’ free speech rights. It may
militate the Internet’s own grassroots political influence to
counterbalance the broadcasters’ lobbying muscle.
It is
consistent with the public trustee doctrine’s purpose to have
broadcast licensees promote a “free marketplace of ideas.” And
it is consistent with the broadcasters’ own interests,
considering that the DTV transition has made them digital
players themselves with significant and burgeoning presences
on the web. Maximizing access to and participation in the
Internet “marketplace” may – at long last – satisfy both the
broadcasters’ commercial interests as well as the interests of
the American viewing public.

